Sense, Reference, and Philosophy

Contents......Page 17
Introduction......Page 21
1.1. Two definitions of sense......Page 30
1.2. Problems with the Fregean definition of sense......Page 38
1.3. The autonomous theory of sense......Page 50
2.1. Introduction......Page 57
2.2. Analyticity: logical and mereological......Page 58
2.3. The mediation thesis......Page 65
2.4. A conception of the theory of type-reference......Page 70
3.1. The benefits of thinness......Page 88
3.2. Indirect reference does not make sense......Page 95
3.3. Thinness of senses as the source of fine-grainedness......Page 97
3.4. The paradox of analysis......Page 101
3.5. Frege’s context principle and the linguistic turn......Page 106
3.6. Propositions and the Epimenidean dilemma......Page 111
3.7. A speculation about the essence of natural language......Page 120
3.8. Presupposition......Page 125
3.9. The aboutness and confirmation dilemmas......Page 134
3.10. Names......Page 138
3.11. The natural kind term dilemma and the epistemology of semantics......Page 146
3.12. Fregean sense in the philosophy of mathematics......Page 155
3.13. The irony of indeterminacy......Page 160
3.14. Wittgenstein’s family resemblance criticism......Page 164
3.15. Vagueness......Page 166
3.16. The dilemma about color incompatibility......Page 169
3.17. Analyticity, epistemology, and skepticism......Page 183
3.18. Existence......Page 186
3.19. The paradox of non-being......Page 194
3.20. Regimentation revisited......Page 197
3.21. The dilemma of the logical and the extralogical......Page 203
3.22. What was the problem with linguistic philosophy?......Page 205
3.23. A balance sheet......Page 215
Notes......Page 223
Bibliography......Page 231
K......Page 238
W......Page 239
D......Page 240
M......Page 241
W......Page 242