Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness

Cover......Page 1
Title page......Page 4
Contents......Page 6
1 Introduction [Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford]......Page 8
1 The Case for the Self-Representational Theory......Page 9
2 Challenges to the Self-Representational Theory......Page 10
3 Synopsis of the Book......Page 12
Notes......Page 14
I - In Favor of the Self-Representational Approach to Consciousness......Page 16
I Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness......Page 18
II The Teleopragmatic View of Mind......Page 24
III Implicit Self-Understanding and the Refl exive Loop......Page 28
IV The HOGS Model......Page 30
V What’s Higher Order about HOGS?......Page 33
VI HOGS and the Objections to HOT and HOP......Page 42
Notes......Page 46
3 Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness [Terry Horgan, John Tienson, and George Graham]......Page 48
1 Internal-World Skepticism and Its Non-Grippingness......Page 49
2 “Access Consciousness”?......Page 51
3 Ontological Constituency?......Page 53
4 Ontological Constituency Plus Long-Armed Functional Role?......Page 57
5 Phenomenal States as Self-Presenting Modes of Presentation......Page 61
6 Cognitive Phenomenology and the Scope of Direct COMS Beliefs......Page 64
Notes......Page 65
4 Emotion and Self-Consciousness [Kathleen Wider]......Page 70
1 Mapping the Conceptual Terrain......Page 71
2 The Affective Quality of Consciousness......Page 73
3 Self-Consciousness and Emotion......Page 79
4 Objections and Replies......Page 85
Notes......Page 90
1 Kant’s Overall Project......Page 96
2 Representational Base of Consciousness......Page 102
3 Putting the Self-Presenting Global Representation to Work......Page 109
Notes......Page 115
I Introduction......Page 118
II The Regress Arguments......Page 120
III A Sketch of a Model......Page 134
IV Some Considerations......Page 140
V Conclusion......Page 141
Notes......Page 142
1 Introduction......Page 150
2 The Same-Order Monitoring Theory......Page 151
3 Comparing the Plausibility of SOMT’s Different Versions......Page 155
4 The Problem of Immediacy......Page 160
5 The Problem(s) of Relationality......Page 165
6 Conclusion......Page 168
Notes......Page 169
II - Against the Self-Representational Approach to Consciousness......Page 178
8 Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation [Joseph Levine]......Page 180
Notes......Page 204
I......Page 206
II......Page 208
III......Page 212
IV......Page 220
Notes......Page 226
1 Introduction: Three Views of State Consciousness......Page 228
2 The Wide Intrinsicality View versus Extrinsic HOT Theory......Page 229
3 Against Pure Self-Referentialism......Page 233
4 Objections and Replies......Page 243
Notes......Page 250
I......Page 256
II......Page 259
III......Page 261
IV......Page 265
V......Page 269
VI......Page 273
VII......Page 277
Notes......Page 278
1 Consciousness and Prerefl ective Self-Consciousness......Page 280
2 Intentionality, Temporality, Refl ection, and Embodiment......Page 288
Notes......Page 300
III - Connections: Cognition, Attention, and Knowledge......Page 304
1 The Demands on Theories of Conscious Experience......Page 306
2 The Demands on Theories of Conscious Thought......Page 309
3 How Is Conscious Thinking Possible?......Page 312
4 Is Conscious Thinking Actual?......Page 313
5 An Alternative Model of the Higher-Order Thought Faculty......Page 317
6 Does Inner Speech Make Thinking Conscious?......Page 318
7 Conclusion......Page 324
Notes......Page 325
1 Introduction......Page 328
2 Paradigm Cases of Conscious Belief and Conscious Desire......Page 329
3 The SO Approach to Conscious Belief and Desire......Page 339
4 Immediate Awareness: Form and Content......Page 342
5 Immediate Awareness: Mechanism......Page 346
6 Objections and Replies......Page 349
Notes......Page 352
1 Consciousness and Self in the Structure of Attention......Page 360
2 The Structure of Inner Awareness of Conscious Experience......Page 362
3 The Structure of Attention in Conscious Experience......Page 365
4 A Triangular Circuit Model of Attention......Page 367
5 Divided Attention......Page 372
6 Deficits and Normal Images of Self......Page 373
7 Inner Awareness and Peripheral Awareness of Self......Page 378
Notes......Page 382
1 Introduction......Page 386
2 Identifying with Indexicals......Page 389
3 Contrasting Interpretive and Executive Identifi cation......Page 391
4 Indexical Execution as Perspectival......Page 395
5 First-Person Identification......Page 402
6 Indexicality and the Ubiquity of Self-Awareness......Page 407
Notes......Page 409
17 Consciousness, Representation, and Knowledge [Keith Lehrer]......Page 416
IV - Beyond Philosophy: Consciousness and Self-Reference......Page 428
1 Introduction......Page 430
2 Background: Consciousness According to Current Cognitive Neuroscience......Page 431
3 Preliminary Epistemological Considerations......Page 437
4 Rationale for the Hypothesis......Page 444
5 Hypotheses......Page 458
6 Interpretative Frame......Page 464
7 Conclusion......Page 467
Notes......Page 468
19 What Is It Like to Be a Strange Loop? [Douglas R. Hofstadter]......Page 472
References......Page 524
List of Contributors......Page 560
Index......Page 562