Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (SpringerBriefs in Philosophy)

Acknowledgements
Contents
1 Introduction
	1.1 What I do in this Book
	References
2 Phenomenal Conservatism
	2.1 The Basics of Phenomenal Conservatism
	2.2 The Nature of Seemings
	2.3 Supporting Phenomenal Conservatism
	2.4 Criticism of Phenomenal Conservatism
	2.5 Conclusions
	References
3 Cognitive Penetrability
	3.1 Characterizing Cognitive Penetrability
	3.2 The Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetrability
	3.3 The Reliabilist Account
	3.4 The Inferentialist Account
	3.5 Taming Cognitive Penetrability
	3.6 Conclusions
	References
4 The Bayesian Objection
	4.1 White’s Objection
	4.2 Responding to White’s Objection
	4.3 Perceptual Appearances and Reflective Justification
	4.4 Conclusions
	References
5 Antiscepticism and Easy Justification
	5.1 Antiscepticism and Reflective Awareness
	5.2 Easy Justification Objections
	5.3 Answering the Easy Justification from Closure Objection
	5.4 Answering the Easy Justification from Bootstrapping Objection
	5.5 Conclusions
	References
6 Concluding Remarks
	References