Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Contributors
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
PART I: Understanding, Knowledge, and Explanation
	2 Can Scientific Understanding Be Reduced to Knowledge?
	3 Should Friends and Frenemies of Understanding Be Friends? Discussing de Regt
	4 Frenemies or Friends? A Reply to Khalifa
	5 Onwards, My Friend! A Reply to De Regt
	6 Factivism in Historical Perspective: Understanding the Gravitational Deflection of Light
	7 Ideal Patterns and Non-Factive Understanding
	8 Topological Explanations: An Opinionated Appraisal
	9 Explanatory Power: Factive vs. Pragmatic Dimension
PART II: Understanding and Scientific Realism
	10 Understanding the Success of Science
	11 Truth and Reality: How to Be a Scientific Realist Without Believing Scientific Theories Should Be True
	12 Defensible Scientific Realism: A Reply to Potochnik
	13 Different Ways to Be a Realist: A Reply to Pincock
	14 Realism about Molecular Structures
	15 Anti-Fundamentalist Lessons for Scientific Representation from Scientific Metaphysics
PART III: Understanding, Representation, and Inference
	16 Factivity, Pluralism, and the Inferential Account of Scientific Understanding
	17 Scientific Representation and Understanding: A Communal and Dynamical View
	18 Representation and Understanding Are Constitutively Communal but Not Constitutively Historical: A Reply to Rice
	19 Which Modal Information and Abilities Are Required for Inferential Understanding? A Reply to Kuorikoski
	20 Maps, Models, and Representation
	21 DEKI, Denotation, and the Fortuitous Misuse of Maps
	22 DEKI and the Mislocation of Justification: A Reply to Millson and Risjord
	23 DEKI and the Justification of Surrogative Inference: A Reply to Nguyen and Frigg
	24 How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem
	25 Understanding from Deep Learning Models in Context
	26 Link Uncertainty, Implementation, and ML Opacity: A Reply to Tamir and Shech
	27 Expecting Too Much from Our Machine Learning Models: A Reply to Sullivan
PART IV: Understanding and Scientific Progress
	28 Understanding the Progress of Science
	29 Scientific Progress without Justification
	30 The Significance of Justification for Progress: A Reply to Dellsén
	31 Scientific Progress without Problems: A Reply to McCoy
Index