Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth

Book Cover......Page 1
Half-Title......Page 2
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
Illustrations......Page 12
Preface......Page 13
Introduction......Page 16
1 Empiricism and theoretical discourse......Page 26
Failures of verificationism......Page 27
Liberalisation......Page 30
Indispensability arguments......Page 33
Semantic realism......Page 34
Hempel’s half-way house......Page 37
2 Theories as instruments?......Page 39
Machian themes......Page 40
Whatever happened to the theoretician’s dilemma?......Page 44
Unnatural splits in the language of science......Page 45
Diachronic gains and inductive support......Page 47
Instrumentalism and probability statements......Page 48
Duhem I: anti-explanationist instrumentalism......Page 50
The theoretician’s practice......Page 55
Novel predictions......Page 56
Searching for unity......Page 57
Duhem III: between realism and instrumentalism......Page 58
The two-language model......Page 62
Metaphysical versus empirical realism......Page 63
Early structuralism......Page 69
Carnap meets Ramsey......Page 70
Structuralism existentialised......Page 73
Neutralism......Page 80
Empiricism and realism-without-the-tears?......Page 83
Triviality......Page 85
Incoherence......Page 87
Resolution......Page 89
4 In defence of scientific realism......Page 92
Cosmic coincidences and the success of science......Page 94
The explanationist defence of realism......Page 99
EDR and circularity......Page 103
Are there better explanations of the success of science?......Page 111
Could we not just deflate our quest for explanation?......Page 115
Can Darwin help?......Page 117
5 Resisting the pessimistic induction......Page 120
Laudan’s reductio......Page 121
Success too-easy-to-get......Page 123
The divide et impera move......Page 127
Heat as an imponderable fluid or heat as motion?......Page 134
Laplace’s prediction of the speed of sound in air......Page 138
Carnot and caloric......Page 140
Localising relations of evidential support......Page 144
From the caloric theory to thermodynamics......Page 146
Abstract dynamics versus concrete models......Page 149
Green: modelling the unknown ether......Page 151
McCullagh’s rotational ether......Page 153
Stokes and the elastic jelly......Page 154
Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field......Page 156
Theories and models: the analogical approach......Page 159
Models, heuristics and realism......Page 162
7 Worrall’s structural realism......Page 164
Structural versus scientific realism......Page 165
Poincaréan preludes......Page 167
Structural realism and the pessimistic induction......Page 169
Structure versus nature?......Page 173
The case of light......Page 174
Maxwellian insights......Page 177
8 Underdetermination undermined......Page 180
The structure of UTE......Page 182
Evidence and entailment......Page 186
The role of theoretical virtues......Page 189
Normative naturalism without truth?......Page 193
9 Constructive empiricism scrutinised......Page 202
Against naive agnostic empiricism......Page 203
Oz and Id: the tale of two worlds......Page 208
The vagaries of observability......Page 210
Commitment as potential belief......Page 217
Belief in truth is better......Page 221
On van Fraassen’s critique of abductive reasoning......Page 227
Abduction and commonsense reasoning......Page 229
The argument from a bad lot......Page 232
The argument from indifference......Page 239
New epistemology?......Page 242
10 NOA, cognitive perfection and entity realism......Page 244
Fine’s deflationism......Page 245
Theories of truth......Page 247
The ‘core position’ and positivist anti-realism......Page 251
What is the ‘core position’ about?......Page 253
The positive attitude......Page 256
Reciprocity and contamination......Page 261
Success and truth......Page 262
Need we do epistemology of science?......Page 264
Mor(e) of NOA......Page 267
The ‘state of cognitive perfection’......Page 269
Entity realism?......Page 271
Popper on verisimilitude......Page 276
The ‘possible worlds’ approach......Page 279
The ‘type-hierarchies’ approach......Page 284
Giere on truth-likeness......Page 287
An ‘intuitive’ approach......Page 290
12 Reference of theoretical terms......Page 294
Causal theories......Page 295
Problems with natural-kind terms......Page 298
Yet more problems with theoretical terms......Page 303
Causal descriptivism and theory change......Page 305
Hardin and Rosenberg versus Laudan......Page 306
End of drama: how theoretical terms get their reference......Page 307
Notes......Page 314
Bibliography......Page 331
Index......Page 346