Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 9
Contributors......Page 11
Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics......Page 13
why study courts in authoritarian regimes?......Page 14
Social Control......Page 16
Legitimation......Page 17
Controlling Administrative Agents and Maintaining Elite Cohesion......Page 19
Credible Commitments in the Economic Sphere......Page 20
The Delegation of Controversial Reforms to Judicial Institutions......Page 21
Complementarities among the Functions......Page 22
time horizons and the double-edged sword......Page 23
Judicial Self-Restraint......Page 26
Fragmented versus Unified Judicial Systems......Page 29
Constraining Access to Justice......Page 30
Incapacitating Judicial Support Networks......Page 32
conclusion......Page 33
introduction......Page 35
security courts in brazil and the southern cone......Page 36
patterns of military-judicial collaboration......Page 40
Pushing the Envelope in Brazil’s Security Courts......Page 44
extending the analytical framework......Page 49
Nazi Germany......Page 51
Franco’s Spain......Page 54
Salazar’s Portugal......Page 57
the united states after 9/11: authoritarian courts in a democracy?......Page 59
conclusion......Page 66
appendix......Page 69
2 Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes......Page 70
Internalization and Ideology......Page 72
Hierarchy and Second-Party Supervision......Page 73
Judicial Control and Third-Party Supervision......Page 75
why administrative law? comparative institutional choice......Page 77
an illustration: the case of china and the shift from hierarchy to administrative law......Page 79
conclusion......Page 83
3 Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules Matter......Page 85
unpacking the rule of law......Page 87
singapore and the rule of law......Page 88
Puzzle 1 … De-Linking Globalization and Judicialization......Page 90
Puzzle 2 … De-Linking Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law......Page 95
Puzzle 3 … Law, Courts, and the Shape of International Opinion......Page 98
Puzzle 4 … Law, Courts, and Domestic Political Opposition......Page 104
singapore: a model or an exception?......Page 109
appendix: singapore by the numbers......Page 111
introduction......Page 114
the judicial role in the pinochet regime: context and content......Page 116
Habeas Corpus (Amparo)......Page 117
Review of Military Court Decisions......Page 118
Constitutional Review (Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad)......Page 119
The New Constitutional Review Mechanism: Recurso de Proteccion......Page 121
contrasting performance of the constitutional tribunal......Page 123
Regime-Related Factors......Page 124
The Attitudinal Explanation......Page 127
The Class-Based Explanation......Page 129
The Legal Theory Explanation......Page 130
the institutional argument......Page 132
conclusions and implications......Page 141
5 Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt......Page 144
judicial institutions and economic development......Page 145
judicial institutions and bureaucratic discipline......Page 151
marketing judicial reform at home and abroad......Page 158
mobilizing through the courts......Page 161
the limits of legal mobilization: state security courts and “insulated liberalism”......Page 163
introduction......Page 168
the context of judicial failure: military dictatorship and constitutional exception......Page 171
Military Dictatorship as Constitutional Exception......Page 175
Exception, Dictatorship, and the Courts......Page 176
modalities of repression and the rule of law......Page 179
judicial failure in context......Page 182
preliminary conclusion......Page 189
introduction......Page 192
autocratic rule and the courts......Page 194
citizens’ rights and autocratic abuse......Page 202
enforcing political order......Page 205
The Crumbling of the Autocratic Political Order......Page 209
empowering the supreme court and the 1994 constitutional reform......Page 211
the democratic court......Page 213
alternative theories of judicial empowerment......Page 215
conclusion......Page 217
8 The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data......Page 219
Trust......Page 222
Explaining Institutional Diffusion: Networks......Page 226
Community Experiences and Institutional Diffusion......Page 230
Social Networks......Page 232
Political Institutions and the Acquisition of Legal Knowledge......Page 233
Media Consumption......Page 236
Education......Page 237
Modeling the Propensity to Go to Court......Page 238
Institutional Diffusion......Page 239
Party and Youth League Membership......Page 244
conclusion......Page 245
9 Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies: Uganda and Zimbabwe......Page 247
judicial independence as an equilibrium......Page 248
a tale of two courts......Page 249
Uganda: Persistent Ambiguity......Page 250
Zimbabwe: Unhappy Outcomes......Page 260
External Leverage......Page 266
Factions and Ideas......Page 268
The Court......Page 269
tentative implications......Page 270
theoretical perspectives......Page 273
tsarist russia: courts and autocracy......Page 275
courts in the service of the regime: judicial power in the ussr......Page 279
liberalization, democratization, and the courts......Page 284
russian courts in an age of competitive authoritarianism......Page 287
conclusion......Page 293
11 Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics......Page 295
military-inspired judicial empowerment......Page 297
the turkish political system......Page 299
Judicial Empowerment in Turkey......Page 302
The Judiciary After 1982......Page 305
The Courts in Action......Page 307
courts in the islamic republic of iran......Page 310
conclusion......Page 314
the economic role of the courts according to regime type......Page 316
Dilemma 1: Property Rights and Securing Investment Opportunities for Distribution to Loyalists......Page 319
Dilemma 2: Financial Credibility and Debt Repayment......Page 321
Dilemma 3: Secrecy, Central Authority, and Administrative Discipline......Page 324
linkages between political discipline and commercial law enforcement......Page 326
the law and regime change......Page 328
Dualism and Inclusivity as a Steady-State Equilibrium......Page 329
Revolution or Evolution......Page 331
The Law and Emerging Loyalty to the State......Page 333
conclusion......Page 336
the expansion of judicial studies......Page 338
the rule of law......Page 341
the development and rights story......Page 342
of individuals and institutions......Page 343
convergence......Page 344
the legitimacy paradox......Page 346
courts and regimes......Page 347
References......Page 349
Index......Page 375