Responsibility and Desert

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
	Part I: The View
	Part II: Clarifications and Further Developments
	Part III: Interrogating the Proposal
Part I The View
	2 Directed Blame and Conversation
		2.1 The Challenge of Theorizing about Blame
		2.2 Some Preliminary Considerations Regarding the Nature and Norms of Blame
		2.3 Blame as a Response to Quality of Will
		2.4 The Mode of Response Constitutive of Directed Blame
		2.5 Directed Blaming and Conversation
		2.6 Directed Blaming and the Question of Normative Warrant
		2.7 The Ethics of Blame and a Challenge for Emotion-Based Views
		2.8 Closing Reflections on Methodology
	3 Basically Deserved Blame and Its Value
		3.1 Basic Desert
		3.2 Zeroing in on a Principle of Basic Desert
		3.3 The Difference between Blame and Punishment
		3.4 Fitting the Conversational Theory for a Basic Desert Thesis
		3.5 A Challenge: Are the Goods at Issue Really Suited for Basic Desert?
		3.6 My Reply: Defending the Role of Extrinsic and Noninstrumental Goodness
		3.7 Conclusion
	4 Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering
		4.1 The Relevance of a Modest Theory of Blame and Punishment
		4.2 Blame within the Conversational Theory
		4.3 Adding to the Conversational Theory
		4.4 Introducing a Conversational Theory of Punishment
		4.5 The Modest Retributivism in the Conversational Theory of Punishment
		4.6 Resisting Skepticism about Retribution
Part II Clarifications and Further Developments
	5 The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert
		5.1 Basic Desert and the Traditional Free Will Debate
		5.2 Free Will and Grounding Blameworthiness
		5.3 Clarifying Basic Desert as Applied to Blame
		5.4 Is Basically Deserved Blame Essential to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?
		5.5 Preserving the Free Will Debate in the Absence of Basic Desert
		5.6 Further Reflections on Fairness
		5.7 Conclusion
	6 Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket?
		6.1 Fittingness
		6.2 Feinberg and Strawson on Fittingness and Our Moral Responsibility Responses
		6.3 Desert as a Species of Fittingness: Two Paths Forward for Strawsonians
		6.4 Conclusion
	7 Guilt and Self-Blame
		7.1 Self-Blame and Guilt: My Proposal
		7.2 Appropriateness, Fittingness, and Desert
		7.3 Blame and the Reactive Attitudes
		7.4 The Fittingness and Deservingness of Directed Blame and Moral Anger
		7.5 An Analog to “The Punishment Should Fit the Crime”
		7.6 The Fittingness and Deservingness of Self-Blame and Guilt
		7.7 Assessing Carlsson’s Guilt-Based Theory of Blameworthiness
		7.8 A Final Consideration: How Fitting Guilt Might Come Apart from Desert
Part III Interrogating the Proposal
	8 The Attenuated Role of the Hostile Emotions
		8.1 The Essentialist Thesis and the Hostility Thesis
		8.2 Resisting the Essentialist Thesis
		8.3 Resisting the Hostility Thesis
		8.4 An Ethical Prescription: Blame Should Be Attenuated by Compassion
	9 Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory
		9.1 Strawsonian Theories of Responsibility and the (Dubious?) Demand for Good Will
		9.2 The Conditions for Moral Responsibility
		9.3 Excusing Morally Ignorant Oppressors?
		9.4 The Role of the Conversational Theory and the Demand for Good Will
		9.5 Something Insidious Rooted in Our Responsibility Practices?
		9.6 Conclusion
	10 Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theories
		10.1 Retributivism and Shretributivism
		10.2 Minimal Retributivism
		10.3 From Minimal to Wimpy Retributivism
		10.4 Enter the Moral Influence Theorist
		10.5 Conclusion
	11 Conclusion
		Part I: The View
		Part II: Clarifications and Further Developments
		Part III: Scrutinizing the Proposal
Appendix The Signaling Theory of Blame as a Competitor Proposal
	A.1 The Signaling Theory of Blame
	A.2 Problems for the Signaling Theory
	A.3 Weighing Comparative Advantages and Burdens
Bibliography
Index of Authors
Index of Topics