Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State

Acknowledgements\nTable of Contents\nNotes on the Contributors\n1. Introduction\n	Part A: Theoretical Reflections on Conscientious Exemptions\n	Part B: How Should Courts Adjudicate Conscientious Exemptions?\n	Part C: Comparative Questions in the Law of Conscientious Exemptions\n	Part D: Conclusion\nPart A: Theoretical Reflections on Conscientious Exemptions\n	2. Is Religion Special? Exemptions, Conscience and the Culture Wars\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Religion as Particularly Binding\n		III. Religion as a Distinctive Good Worth Promoting\n		IV. \'Egalitarian\' Views\n		V. Religion as a Site of Discrimination\n		VI. Conclusion\n	3. Conscientious Claims, Ill-Founded Belief and Religious Exemption\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Examples\n		III. Ill-Foundedness and Judicial Agnosticism\n		IV. The Moral Right to Religious Freedom and the Relevance of Well-Foundedness\n		V. Competence and Pragmatism\n		VI. A Group Test of Well-Foundedness? The Case of Indirect Religious Discrimination\n		VII. Conclusion\n	4. Exemptions for Religious Groups and the Problem of Internal Dissent\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Liberal Justifications and the Problem of Internal Dissent\n		III. Internal Decision-Making\n		IV. Implied Consent\n		V. Exit Rights\n		VI. Justifying Deference to Religious Groups\' Procedures\n		VII. Group Autonomy in the Face of Internal Dissent\n		VIII. Internal Dissenters or Liberal Congruence?\nPart B: How Should Courts Adjudicate Conscientious Exemptions?\n	5. Conscience in the Image of Religion\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Freedom of Conscience and Religion\n		III. Religious Accommodation\n		IV. The Scope of Freedom of Conscience\n		V. Conclusion\n	6. The Courts and Conscience Claims\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Responding to Preliminary Objections\n		III. The Dangers of Judicial Conscience-Blindness\n		IV. When Legislation is Silent\n		V. Judicial Supervision\n		VI. Weighing Conscience Claims Against Other Interests\n		VII. Conclusion\n	7. The Difference between Illegitimate Conscience and Misguided\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Conscientious Objection and Illegitimate Values: Equality Laws\n		III. Conscientious Objection and Misguided yet Legitimate Values\n		IV. Conclusion\n	8. Conscientious Objection, \'Proper Medical Treatment\' and Professionalism: the Limits of Accommodation for Conscience in Healthcare\n		I. Introduction\n		II. The Spectrum of \'Proper Medical Treatment\'\n		III. Restricting Conscientious Objection to Liminally Proper Treatment\n		IV. Some Clarifications\n		V. Conclusion\n	9. The Art of Living with Ourselves: What Does the Law Have to do with Conscience?\n		I. Introduction\n		II. What is Freedom of Conscience?\n		III. Evaluating Conscience\n		IV. Conclusion\nPart C: Comparative Questions in the Lawof Conscientious Exemptions\n	10. Conscientious Objections in Employment: is a Duty of Reasonable Accommodation the Answer?\n		I. Conscientious Objection and Indirect Discrimination\n		II. The Reasonable Accommodation Model\n		III. Is a Reasonable Accommodation Model a Better Way to Deal with Conscientious Objection?\n		IV. Conclusion\n	11. Who Should Give Effect to Conscientious Exemptions? The Case for Institutional Synergy\n		I. Introducing the Allocation Problem: Conscientious Objection to Officiating Same-Sex Marriages\n		II. Institutional Synergy as the Lodestar to the Solution to the Allocation Problem\n		III. Tackling the Allocation Problem by Analysing Five Basic Characteristics of Conscientious Exemptions\n		IV. Conclusion\n	12. Can Secular Non-Natural Persons be Said to Have a \'Conscience\'?\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Company X\n		III. Verein \'Kontakt-Information-Therapie\'\n		IV. Kustannus\n		V. Blackburn\n		VI. Hobby Lobby\n		VII. Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises\n		VIII. Ashers Baking\n		IX. So can a Corporation be Said to Have a \'Conscience\'?\n		X. Conclusion\nPart D: Conclusion\n	13. Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State\n		I. Introduction\n		II. The Liberal State Should Grant a General Right to Conscientious Exemption\n		III. The Liberal State Should Refrain from Passing Moral Judgement on the Content of the Beliefs Which Give Rise to a Claim for Conscientious Exemption\n		IV. The Liberal State Should Neither Privilege Nor Disadvantage Religious Beliefs Over Non-Religious Ones When Considering Whether to Grant a Conscientious Exemption\n		V. The Liberal State Should Grant Conscientious Exemptions to Claimants Who are Sincere and if the Exemptions would not Disproportionately Impact the Rights of Others or the Public Interest\n		VI. Balancing the Right to Conscientious Exemption and the Right to Non-Discrimination: Beyond Ongoing Culture Wars\n		VII. Conclusion\nIndex