Reforming the European Union : realizing the impossible

Content: Cover
 Title Page
 Copyright Page
 Dedication Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Figures
 List of Tables
 Acknowledgments
 Introduction
 Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis By George Tsebelis
 1.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit
 1.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications
 1.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede Decision Making?
 1.4 Battles over the \"Default Solution\"
 1.5 Conclusion. Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention By Sven-Oliver Proksch2.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European Convention
 2.2 Data and Method
 2.3 Results: Giscard\'s Central Position within the Conflict Space
 2.4 Conclusion
 Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention By George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch
 3.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments
 3.2 Shaping Amendments
 3.3 The Absence of Voting
 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
 Appendix: 3A
 Appendix: 3B. Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of Nice By Thomas König and Daniel Finke4.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage
 4.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders\' Positions
 4.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders\' Positions
 4.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders
 4.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties
 4.6 Summary
 Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular Votes By Thomas König and Daniel Finke. 5.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums5.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country
 5.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration
 5.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements
 5.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis
 Chapter Six: Principals and Agents: From the Convention\'s Proposal to the Constitutional Treaty By Thomas König and Daniel Finke
 6.1 The Setup for Intergovernmental Bargaining
 6.2 The Reaction to Failure: Delegating the Negotiation Mandate. 6.3 How Drifting Agents Enabled a Disagreeable Compromise6.4 From Compromising Agents to the Defeat by the Vote of the Irish
 Chapter Seven: In the Aftermath of the Negative Referendums: The Irish Resistance By Thomas König and Daniel Finke
 7.1 The Strategy of the German Presidency
 7.2 Moderate but Well-directed Concessions
 7.3 From Treaty Reform to Constitution Building, and Back
 Conclusion
 Appendix: Research Design and Methodology By Thomas König and Sven-Oliver Proksch
 References
 Index.