Recreating the American Republic: Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change, and American Political Development, 1700-1870

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
TABLES......Page 11
FIGURES......Page 13
Preface......Page 15
CONCLUSION......Page 31
1 Introduction......Page 37
CASE SELECTION......Page 39
EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL CHANGE......Page 45
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND RATIONALITY MODELS......Page 50
Description......Page 55
Explanation......Page 56
Initial Condition — (causal mechanism)…......Page 57
Theorization......Page 62
B. Expected Increase in Governmental Authority, Expected Increase in Decision-making Capacity......Page 67
C. Expected Decrease in Decision-making Capacity, Expected Decrease in Governmental Authority......Page 69
D. Expected Decline in Governmental Authority, Expected Decline in Decision-making Capacity......Page 70
ORGANIZATION......Page 71
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE I: 1700–1781......Page 73
2 Raising Leviathan: British-American Relations, 1700–1774......Page 75
PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 76
PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 83
PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 86
The British Constitution......Page 90
The Imperial Constitution......Page 94
The Colonial Constitution......Page 96
Conceptual Change and the British Constitution......Page 101
Conceptual Dissension and the American Conceptualization of Representation......Page 120
American and British Concepts of Representation......Page 130
CONCLUSION......Page 141
3 Our Emperors Have No Clothes: The Macro-Micro Synthesis and the American Revolution......Page 143
PART I: THE MACRO-MICRO SYNTHESIS......Page 145
PART II: DEFINING THE OUTCOME SET......Page 151
Colonial Submission to Parliamentary Authority......Page 152
Colonial Independence......Page 155
The Status Quo......Page 158
Colonial Representation in Parliament......Page 159
Dual Sovereignty......Page 166
PART III: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION......Page 168
CONCLUSION......Page 179
4 Union over Multiplicity: A Bond of Words, a Confederation in Speech, and the Constitutional Rule of Equal State…......Page 182
PART I: THE PROBLEMS OF UNION......Page 187
The Architectonic Issue of Apportionment......Page 189
The Financial Costs and Constitutional Benefits of a Coordinated Resistance......Page 192
Territorial Lines as Constitutional Divisions......Page 194
Framing the Constitutional Debate......Page 195
PART II: DELIBERATIONS TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS......Page 200
The Rule of Apportionment and the Powers of the National Government......Page 201
Securing the Consent of Uncertain Majorities and Certain Minorities......Page 204
The Apportionment Rule Debated......Page 206
The Rule for Dividing Common Expenses Debated......Page 208
Rules for Regulating State Boundaries and the Western Lands Debated......Page 211
PART III: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE CONSENSUAL UNION......Page 214
Evolution of Constitutional Consensus......Page 216
The Calculus of Consent......Page 227
PART IV: RATIFICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION......Page 231
CONCLUSION......Page 233
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE II: 1781–1789......Page 235
5 Contours of the Confederation: Macrolevel Conditions, 1776–1786......Page 237
PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 239
PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 243
PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 246
PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS......Page 248
PART V: IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS – THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION......Page 255
Localism......Page 259
Responsive Elitism......Page 264
Dynamic Institutionalism......Page 266
CONCLUSION......Page 270
6 Divide et Impera: Constitutional Heresthetics and the Abandonment of the Articles of Confederation......Page 272
PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS......Page 273
Profile of An Entrepreneur: James Madison......Page 275
PART II: STRATEGIC ACTORS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE......Page 278
PART III: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF STATE COMMITMENT TO THE 1787 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION......Page 284
CONCLUSION......Page 295
7 The Veil of Representational Certainty: The 1787 Constitutional Convention and the Making of the U.S. Constitution......Page 297
PART I: A CONTEST FOR POWER, NOT FOR LIBERTY......Page 300
The Virginia Plan......Page 301
The Rule of Apportionment......Page 302
House Elections......Page 304
Senate Elections......Page 306
The Rule of Apportionment Revisited......Page 309
PART II: CONSTRUCTING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS......Page 320
The Representation of Enslaved Persons......Page 331
Representation of New Western States......Page 334
PART III: THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT......Page 336
CONCLUSION......Page 342
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE III: 1790–1870......Page 345
8 The Relational Republic: Macrolevel Conditions, 1790–1860......Page 347
PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 350
PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 353
PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 355
PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS......Page 363
PART V: IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS – THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION......Page 376
Representation in the State Legislatures......Page 386
Beyond Localism......Page 387
From Dynamic to Static Institutionalization......Page 412
CONCLUSION......Page 418
9 Between Consent and Coercion: Libido Dominandum and the End of Representation......Page 420
PART I: THE OUTCOME SET......Page 422
Symbolic Reform......Page 425
Status Quo......Page 426
PART II: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECESSION CRISIS......Page 435
PART III: RECONSTRUCTION AND A NEW NATIONAL RULE OF APPORTIONMENT......Page 449
CONCLUSION......Page 454
10 Conclusions......Page 458
Acknowledgments......Page 471
Index......Page 473