Punishment, Compensation, and Law: A Theory of Enforceability

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 11
Introduction......Page 13
1 The Means of Enforcement......Page 29
1.1 Physical Force......Page 31
1.2 Strategic Power......Page 34
1.3 Moral Condemnation and Regret......Page 37
1.4 Social Criticism and Withdrawal of Social Cooperation......Page 41
1.5 Automatic Sanctions......Page 46
1.6 Legal Remedies......Page 52
2.1 The Three Critical Stages of Enforcement......Page 57
2.2 Previolation Enforceability and Social Cooperation......Page 59
2.2.1 Enabling Nonsimultaneous Exchange......Page 61
2.2.2 Encouraging Risk Taking and Reducing Precautions......Page 63
2.2.3 Solving Collective Action Problems......Page 65
2.2.4 Solving Problems of Coordination......Page 74
2.2.5 Prohibiting Socially Pernicious Cooperation......Page 77
2.2.6 Instantiating Distributive Justice......Page 78
2.3 Postviolation Enforceability and  the Facilitation of  Social Conflict......Page 79
2.3.1 Three Retaliatory Strategies......Page 80
2.3.2 Problems with Tit for Tat......Page 83
2.3.3 The Objective of Containment......Page 85
2.4 Acceptance and the Restoration of Social Cooperation......Page 87
3 Measuring Enforceability in the Previolation State of Affairs......Page 88
3.1 Threat of Punishment  and Previolation Enforceability......Page 89
3.1.1 The Mathematics of Deterrence......Page 93
3.1.2 Deterrence and Previolation Enforceability Compared......Page 99
3.1.3 The Concept of Critical Risk......Page 102
3.1.4 Rational Beliefs and Beneficiaries......Page 107
3.2 Promise of Compensation  and Previolation Enforceability......Page 110
3.2.1 Calculating Compensatory Effect......Page 112
3.2.2 Problems with the Indifference Test......Page 114
3.2.3 Indifference and Critical Risk......Page 121
4 Measuring Enforceability in the Postviolation State of Affairs......Page 123
4.1 The Role of Deterrence......Page 124
4.2 Retribution Reconceived......Page 128
4.2.1 The Retributive Point of View......Page 129
4.2.2 The Components of the Retributive Equation......Page 137
4.2.3 Calculating Retributive Equivalence......Page 146
4.3.1 Retribution as a Sufficient Condition......Page 153
4.3.2 Retribution as a Necessary Condition......Page 161
4.3.3 Moral Significance and the Ultimatum Game......Page 162
4.4 Compensation and Postviolation Enforceability......Page 171
4.4.1 The Limits of Compensation......Page 173
4.4.2 Uncompensable Suffering and Punishment......Page 180
4.4.3 The Incentive but Not the Duty to Compensate......Page 182
4.5 Previolation and Postviolation Enforceability Compared......Page 183
5.1 Previolation Expectation and Postviolation Practice......Page 187
5.2 Publicity and Previolation Expectations......Page 193
5.3 Uncertainty and Previolation Expectations......Page 200
6.1 Legal Rights and Legal Remedies......Page 203
6.2 Legal Rights and Lawful Remedies......Page 211
6.3 The Threat or Imposition of Countersanctions......Page 216
6.4 Coda on the Advantages of a Unified Theory......Page 219
7.1 Uncollectability......Page 225
7.2 Insurance and Other Forms of Burden Shifting......Page 227
7.3 Transaction Costs......Page 233
7.4 Nominal Damages......Page 238
7.5 Failures of Proof......Page 239
7.6 Errors in Determination......Page 241
7.7 The Enforcement of Rights in International Law......Page 243
8.1 Sources of Previolation Value......Page 246
8.2 Sources of Postviolation Value......Page 251
8.3 Naked Rights and the Provision of Public Reasons for Action......Page 253
References......Page 255
Index......Page 265