Private Equity, Corporate Governance And The Dynamics Of Capital Market Regulation

Contents......Page 10
Preface......Page 8
Contributors......Page 12
Introduction: The Dynamics of Capital Market Governance Justin O’Brien.......Page 14
I THE AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE......Page 19
II THE CONFLICTING ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS......Page 24
III SETTING REGULATORY PRIORITIES......Page 27
I A CLEAR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK......Page 32
II INFLUENCES ON ASIC’S THINKING......Page 35
(A) Accounting for Regulatory Performance......Page 37
(B) Costs and Benefits of Regulation......Page 38
IV PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN REGULATOR AND THE ACADEMY......Page 39
2. Evolving ‘Rules of the Game’ in Corporate Governance Reform Jennifer Hill......Page 42
I COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE......Page 44
II THE POST-SCANDAL REGULATORY RESPONSES: LAWS, PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS......Page 47
III SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS VERSUS PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS — WHAT THE POST-SCANDAL REFORMS DID AND DID NOT ADDRESS......Page 56
IV CURRENT POLICY DEBATES AND REGULATORY BACKLASH......Page 60
CONCLUSION......Page 66
3. Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of Law Lauren B Edelman......Page 68
I LEGAL AND ORGANISATIONAL FIELDS......Page 74
II THE MANAGERIALISATION OF LAW IN ORGANISATIONAL FIELDS......Page 81
(A) Professional Construction of the Legal Environment......Page 82
(B) The Construction and Diffusion of Symbolic Forms of Compliance......Page 84
(C) The Construction of Law within Organisations......Page 86
III LEGAL FIELDS AND THE RATIONALISATION OF MANAGERIALISED LAW......Page 91
(A) Employees’ Legal Consciousness and the Mobilisation of Law......Page 92
(B) Professional Framing of Rights Violations......Page 93
(C) Judicial Deference to Organisational Constructions of Law......Page 94
CONCLUSION: OVERLAPPING FIELDS AND ENDOGENOUS PROCESSES......Page 101
4. The Significance of Relative Autonomy in How Regulation of the Financial Services Sector Evolves George Gilligan.......Page 104
I THE EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN ENGLAND......Page 105
II REGULATION AS A COMPETITIVE COMMODITY?......Page 121
III THE LEVERAGED CHARACTER OF FINANCIAL SERVICES......Page 126
CONCLUSION......Page 128
5. ASIC v Citigroup: Investment Banks, Conflicts of Interest, and Chinese Walls Pamela F Hanrahan......Page 130
(A) The Patrick Takeover......Page 132
(B) The Allegations......Page 134
II THE CONFLICTS CLAIMS......Page 135
III ISSUE 1: THE FIDUCIARY POINT......Page 137
(A) The Fiduciary Character of Advisory Relationships......Page 138
(B) The Effect of the Contractual Stipulation......Page 141
IV ISSUE 2: THE CONFLICTS POINT......Page 142
(A) The Daly Positive Duty of Disclosure......Page 143
(B) The Fourth and Fifth Allegations......Page 144
V ISSUE 3: INFORMED CONSENT......Page 145
VI ISSUE 4: CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT AND CHINESE WALLS......Page 147
(A) Chinese Walls......Page 148
VII IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVISERS......Page 150
VIII THE NATURE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES......Page 151
IX IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION......Page 153
6. Enforcement of Capital Markets Regulation: The United Kingdom and Its International Markets Iain MacNeil......Page 156
I RISK-BASED REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT......Page 159
(A) The Move towards More-Principles-Based Regulation......Page 161
(B) The Enforcement Implications of Principles-Based Regulation......Page 165
III THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE......Page 168
IV CORPORATE, COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY?......Page 174
(A) Public Enforcement......Page 180
(B) Private Enforcement......Page 182
(A) Sanctions: The Statutory Options......Page 184
(B) Settlements: Process and Incentives......Page 186
(C) Procedural Complications......Page 187
CONCLUSION......Page 188
7. Why Auditors Don’t Find Fraud Nicholas M Hodson......Page 192
II THE ESSENTIALS......Page 193
III DECEPTION......Page 196
IV THE DECEIVERS......Page 197
(A) Thoughts on Collusion......Page 198
V THE DECEIVED......Page 199
VI AUDITOR–CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS......Page 200
VIII A REAL EXAMPLE......Page 201
IX A HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION......Page 205
X THE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD......Page 216
XI CHANGING AUDITING STANDARDS......Page 218
(A) Acknowledging a Problem......Page 220
(B) Spreading the Load......Page 221
(E) Plausible Deniability......Page 223
CONCLUSION......Page 224
8. Compliance, Ethics and Responsibility: Emergent Governance Strategies in the US and UK Doreen McBarnet......Page 226
(A) US Regulation and the Enron Effect......Page 227
(B) US Regulatory Initiatives......Page 230
(C) Enforcement Policy......Page 233
(D) Regulatory Initiatives: The UK......Page 236
(E) Enforcement Policy: UK......Page 240
(A) Potential Limitations in the Regulatory Bid for Ethical Compliance......Page 243
(B) Corporate Social Responsibility......Page 245
(C) Legal Compliance on the CSR Agenda......Page 248
(D) CSR as an Enforcement Mechanism......Page 250
CONCLUSION......Page 252
9. Professional Norms Dean Cocking......Page 254
I TWO MODELS OF ETHICO-PROFESSIONAL NORMS......Page 256
II THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY......Page 263
III CORRELATIVE DUTIES OF CARE TO CLIENTS......Page 268
CONCLUSION......Page 275
10. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Search for Accountable Corporate Governance Melvin J Dubnick.......Page 278
I ‘PURPOSE’ AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM......Page 280
II UNCOVERING THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE......Page 284
(A) The Modern Corporate Form as Hybrid......Page 285
(B) Inventing the Corporate Form......Page 288
III CLARIFYING THE STANDARD......Page 292
(A) The Stakeholder Model......Page 293
(B) The Fiduciary Model......Page 294
(C) The Accountability Model......Page 295
IV ASSESSING ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK......Page 297
V ASSESSING SARBANES-OXLEY......Page 301
(A) The Performative Provisions......Page 303
(B) The Regulatory Provisions......Page 304
(C) Managerial Provisions and the Absence of Fourth Order Provisions......Page 305
CONCLUSION......Page 306
11. Charting an Icarian Flightpath: The Implications of the Qantas Deal Collapse Justin O’Brien.......Page 308
I A CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD......Page 315
(A) Inside the Alchemist Workshop......Page 316
(B) Back to the Future: The Return of the LBO......Page 319
(C) The Creative Destruction of Private Equity......Page 325
II CHARTING AN ICARIAN FLIGHTPATH......Page 329
(A) The Fall to Earth......Page 330
(B) The Deal Structure......Page 334
III ALIGNING AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS......Page 339
(A) The Limits of Directorial Discretion......Page 340
(B) Investing in Conflict......Page 342
IV THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY REFORM......Page 344
CONCLUSION......Page 348
12. Institutions, Integrity Systems and Market Actors Seumas Miller......Page 352
I SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS......Page 357
II INTEGRITY SYSTEMS......Page 367
III CORPORATIONS, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND MARKET ACTORS......Page 375
1 BOOKS/ARTICLES/REPORTS......Page 384
2 CASES......Page 409
3 LEGISLATION AND TREATIES......Page 410
4 OTHER MATERIALS......Page 411