Presidents, Unified Government and Legislative Control

Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Presidents, Unified Government, and Legislative Control
	Introduction
	Literature Review
	Political Parties Under Unified Government
	The Balance of Power Between the President and the Legislature
	Confidence Vote and Cohesion
	Electoral System and Cohesion
	Nomination and Cohesion
	Unilateral Presidential Power and Cohesion
	The Structure of the Book
	References
2 A Gently Slopped Leadership: Parliamentary Support for Presidents in France
	Introduction
	A Semi-Presidential System Driven by the President
	A Strong Support, a Constant Decline
	A Discussion of the Four Hypotheses for Parliamentary Support
		Confidence Vote Procedures in the Hands of the President
		A Candidate-Centered Electoral System
		A Differentiated Capacity for Presidents to Select Candidates
		Limited Decree Power but Strong Statutes
	Three Determining Contextual Hypotheses
		Popularity in Decline
		The Uncertainty of Ideological Cohesiveness
		The Crucial Micromanagement of the Majority
	Conclusion
	References
3 Power Scope and Party Disunity of Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan: The Perspective of Political Participation of Elites and the Masses
	Introduction
	Problem Awareness and Variable Definition in This Study
	The Case Study of Taiwan
	Political Elites: The Situations of the President of Taiwan or the President of the Executive Yuan as Party Leaders
	Mass Participation: Comparison of Voter Turnout
	Political Elites: Background and Political Career Plan of the Presidents of the Executive Yuan
	Party Unity in Taiwan
	Conclusion
	References
4 President and Congress in the Period of Unified Government in America
	Introduction
	Legislative Defection in American Congress
	Personal Connection and Party Connection
	Electoral Demand and Party Demand
	Unilateral Power: Decree Power and Veto Power
		Decree Power
		Veto Power
	Unified Government
	Party Leaders and Party Unity in Congress
	President and Congress
	Conclusion
	References
5 Political Institutions, Democratization, and Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico
	Introduction
	Perspectives of New Institutionalism for Studying Legislative Behavior
	Institutional Settings for Executive-Legislative Relations in Mexico
		Centralized Constitutional Power of the Presidency
		Party-Centered Electoral System and the Ban on Reelection
	Centralized System of Candidate Nomination
	Explaining the Dynamics of Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico
		Party Cohesion of the PRI Before 1994
	Democratization and the Changing Trend of the Candidate Nomination Procedure
		Incumbent Party Cohesion Under the Unified Governments After 1994
		Candidate Nomination Procedure and Party Cohesion of the MORENA
	Conclusion
	References
6 Consensual Decision-Making and No Rebels: Presidentialism in Indonesia
	Introduction
	Institutional Environment and Executive-Legislative Relations
	Basic Patterns of Support for the President from Members of the President’s Party/Coalition
	Legislative Rebels of Members of the President’s Party/Coalition Over Presidential Supporting Bills or Government-Initiated Bills
	Discussion of the Effects of the Four Explanatory Variables on Legislative Support or Defection
	Conclusion
	References
7 Presidents, Unified Government, and Legislative Control: What Have We Learned?
	Introduction
	Case Studies
		France
		Taiwan
		United States
		Mexico
		Indonesia
	Conclusion
	References
Index