Powers, Time and Free Will (Synthese Library, 451)

Acknowledgements
Introduction
Contents
Chapter 1: What´s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!
	1.1 The Black Box Problem
	1.2 Telic Properties
	1.3 The Directedness of Powers
		1.3.1 Physical Intentionality
		1.3.2 Identity-Fixing Relations
		1.3.3 A Relation of Production?
	1.4 Intrinsic Complexity and Extrinsic Dependency of Powers
	1.5 Taking Stock
	1.6 Tu Quoque, but for a Reason
	1.7 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 2: Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Bricks Without Straw
		2.2.1 Microphysicalism and Priority Monism
		2.2.2 Physical State Monism
	2.3 The Role of Boundary Conditions in Physics
		2.3.1 A Question of Scale
		2.3.2 Quantum Mechanics of a Particle in a Box
		2.3.3 The Arrow of Time in Electromagnetism
	2.4 The Role of Representations in Physics
		2.4.1 A Question of Context
		2.4.2 Representing Phase Transitions
		2.4.3 Representing Chemical Forces
	2.5 Saving the Macroscopic
		2.5.1 Quantum Entanglement and Reductionism
		2.5.2 Quantum Darwinism and Weak Emergence
		2.5.3 Causal Closure and Strong Emergence
	2.6 Concluding Remarks
	References
Chapter 3: Dispositional Essentialism in the Eternalist Block
	3.1 Temporal Dynamism in the Metaphysics of Time
	3.2 The Incompatibility Argument
	3.3 The Argument Is Either Trivial or False
	References
Chapter 4: A Dynamic B Theory of Time
	4.1 Free Will and Causal Powers
	4.2 Does Free Will Require the a Theory of Time?
	4.3 The Challenges of Logical Fatalism and the Unreality of Change
	4.4 A Formal Model of Dynamic B Theory
	4.5 McTaggart´s Challenge to the a Theory Applied to Dynamic B Theory
	4.6 Moving from the Dynamic B Theory to the Intermediate Theory
	4.7 Problems for Aristotelian A Theory
	4.8 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 5: Libertarian Freedom in an Eternalist World?
	5.1 Eternalism and Libertarianism
	5.2 Alternative Possibilities and Fixity
	5.3 Causation and Change
	5.4 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 6: The Temporal Structure of Agency
	6.1 Introduction: Agency and Temporality
	6.2 The Problem of Alienated or Disappearing Agents
		6.2.1 Velleman
		6.2.2 Hornsby
		6.2.3 Lavin
	6.3 The Time of an Action
	References
Chapter 7: Freedom of the Will and Rational Abilities
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Which Abilities and How to Understand Them
	7.3 List on Free Will and Agential Possibility
	7.4 Bringing in Abilities
	7.5 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 8: The Power to Will Freely: How to Re-Think About the Problem of Free Will Without Laws of Nature
	8.1 Power Realism & Nomological Antirealism
		8.1.1 The Ontological Reality of Causal Powers
		8.1.2 Power Realism Rejects Categoricalism
		8.1.3 Real Causation by the Mutual Manifesting Powers of Powerful Particulars
		8.1.4 Defeasibility of Manifesting Powers
		8.1.5 Causal Pluralism
		8.1.6 Why Causal Powers Deliver Nomological Antirealism
		8.1.7 Cartwright on the Laws of Nature
	8.2 Re-Thinking the Free Will Problem
	8.3 Indeterminisms & Determinisms Compatible with PRNA
		8.3.1 Dispositional Modality Incompatibilism
		8.3.2 Determinisms Compatible with PRNA
	8.4 Free Will Compatible with PRNA
		8.4.1 Two-Way Power-Free-Will
		8.4.2 Hierarchical Model of One-Way Powers for Free Will
	8.5 Compatibilisms and Incompatiblisms
	8.6 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 9: Laws Loosened
	9.1 Probabilistic Laws
	9.2 Ceteris Paribus Laws
	9.3 Laws as Ceteris Paribus All the Way Down?
	9.4 Laws as World-Constrainers vs Laws as World-Dictators
	References
Chapter 10: The Problem of Radical Freedom
	10.1 Introduction
	10.2 Humean and Non-Humean Conceptions of Laws
	10.3 The Non-Humean Conception of Laws and the Consequence Argument
	10.4 The Humean and the Consequence Argument
	10.5 The Problem of Radical Freedom
	References
Chapter 11: How the Libet Tradition Can Contribute to Understanding Human Action Rather than Free Will
	11.1 The Logic of the Classic Libet Experiment
	11.2 Types of Actions
		11.2.1 The Content of LAs
		11.2.2 The Habituality of LAs
		11.2.3 LAs as Bodily Movements
	11.3 LAs and the (Causal) Role of Conscious Mental States
	11.4 LAs and the Causal Role of the RP
	11.5 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 12: The Consequence Argument and an Ontology of Dispositions
	12.1 Introduction
	12.2 Three Notions of Freedom and Van Inwagen´s Consequence Argument
	12.3 The Deterministic Horn and the Humean Compatibilist Solution
	12.4 The Indeterministic Horn
	12.5 The First Way Out of the Dilemma
	12.6 The Second Way Out of the Dilemma: Freedom2 as a Presupposition of Scientific Activity
	12.7 A Third Way Out of the Consequence Argument: Kant´s Transcendental Viewpoint
	12.8 Why Van Inwagen´s Argument Needs an Ontic Form of Determinism
		12.8.1 Syntactic Approach
		12.8.2 Epistemic Approach
		12.8.3 Ontic Approach
	12.9 Free Will and the Problem of the Existence of Laws of Nature
	12.10 The Problems of the Humean Conception of Laws
	12.11 The Antireductionist Conception of Laws
	12.12 Properties, Capacities and Human Capabilities
	References
Chapter 13: Super-Humeanism and Mental Causation
	13.1 (Super-)Humeanism, Laws and Free Will
	13.2 The Problem of Mental Causation
	13.3 Difference Making
	13.4 Mental Causation and the Humean View of Causation
	References