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ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Robert F. van Brederode (editor)
سری:
ISBN (شابک) : 9789811910913, 981191091X
ناشر: Springer
سال نشر: 2022
تعداد صفحات: 421
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 5 مگابایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Political Philosophy and Taxation: A History from the Enlightenment to the Present به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب فلسفه سیاسی و مالیات: تاریخ از عصر روشنگری تا امروز نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
Preface\nContents\nEditor and Contributors\nAbout the Editor\nContributors\nAbbreviations\nList of Tables\nChapter 1: Introduction: The Value of a Political Theory for the Proper Application of Taxation\n 1.1 Introduction\n 1.2 Enlightenment\n 1.2.1 Social Contract\n 1.2.1.1 Fiction and Function\n 1.2.1.2 Quid Pro Quo: Taxation as Payment for Public Services\n 1.2.2 Social Contract Theorists Views on Taxation\n 1.2.3 Non-social Contract Enlightenment Views on Taxation\n 1.2.4 Natural Rights\n 1.3 Utilitarianism and the Benefits Principle\n 1.4 Conservatism\n 1.5 Liberalism and Libertarianism\n 1.5.1 General\n 1.5.2 Private Ownership: Myth or Truth\n 1.5.2.1 Taxation Is a Retainer Right on Property\n 1.5.2.2 Taxes Partially Define Private Property Rights\n 1.5.2.3 The State as Co-owner of Individual Income\n 1.6 Marxism\n 1.7 Egalitarianism as Basis for Distributive Justice and Taxation\n 1.7.1 Introduction\n 1.7.2 Egalitarianism and Taxation\n 1.7.3 Luck Egalitarianism\n 1.7.3.1 Introduction\n 1.7.3.2 Desert Theory\n 1.7.3.3 Endowment Taxation\n 1.8 Taxation Through Feminist Eyes\n 1.9 Lessons from Legal Positivism for Taxation Law\n 1.10 Finally\n References\nChapter 2: The Enlightenment and Influence of Social Contract Theory on Taxation\n 2.1 Introduction\n 2.2 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)\n 2.2.1 Introduction\n 2.2.2 Social Contract: Security Justifies Obedience\n 2.2.3 Law as Command\n 2.2.4 Tax Principles and Benefit\n 2.3 John Locke (1632–1704)\n 2.3.1 Introduction\n 2.3.2 Taxation and Property\n 2.3.3 Locke’s Version of the Social Contract\n 2.3.4 Tax and Justice\n 2.4 Montesquieu (1689–1755)\n 2.4.1 Introduction\n 2.4.2 Irrelevance of the State of Nature and Social Contract\n 2.4.3 Theory of Law\n 2.4.4 Liberty\n 2.4.5 Separation and Distribution of Powers\n 2.4.6 Taxation\n 2.5 David Hume (1711–1776)\n 2.5.1 Introduction\n 2.5.2 Property and the Destruction of the Social Contract\n 2.5.3 Taxation, and the Relevance of Custom\n 2.6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)\n 2.6.1 Introduction\n 2.6.2 Relation Between the State, Society and Citizens/Subjects\n 2.6.3 State of Nature, Civil Society and Property\n 2.6.4 Renewing Social Contract Theory: Liberty and Equality\n 2.6.5 Social Contract: Grounding a Legitimate Political Society\n 2.6.6 Taxation\n 2.7 Thomas Paine (1737–1809)\n 2.7.1 Introduction\n 2.7.2 Paine’s Version of the Social Contract\n 2.7.3 Extension of the Idea of Benefit\n 2.8 America, The Federalist Papers and The Anti-Federalist Papers\n 2.8.1 Introduction\n 2.8.2 The Influence of the Philosophers\n 2.8.3 The Move to an Explicit Contract\n 2.9 Concluding Remarks\n References\nChapter 3: Taxation and Utilitarianism: The Historical Evolution\n 3.1 Introduction\n 3.2 Some Preliminary Remarks About Utilitarianism and Taxation\n 3.2.1 Utilitarianism\n 3.2.2 Taxation\n 3.2.3 Utility and Taxation\n 3.3 Historical Overview of Utility and Taxation\n 3.3.1 Social Contract Theory and Taxation: Hobbes and Locke\n 3.3.2 Utility, Sympathy and Taxation\n 3.3.2.1 Hume\n 3.3.2.2 Teleology and Social Science\n 3.3.2.3 Smith\n 3.3.3 Utilitarianism\n 3.3.3.1 Bentham\n 3.3.3.2 Mill\n 3.3.3.3 Taxation\n 3.4 Conclusions\n References\nChapter 4: Classical Liberalism: Market-Supporting Institutions and Public Goods Funded by Limited Taxation\n 4.1 Classical Liberal Political Philosophy\n 4.2 Classical Liberal Institutions\n 4.3 Taxation Within the Classical Liberal Tradition\n 4.3.1 The Benefit Theory of Tax\n 4.3.2 The Problem of Administration: The Need for a Simple Rule\n 4.3.3 The Problem of Opportunism: The Need for a General and Constitutionalized Rule\n 4.4 Conclusion\n References\nChapter 5: Marxism and Socialism: Progressive Taxation and Socialisation of Property\n 5.1 Introduction\n 5.2 Socialism, Communism and Marxism\n 5.2.1 The Revolutions of 1848\n 5.2.2 The Paris Commune and the Transcendence of the State\n 5.3 The Parliamentary Road and the Dilemma of State Socialism\n 5.3.1 The German Socialists Under Bismarck\n 5.3.2 Kautsky, the Erfurt Programme and Scientific Socialism\n 5.4 Revisionism and the Great Schism\n 5.4.1 Bernstein and ‘Back to Kant’\n 5.4.2 Socialists and the Welfare-Warfare State\n 5.5 Marxists in Government\n 5.5.1 Lenin and the Bolsheviks\n 5.5.2 The Austro-Marxists\n 5.5.2.1 Hilferding and Weimar Germany\n 5.5.2.2 A Fiscal Sociology of the State: Goldscheid and Schumpeter\n 5.6 Socialism, the Mixed Economy and Neoliberalism\n 5.6.1 Keynesianism and Socialism\n 5.6.2 Neo-Marxist State Theories and the ‘Fiscal Crisis of the State’\n 5.6.3 The Financial Crash and the Revival of Progressive Taxation\n 5.7 Conclusion: Taxation in the Transformation and Transcendence of Capitalism\n References\nChapter 6: The Conservative Approach to Taxation: The Complexity of Society, the Displacement of Voluntary Associations, and the Growth of the State\n 6.1 Introduction\n 6.2 Foundations\n 6.2.1 Man as a Social Creature and the Importance of Community\n 6.2.2 Variety and Complexity of Man and Society\n 6.2.3 The Limits of Rationalism\n 6.2.4 Man as a Fallible Being and the Impossibility of Utopian Society\n 6.2.5 Sanctity of Property\n 6.3 Two Common Principles of Taxation\n 6.3.1 Taxation Should Be Limited in Scope and Remain Free of Excess\n 6.3.2 Taxes Should Not Be Enacted for the Purpose of Promoting Abstract Equality, Facilitating Mass Wealth Redistribution, and Advancing Other Forms of Social Engineering\n 6.4 Tensions\n 6.4.1 The First School of Thought: Taxation as Necessary for a Civilized Society Yet Prone to Rationalist Excess\n 6.4.1.1 Burke\n 6.4.1.2 Churchill\n 6.4.1.3 Churchill’s Tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer\n 6.4.1.4 Kirk, Civilized Society, and the Farming Community\n 6.4.2 The Second School of Thought: The Limited State and Civil Association\n 6.4.2.1 Oakeshott\n 6.4.2.2 Buckley, Will, and Sowell\n 6.4.3 The Third School of Thought: Taxation, the Modern State, and the War Economy\n 6.5 Conclusion: When Is Taxation Just?\n Compañía of Case Law\n References\nChapter 7: Taxation: The Libertarian View\n 7.1 Introduction\n 7.2 Taxation as Slavery\n 7.3 Fairness Issues\n 7.4 Efficiency and Value Issues\n 7.5 Redistribution\n 7.6 Are Some Taxes Better Than Others?\n 7.7 Is There a Moral Limit?\n 7.8 Taxes in a Libertarian World\n Overview of Case Law\n References\nChapter 8: Legal Positivism and Tax Law: Kelsen, Is/Ought and Capital/Revenue; Hart, Open Texture and GAARs\n 8.1 General Introduction\n 8.2 An Introduction to Legal Positivism and Its Meaning for Tax Law\n 8.3 Kelsian Analysis Reveals the Confusion of “Is” and “Ought” in Income Tax Law\n 8.3.1 Introduction\n 8.3.2 Hans Kelsen (1881–1973)\n 8.3.3 Pre-Enlightenment Law\n 8.3.4 Kelsen’s Generalisations and Tax Law\n 8.3.5 The Capital/Revenue Distinction\n 8.3.6 Nature of Capital/Revenue Distinction\n 8.3.7 Sources of Law\n 8.3.8 Forms of Rules: Kelsen’s Paradigm of a Norm\n 8.3.9 How Are the Rules That Distinguish Capital and Revenue Defective?\n 8.3.10 The Question of Capital: Law or Fact?\n 8.3.11 Capital/Revenue as a Matter of Law\n 8.3.12 Examples of Capital or Revenue Questions\n 8.3.13 Questions of Degree\n 8.3.14 Conclusion\n 8.4 Hart and Tax Law: The Case of GAARs\n 8.4.1 Introduction\n 8.4.2 The Rule of Law and GAARs\n 8.4.3 Conclusion\n Table of Cases\n References\nChapter 9: Egalitarianism and Taxation\n 9.1 Introduction\n 9.2 Property-Owning Democracy: Meade and Rawls\n 9.3 Rawls on Taxation\n 9.4 Piketty’s Participatory Socialism\n 9.5 Combining Rawls and Piketty\n 9.6 Pre- and Redistribution\n 9.7 Murphy and Nagel on Distributive Justice and Taxation\n 9.8 Controversies Within the Egalitarian Camp\n 9.9 Social Egalitarianism, Taxation, the State, and the Individual\n 9.10 The Choice of Social System\n References\nChapter 10: Tax’s Power: Feminism, Tax, and the Making of Society\n 10.1 Taxation and Belonging—Early Feminist Thought and the Tax Nexus\n 10.2 What Equality Demands—Bringing Wollstonecraft and Mill to Tax\n 10.3 Ends Meet Means: Feminist Tax Scholarship\n 10.4 Many Paths to Equality\n 10.4.1 Intersectional Feminism\n 10.4.2 Difference Feminism and Autonomy\n 10.4.3 Dominance Feminism\n 10.5 Money, Power, and the Path Forward\n Overview of Case Law\n References\nChapter 11: A Summary Proposal for Democratized Taxation\n 11.1 The Birth of Taxation and the Birth of the Nation State\n 11.2 The Administrative State\n 11.3 Opposing Future Forms of Government\n 11.3.1 The Centralized, Autocratic State\n 11.3.2 Cooperative Networks\n 11.4 Majoritarianism and Its Consequences for Political Equality and the Legitimacy of Taxation\n 11.5 Political Decentralization and Privatization Through Voluntary Alliances\n 11.6 A First Step: Democratized Taxation\n References\nName Index\nSubject Index