Political competition: theory and applications

Cover......Page 1
Title Page - Political Competition......Page 2
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Introduction......Page 15
Figure I.1 The plan of the book......Page 19
1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties......Page 28
1.2 The DownsModel......Page 31
Figure 1.1 A non-quasi-concave function with a unique local maximum......Page 34
Figure 1.2 All citizens with ideal policies.........Page 37
Figure 1.3 The set of types in Example 1.2 with ideal tax rate less than t......Page 39
1.3 TheWittmanModel......Page 43
Figure 1.4......Page 48
1.4 Conclusion......Page 51
2.1 Introduction......Page 53
2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty......Page 54
2.3 An Error-DistributionModel of Uncertainty......Page 60
2.4 A Finite-TypeModel......Page 62
Figure 2.1......Page 64
Figure 2.2......Page 65
2.5 Conclusion......Page 66
3.2 The DownsModel......Page 67
3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example......Page 70
Figure 3.1a Conditional payoff functions at equilibrium for Example 3.1......Page 73
Figure 3.1b Conditional payoff functions at equilibrium for Example 3.1,......Page 74
3.4 Existence ofWittman Equilibrium......Page 76
3.5 Properties ofWittman Equilibrium......Page 84
3.6 Summary......Page 86
Figure 3.2......Page 87
4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism......Page 88
4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity......Page 91
Table 4.1 Wittman equilibria in model of section 4.2......Page 95
4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism......Page 96
4.4 A DynamicModel of Political Cycles......Page 97
Table 4.2 Wittman equilibria in Hirschman model......Page 101
Figure 4.1 Long-term electoral cycles in the Hirschman model......Page 103
4.5 Conclusion......Page 104
5.1 Introduction......Page 105
5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium......Page 106
5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium......Page 109
5.4 Conclusion......Page 116
6.2 The DownsModel......Page 118
Figure 6.1 The domain of policies in Example 6.3......Page 127
6.3 TheWittmanModel......Page 131
Figure 6.2 Example 6.4......Page 133
Figure 6.3......Page 135
Figure 6.5......Page 136
6.4 Conclusion......Page 137
7.2 The State-Space and Error-DistributionModels of Uncertainty......Page 139
7.3 The Coughlin Model......Page 142
7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model......Page 145
7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty......Page 149
Figure 7.2......Page 152
7.6 Conclusion......Page 159
8.1 Introduction......Page 160
8.2 Party Factions......Page 163
8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium......Page 170
Figure 8.1 The proof of Theorem 8.2......Page 173
8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE......Page 174
Figure 8.2 Party 1’s policy at local PUNE......Page 176
8.5 RegularWittman Equilibrium......Page 178
8.6 PUNEs in the UnidimensionalModel......Page 181
8.7 PUNEs in aMultidimensional EuclideanModel......Page 182
Figure 8.4......Page 183
8.8 Conclusion......Page 185
9.1 Introduction......Page 187
9.2 TheModel......Page 188
Figure 9.1......Page 190
Figure 9.2......Page 191
9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts......Page 193
9.4 Analysis of Party Competition......Page 194
Figure 9.3......Page 195
Figure 9.4......Page 196
Figure 9.5......Page 198
9.5 Calibration......Page 201
9.6 Conclusion......Page 202
10.1 The Historical Issue and aModel Preview......Page 204
10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment......Page 207
10.3 Analysis of PUNEs......Page 210
10.4 Empirical Tests......Page 213
Table 10.1 Black issue......Page 214
Table 10.2 Salience of values issue, U.S. electorate......Page 215
Table 10.3 British social attitudes survey, 1993: Authoritarian versus libertarian preferences......Page 216
10.5 Proofs of Theorems......Page 217
10.6 Concluding Remark......Page 222
11.1 Introduction......Page 224
11.2 The LuebbertModel......Page 227
11.3 Testing Luebbert’s Theory......Page 233
Table 11.1 Sweden, 1930......Page 235
Table 11.2 Sweden, 1930......Page 236
Table 11.3 Germany, 1930......Page 237
Table 11.4 Germany, 1933......Page 238
Figure 11.1b Projections of 281 PUNEs, Right policies, for Sweden......Page 239
Figure 11.1c Swedish PUNEs of Figures 11.1a and b, shown on the budget simplex......Page 240
Table 11.5 Sweden, 1930......Page 243
Table 11.6 Germany, 1933......Page 244
11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-PartyModel......Page 245
Table 11.8 The three-party PUNE policies......Page 253
Figure 11.2a Communist policies in the three-party model......Page 254
Figure 11.2cRight policies in the threeparty model......Page 255
11.5 Conclusion......Page 256
11.6 Methodological Coda......Page 257
I. The Derivation of Formulae (11.12) and (11.13)......Page 259
12.1 Introduction......Page 266
12.2 The Model......Page 268
12.3 Characterization of PUNEs......Page 269
Table 12.2......Page 271
12.5 Conclusion......Page 272
13.1 Introduction......Page 274
13.2 Endogenous Parties......Page 275
13.3 Taxation and Race......Page 276
13.4 Fitting theModel to U.S. Data......Page 278
Table 13.1 Bivariate lognormal parameters......Page 280
Table 13.2 Endogenous party PUNEs in the tax-race model of section 13.3......Page 282
13.5 Quadratic Taxation......Page 284
Figure 13.2......Page 285
Figure 13.3......Page 288
Figure 13.4 Tax policies for Left and Right, at the average endogenousparty equilibrium......Page 289
Figure 13.5b Marginal rate of taxation as a function of income, Right policy......Page 290
13.6 Private Financing of Parties......Page 291
13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs......Page 292
13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise......Page 294
14.1 Introduction......Page 296
14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party......Page 297
14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium......Page 305
Table 14.1 Three-party equilibria, coalition governments......Page 308
Table 14.2 Three-party equilibria, coalition and majority governments......Page 310
14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics......Page 311
14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example......Page 314
14.6 Conclusion......Page 319
A.1 Basics of Probability Theory......Page 324
Figure A.1 The Lebesgue integral......Page 328
Figure A.2 The density of a beta measure......Page 331
A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis 2......Page 333
Figure A.3 Farkas’ lemma......Page 335
References......Page 338
Index......Page 342