Philosophy of Law as an Integral Part of Philosophy: Essays on the Jurisprudence of Gerald J Postema

Table of Contents\nList of Contributors\nIntroduction\n	I. The Pursuit of a Sociable Jurisprudence\n	II. Philosophical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Law\n	III. Philosophical Jurisprudence Applied\n	IV. A Note on Eliminativism and the Future of Legal Philosophy\n	V. The Contents of the Book\nPart I: On the Value of the Rule of Law\n	1. Fidelity, Accountability and Trust: Tensions at the Heart of the Rule of Law\n		I. Rule of Law: The Core IDEA\n		II. Accountability Fit for the Rule of Law\n		III. Trust and Distrust: Interpersonal Dimension\n		IV. Response to the Trust Challenge\n		V. Conclusion\n	2. Equal Concern and Respect as the Foundation of Postema\'s Notion of the Rule of Law\n		I. Legality and Fidelity as Conditions for the Law to Rule\n		II. Realms of Principles: Monism and Dualism\n		III. Between Non-Domination and Equality\n		IV. Concluding Remarks\nPart II: Legal Reasoning, Integrity and Protestant Interpretation\n	3. Postema\'s Account of Integrity\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Outline of the Argument for Integrity\n		III. Terminology\n		IV. What is Integrity?\n		V. Deeper Links between Justice And Integrity\n		VI. The Past: Link Between Integrity, Fidelity and Justice\n		VII. Conclusion\n	4. Revisiting the Idea of Protestant Interpretation: Towards Reconciliation between Dworkin and Postema\n		I. Postema\'s Worry About Protestant Interpretation\n		II. A Dworkinian Response to Postema\'s Criticism\n		III. Conclusion\n	5. Postema, Dworkin, and the Question of Meaning\n	6. Protestant Interpretation, Conventions, and Legal Truth\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Dworkin\'s \'Protestant Interpretation\'\n		III. Conventions, Reasons for Action and Legal Truth\n		IV. Conclusion\nPart III: Analogical Reasoning in Law\n	7. Some Inferentialist Remarks on Postema\'s Conception of Analogical Thinking in Law\n		I. Traces of an Inferentialist Theoretical Framework in Postema\'s Two-Level Conception of Analogical Reasoning in Law\n		II. Regulism, Infinite Regress and Fundamental Pragmatism\n		III. Making Postema\'s INFERENTIALISM Explicit\n		IV. Material Inferences and the Expressive Function of Logical Vocabulary: Explaining \'Contrast\', \'Consilience\', \'Frame\' and the Argumentative Nature of Analogical Reasoning\n		V. Norms Implicit in Practices and Norms Explicit as Rules: Distinguishing Two Levels of Analogical Reasoning\n		VI. The Historic-Expressive Rationality of Social Practices as the Rationale for a one-Level Conception of Analogical Reasoning\n	8. Postema on Analogies in Law\n		I. Claims and Reasons\n		II. Thinking, Argument and Justification\n		III. Postema on Analogical Thinking in Law\nPart IV: Methodology and the Nature of Jurisprudence\n	9. Postema on Hart: The Illusion of Value-Neutrality\n		I. The Illusion of Value-Neutrality\n		II. From the \'Bad Man\' to the \'Victim\': Locating Law\'s Normative Authority\n	10. Analytic Jurisprudence in Time\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Jurisprudence as a Progressive Science\n		III. Jurisprudence as Interpretation of a Social Practice\n		IV. Reconciliation?\n		V. Three Challenges to Timeless Jurisprudence\n		VI. Conclusion\n	11. How Postema’s Jurisprudence as Sociable Science is Like Dworkin’s Interpretivism: On Conceptual Analysis in Legal Theory\n		I. Introduction: Postema’s Jurisprudence as Sociable Science\n		II. The Dispute of Method in Analytical Jurisprudence\n		III. Postema’s and Dworkin’s Projects for Jurisprudence\n		IV. Final Comments\nPart V: Postema’s Analysis of Contemporary Legal Theories\n	12. In Defence of a Thin Concept of Law\n		I. Introduction\n		II. The Hartian Concept of Legal Obligation\n		III. The Conventionalist Approach to Normativity\n		IV. The Normativity of Law\n	13. Philosophical and Psychological Distinctions between Presumptive Positivism and Rule-Sensitive Particularism\n		I. Introduction\n		II. Models of Judicial Decision Making\n		III. Postema\'s Critique\n		IV. Definitional Issues\n		V. Psychological Models of Moral Decision Making\n		VI. The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making\n		VII. Extensional Divergence and Psychological Models\n		VIII. Extensional Divergence and Human Behaviour\n		IX. Conclusion\n	14. Interview with Professor Gerald Postema\nIndex