Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscienc

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
Contents
Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble
Foreword to the First Edition by Denis Noble
Acknowledgements to the Second Edition
Acknowledgements to the First Edition
Introduction to the First Edition
Introduction to the Second Edition
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience:
Their Historical and Conceptual Roots
	Preliminaries to Part I
		1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots
		2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots
	1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge:
The Integrative Action of the Nervous System
		1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine
		1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine
		1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath
		1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall
		1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig
		1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington
			1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex:
localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof
			1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers
	2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and
His Protégés
		2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact
		2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism
		2.3 John Eccles and the ‘Liaison Brain’
		2.4 Wilder Penfield and the ‘Highest Brain Mechanism’
	3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience
		3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience
		3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes
		3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience
		3.4 Replies to Objections
	4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience:
Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity
		4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being
		4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity
		4.3 The Inner
		4.4 Introspection
		4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect
		4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity
		4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates:
How They Are Explained and Learned
		4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary
Neuroscience: An Analysis
	Preliminaries to Part II
		1 Brain–Body Dualism
		2 The Project
		3 The Category of the Psychological
	5 Sensation and Perception
		5.1 Sensation
		5.2 Perception
			5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities
			5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz
			5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem
			5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr’s theory of vision
	6 The Cognitive Powers
		6.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability
			6.1.1 Ability and know-how
			6.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge
		6.2 Memory
			6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory
			6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces
	7 The Cogitative Powers
		7.1 Belief
		7.2 Thinking
		7.3 Imagination and Mental Images
			7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery
	8 Emotion
		8.1 Affections
		8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey
			8.2.1 Neuroscientists’ confusions
			8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions
	9 Volition and Voluntary Movement
		9.1 Volition
		9.2 Libet’ s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny
		9.3 Refutations and Clarifications
		9.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive
		9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically,
Mechanically, from Force of Habit
		9.6 Taking Stock
Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience:
An Analysis
	10 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness
		10.1 Consciousness and the Brain
		10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness
			10.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness
		10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms
			10.3.1 A partial analysis
	11 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia,
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
		11.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness
		11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States
			11.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain
		11.3 Qualia
			11.3.1 ‘How it feels’ to have an experience
			11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like …
			11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience
			11.3.4 Thises and thuses
			11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia
	12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information
Theory, Global Workspace Theory
		12.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi
			12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory
			12.1.2 The ambiguity of ‘information’
			12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again
		12.2 Global Workspace Theory
			12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene’ s example
			12.2.2 On Dehaene’ s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing
		12.3 On Finding One’ s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools
		12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation
		12.5 Where to Find the Explanations
	13 Puzzles about Consciousness
		13.1 A Budget of Puzzles
		13.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality
		13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience
		13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness
		13.5 The Problem of Awareness
		13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals
	14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language
		14.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self
		14.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James
		14.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness
		14.4 The Illusion of a ‘Self ’
		14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection
			14.5.1 Thought and language
		14.6 Self-Consciousness
	15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking
		15.1 Concepts and Concept Possession
			15.1.1 Beginning again
		15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression
		15.3 What Do We Think In?
Part IV On Method
	16 Reductionism
		16.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism
		16.2 Reduction by Elimination
			16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical?
			16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory?
			16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human
			16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits
	17 Methodological Reflections
		17.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation
		17.2 The ‘Poverty of English’ Argument
		17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy
			17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation
		17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience
			17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do
			17.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do
		17.5 Why It Matters
Appendices
	Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett
		1 Dennett’ s Methodology and Presuppositions
		2 The Intentional Stance
		3 Heterophenomenological Method
		4 Consciousness
	Appendix 2 John Searle
		1 Philosophy and Science
		2 Searle’ s Philosophy of Mind
		3 Unified Field Theory
		4 The Traditional Mind–Body Problem
	Appendix 3 Further Replies to Critics
		1 The Mereological Principle
		2 Essentialism
		3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games
		4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence
		5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change,
Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism
Afterword to the Second Edition by Anthony Kenny
Index
EULA