P. F. Strawson and his Philosophical Legacy

Cover
P. F. Strawson and his Philosophical Legacy
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
List of Contributors
Introduction
	Overview of Contributions
	Bibliography
		Primary Literature
			Books by Strawson
			Selected Articles by Strawson
			Videos
		Secondary Literature
1: Strawson on False Presupposition and the Assertive Enterprise
	1. Introduction
	2. Moving Beyond ‘On Referring’
	3. The Assertive Enterprise and Presumptions of Knowledge and Ignorance
	4. Information Structure and the Contrast between Given and New Information
	5. Radical Reference Failure, Topic-Hood, and Aboutness
	6. Degrees of Identificatory Force
	7. Connections to Contemporary Discussions of Discourse Structure
	8. Conclusions
	References
2: Meaning and Speech Acts
	1. Introduction
	2. Acts of Telling and Their Centrality
	3. Strawson’s Account of Telling
	4. McDowell’s Account of Telling
	5. A Better Account of Telling
	6. The Role of Truth-Conditions in Telling
	7. Knowledge of Truth-Conditions: The Fourfold Inferential Disposition
	8. The Homeric Struggle Resolved
	9. Conclusion
	References
3: Strawson’s Basic Particulars
	1. Introduction
	2. Chapter 1 of Individuals
	3. Our Conceptual Scheme
	4. Some Aspects of the Broader Context
	5. The Identification of Particulars (pp. 15–17)
	6. The Spatio-Temporal Framework (pp. 17–30)
	7. Reidentification
	8. Material Objects as Basic
	9. Conclusion
	References
4: Strawson on Other Minds
	1. Strawson’s Contribution
	2. The Conceptual Problem
	3. The Sceptical Problem
	4. The Explanatory Problem
	References
5: P. F. Strawson and the ‘Pseudo-Material Shadows’
	1. Introduction
	2. ‘Objective Particulars’
	3. Descriptive Metaphysics and Thinking of ‘Basic’ Particulars
	4. Individuals: Part I, Chapters 1 and 2
	5. Individuals: Part II, Chapter 6
	6. The Subject-Predicate Distinction and the Particular-Universal Distinction
	7. The Fundamental Level of Thought
	8. Feature-Universals, Feature-Concepts, and Feature-Placing Sentences
	9. Ontology for the Fundamental Level of Thought
	10. Ordinary Basic Particulars Are a Simplifying Device
	References
6: Concepts and Experience in Bounds of Sense and Beyond
	1. Introduction
	2. Descriptive Metaphysics and Connective Analysis
	3. Descriptive Metaphysics and Transcendental Philosophy
	4. Transcendental Arguments
	5. ‘Concept’ and ‘Experience’: Preliminary Clarifications
	6. Self-Conscious Experience and Objective Particulars
	7. Particulars, Concepts, and Judgements
	8. Recognition and the Self-Ascribability of Experience
	9. Animals and Conceptualism About Experience
	10. Second-Class Perception?!
	11. The Myth of Spontaneity
	12. An Analytic Take on Transcendental Arguments
	References
7: Strawson’s Metacritique
	1. Introduction
	2. Kant (I)
	3. Strawson (I)
	4. Moore
	5. Strawson (II)
	6. Kant (II)
	References
8: Seeing (More than) What Meets the Eye: A Critical Engagement with P. F. Strawson
	1. Introduction
	2. ‘Seeing More’ Is Seeing What Meets the Eye
	3. A Genuine Account of Perceptual Experience
	4. An ‘Unforced’ Account of Perceptual Experience
	5. A Response to Scepticism
	References
9: To Reply, or Not to Reply, That Is the Question: Descriptive Metaphysics and the Sceptical Challenge
	1. Introduction
	2. The Parting of the Ways: Modest and Ambitious Transcendental Arguments
	3. Descriptive Metaphysics and Modest Transcendental Strategies
	4. Descriptive Metaphysics and Naturalized Epistemology
	5. On a Walk with the Ambitious Transcendental Strategist, the Modest Transcendental Strategist, the Humean Naturalist, and the Descriptive Metaphysician
	References
10: P. F. Strawson and Connective Analysis
	1. Introduction
	2. A Description of Connective Analysis
	3. Examples of Connective Analysis
	4. Reductive Analysis, Connective Analysis, and Modest Conceptual Analysis
	5. Is Grice’s Analysis of Various Kinds of Meaning Reductive?
	6. Modest Conceptual Analysis and Connective Analysis
	7. Conclusion
	References
11: Responsibility After ‘Morality’: Strawson’s Naturalism and Williams’s Genealogy
	1. Introduction
	2. Responsibility, Scepticism, and Strawson’s Naturalism
	3. Responsibility, ‘Morality’, and Williams’s Genealogy
	4. The Basic Opposition
	5. The Case for Reconciliation
	6. The Limits of Reconciliation
	7. The Limits of Strawson’s Naturalism
	References
12: Navigating ‘Freedom and Resentment’
	1. Introduction
	2. Strawson’s Strategy in ‘Freedom and Resentment’
	3. Choice Points and Different Interpretations
	4. The Thesis of Determinism
	5. Conclusion
	References
13: Between Exemption and Excuse: Exploring the Developmental Dimensions of Responsible Agency
	1. Introduction
	2. Three Signature Strawsonian Theses
	3. The Dispositionalist Approach to Responsible Agency
		3.1 The Demarcation Problem
		3.2 The Epistemic Problem
		3.3 The ‘Hard’ Problem of Deserved Blame
		3.4 The Dudley Do-Right Problem
	4. The Skills-Based Approach to Responsible Agency
		4.1 Solving the Dudley Do-Right Problem
		4.2 Solving the Hard Problem of Deserved Blame
		4.3 Alleviating the Epistemic Problem
		4.4 Revisiting the Demarcation Problem
	5. Navigating the Grey Areas of Responsible Agency
	References
Index