Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 10

Cover
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy
Copyright
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Contributors
1: Three Concepts of Legitimacy
	References
2: Legitimacy, Authority, and Democratic Duties of Explanation
	I. Introduction
	II. Explanation, AI, Power
	III. Power, Legitimacy, Authority
	IV. Legitimacy, Authority, Publicity
	V. Publicity, Explanation, AI
	VI. Objections
		Are Explanations Necessary for Legitimacy and Authority?
		Does AI Really Raise Questions of Legitimacy and Authority?
	VII. Conclusion
3: The Romantic Lie in the Brain: Collective Agency, Moral Responsibility, and the State
	Section One: Collective Responsibility
	Section Two: The Need for the State
	Section Three: Uncovering the State
	Section Four: Fleshing Out the State
	Section Five: The Downfall of the Unitary Model
	Section Six: Clarifications and Objections
	Section Seven: Beyond State Agency
	Section Eight: Conclusion
4: Territorial Jurisdiction: A Functionalist Account
	1. Functionalism, Territory, and Ideal Takeovers
	2. The Unsuccessful States Objection
	3. The Natural Duty of Justice
	4. The Occupation Objection
	5. The Pro Tem Objection
	6. Conclusion
5: Sequential Claims-Balancing, a Weak Limited Aggregationist Proposal
	1. Limited Aggregationism
	2. Preliminary Clarifications
	3. Weak vs. Strong Limited Aggregationism
	4. Why Weak Limited Aggregationism?
	5. Sequential Claims-Balancing
	6. Sequential Claims-Balancing and Challenge Cases
	7. Sequential Claims-Balancing vs. Other Limited Aggregationist Proposals
	8. Sequential Claims-Balancing and a Risk-Based Anti-Limited Aggregationist Argument
	9. Conclusion
	References
6: Proportionality and the Prospect of Compensation
	I. Introduction
	II. Internalism about Compensation
		II.1 Double-Counting
		II.2 Manipulating Lesser Evils
		II.3 Ambiguities
	III. Compensation and Compensability
		III.1 Externalism about Compensation
		III.2 Compensability
		III.3 The Compensability Rule and Internalism Revisited
	IV. Externalism, Compensability, and Proportionality
	V. Conclusion
7: Structures of Sufficiency
	I. Introduction
	II. Standard Sufficientarianism
	III. The Dilemma
	IV. First Horn: Agree with Direct Theory
	V. Second Horn: Disagree with Direct Theory
	VI. Three Alternative Theories
	VII. Threshold Satiability
	VIII. Metric Specificity
	IX. Locating the Threshold
	X. Conclusion
8: Lotteries, Queues, and Bottlenecks
	1. Introduction
	2. Abundance, Scarcity, and Bottlenecks
	3. Scarcity and Lotteries
	4. Bottlenecks and Queues
	5. Complications
	6. Conclusion
	References
Index