Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 3

Cover
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language: Volume 3
Copyright
Contents
Editors’ Preface
List of Contributors
1: Scoreboards Without Scorekeepers: Josh Dever
	1.1 An introduction to scoreboard technology
	1.2 A first pass at scoreboard metaphysics
	1.3 Three problems for cognitivist scoreboards
	1.4 Three grades of scoreboard non-cognitivism
	1.5 Using scoreboards without scorekeepers
	References
2: Singularism vs. Descriptivism?: Rachel Goodman
	2.1 Singularism
	2.2 The anchoring role
	2.3 The conclusion of Revised MR
	2.4 The over-attribution objection and misattribution response
	2.5 Anchored characters and representation*
	2.6 Implications for the new traditional picture and anchored descriptivism
	2.7 Conclusion: agreements and disagreements
	References
3: Verbal Signaling: Mitch Green
	3.1 Signals and indices
	3.2 Verbal signals and verbal indices
	3.3 The assertive family and illocutionary commitment
	3.4 Cultural evolution and the genealogy of speech acts
	3.5 Applications
		3.5a Expositives
		3.5b Grammatical evidentials
		3.5c Conversational implicature
	References
4: Disquotation, Translation, and Context-Dependence: Richard Kimberley Heck
	4.1 The generalizing role of truth
	4.2 Disquotation and translation
	4.3 Translation and context-dependence
	4.4 Translation and semantics
	4.5 Translation and ‘making sense’
	4.6 In closing, a caveat
	References
5: The Place of the Philosophy of Language in Metaphysics: Thomas Hofweber
	5.1 The language–metaphysics gap
	5.2 Bridging the gap
	5.3 Evaluating the question
	5.4 Assessing the status of the question
	5.5 Immanent metaphysics and the status of language
	References
6: On Lying, “Strictly Speaking”: Marga Reimer
	6.1 Lying “strictly speaking”
	6.2 Lies, lies, and more lies!
		6.2 (i) Lying “strictly speaking” (lying in a “strict” sense)
		6.2 (ii) Lying prototypically speaking (lying in a “prototypical” sense)
		6.2 (iii) Lying “loosely” speaking (lying in a “loose” sense)
	6.3 Lying in a “strict” sense: In defense of a philosophical “definition”
		6.3 (i) Saying
		6.3 (ii) Factual falsity of what is believed to be false
		6.3 (iii) Deceptive intent
	6.4 Ongoing debates, overlooked distinctions
		6.4 (i) Is the intention to deceive a necessary condition for lying?
		6.4 (ii) Is it possible to lie through Gricean conversational implicature?
	6.5 Can experimental studies inform philosophical definitions?
	6.6 When those who lie are not liars; when those who do not, are
	6.7 Taking cues from ordinary ways of speaking
	References
7: À Propos de Pierre, Does He . . . or Doesn’t He?: Nathan Salmón
	References
8: The Schmidentity Strategy: Jeff Speaks
	8.1 The schmidentity strategy in action
	8.2 The strategy extended
	8.3 ‘Stipulated to be true’
		8.3.1 Stipulations within worlds
			8.3.1.1 Efficacious vs. inefficacious stipulations
			8.3.1.2 Modally stable semantic properties
			8.3.1.3 Modal stability, names, and descriptions
		8.3.2 Stipulations about worlds
	References
9: Leverage: A Model of Cognitive Significance: Stephen Yablo
	9.1 Coreferring Names
	9.2 Coincident Senses
	9.3 Definite Descriptions
	9.4 Fidelity as Synonymy
	9.5 Reference-Fixers
	9.6 Diagonal Propositions
	9.7 Pragmatic Repair
	9.8 Trigger Problems
	9.9 Pragmatic Enrichment
	9.10 Presupposition Subtraction
	9.11 Subject Matter
	9.12 Conversational Exculpature
	9.13 Pictures
	9.14 Leverage
	9.15 Implication and Validity
	9.16 More Pictures
	9.17 Summing Up
	References
Index