Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 13

Cover
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 13
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Contributors
Introduction: Mark Timmons
1: Paradoxical Proposals and Consent: Tom Dougherty
	1. Introduction
	2. The theoretical challenge of paradoxical proposals
	3. Distinguishing independent and introduced disincentives
	4. My account’s first prong: the Worsening principle
	5. My account’s second prong: taking advantage of vulnerability to unjustifiably set back interests
	6. A further argument for my account’s second prong: the symmetry of initiating and accepting proposals
	7. Conclusion
2: Manipulation, Disrespecting Autonomy, and Deliberative Projects: Ron Aboodi and Shlomo Cohen
	1. Introduction
	2. The Significance of the Manipulee’s Deliberative Commitments
		2.1 Rationality and Responsiveness to Reasons
		2.2 Normative Stances
		2.3 Deliberative Commitments
	3. Disrespecting the Manipulee’s Deliberative Project
		3.1 Our Proposal
		3.2 The Adequacy and Comprehensiveness of Our Proposal
		3.3 Comparison to Some Neighboring Accounts
			3.3.1. Undermining the Capacity to Manage One’s Concerns
			3.3.2. Options and Endorsement
		3.4 External Standards
	4. Conclusion
		4.1 Theoretical Implications
		4.2 Implications to Applied Ethics
	References
3: Moral Indifference: Monika Betzler and Jonas Vandieken
	Introduction
	1. Making Space for Moral Indifference
	2. The Target of Moral Indifference: The Ability to Make a Moral Difference
	3. The Distinct Wrong of Moral Indifference
	4. Basic Second-Personal Regard
	5. The Indifferent Stance
	6. The Value of Moral Indifference
	7. Conclusion
	References
4: Buck-Passing and the Value of a Person: Kyla Ebels-Duggan
	The Buck-Passing View of Value
	The Value of a Person
	Valuing, Loving, and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
	Respect and Moral Reasons
	The Value of a Person and Reasons for Attitudes
5: Moral Theorizing and the Limits of Coherence: Sarah Buss
	Moral Virtue
		The less-than-full coherence of the morally virtuous person
		The desirability of a less-than-fully coherent moral point of view
	A Second Form of Moral Incoherence?
		Akrasia
		Supererogation
		The desirability of a less-than-fully coherent moral point of view (Take Two)
	Conclusion
	References
6: A Contractualist Approach to Moral Uncertainty: Michael Bukoski
	1. Moral uncertainty and its implications
	2. A contractualist approach to moral uncertainty principles
	3. Content-neutral vs. discriminating moral uncertainty principles
		A. Uncertainty about the truth of contractualism
		B. Uncertainty about which kinds of beings have moral status
	4. Some advantages of local moral uncertainty principles
		A. The regress objection
		B. The content objection
	5. Conclusion
	References
7: The Ethics of Expectations: Rima Basu
	1. The Nature of Expectations
		1.1 Expectations as predictions
		1.2 Expectation as prescription
		1.3 Expectations as aspirations
		1.4 Expectations as maps
	2. The Wrongs of Expectations
		2.1 A mistaken view of the evidence
		2.2 A mistaken view of morality
		2.3 A mistaken view of guidance
	3. The Ethics of Expectations
	References
8: Satisficing Virtuously: Earl Conee
	1. Introduction
	2. Problems for MC
	3. Satisficing Proposals
	4. Taking Stock
	5. Virtue to the Rescue
	6. Simplifying Advantageously
	7. Some Assets of VT
	8. Ultimate Explanation
	References
9: Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number: Benjamin Kiesewetter
	1. Directed deontic structure
	2. A distinctive structure characteristic of rights
	3. Defeat
	4. An inference to the best explanation
	5. Taurek cases
	6. A deontological vindication of the Principle of Saving the Greater Number
	7. Conclusion
	References
10: Can’t Kant Count?: Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few: Sergio Tenenbaum
	1. The Specter of Numeracy
	2. Saving the Few
	3. Kantianism, Incomparability, and Choice Principles
	4. Sweetening and No Defeat
	5. Sweetening in the Dark
	6. Kant to the Rescue
	References
11: What Does Virtue Have to Do with Consequences?: Iskra Fileva
	1. Introduction
	2. What non-viciousness teaches us about virtue
	3. The consequentialist’s retort
	4. The motivationalist’s retort
	5. Conclusion
12: Two Conceptions of Rights: David O. Brink
	1. Preliminaries
	2. Resultant and Contributory Conceptions of Rights
	3. Adjudication and Resultant Rights
	4. Moderate Deontology and Contributory Rights
	5. Conflicts Among Contributory Rights
	6. Constitutional Rights as Contributory Rights
	7. New Contributory Rights
	8. The Explanatory Role of Contributory Rights
	9. Concluding Remarks
Index