Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy

Cover
Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy
Copyright
Contents
Series Foreword
Preface
1. Heuristics
	1.1 Counterexamples
	1.2 What are heuristics?
	1.3 The persistence heuristic
	1.4 The suppositional heuristic for conditionals
	1.5 Disquotation and heuristics for belief ascription
	1.6 The weighing heuristic for reasons
	1.7 Implications for philosophical methodology
2. Overfitting and Degrees of Freedom
	2.1 Error-​fragility
	2.2 Data fitting
	2.3 Overfitting in philosophical analysis
	2.4 Overfitting in semantics
	2.5 Overfitting in logic
	2.6 Overfitting in philosophical model-​building
	2.7 Summing up
3. Case Study: Hyperintensionalism
	3.1 Two revolutions?
	3.2 Extensional, intensional, hyperintensional
	3.3 Hyperintensional semantics: impossible worlds
	3.4 Hyperintensional semantics: truthmakers
	3.5 Hyperintensional semantics: Russellian propositions
	3.6 The ‘why?’ heuristic
4. Frege puzzles
	4.1 Representational hyperintensionality
	4.2 The Fregean consensus
	4.3 The failure of the Fregean consensus
	4.4 Frege puzzles and synonymy
	4.5 Frege puzzles from the inside
	4.6 The necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori
	4.7 Heuristics for belief ascription
	4.8 Heuristics for knowledge ascription
	4.9 Evidence
	4.10 Probability
	4.11 Epistemic and doxastic logic
	4.12 Drawing the threads together
5. Intensional metametaphysics
	5.1 Semantic challenges to metaphysics
	5.2 The coarse-​grained challenge to metaphysics
	5.3 Generalizing the problem
	5.4 The metalinguistic strategy
	5.5 Reconceiving the problem
	5.6 In brief
Bibliography
Index