Origins of Objectivity

Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
PART I......Page 22
1. Introduction......Page 24
Individual Representationalism......Page 33
A Different Standpoint......Page 43
Representation......Page 51
Representation-as and Representational Content......Page 55
Representation Failure and Representation As Of......Page 63
Objectivity......Page 67
Particulars, Attributes, Properties, Relations, Kinds......Page 75
Resources and Conditions......Page 77
Constitutive Conditions and Natures......Page 78
Summary......Page 80
Anti-Individualism: What It Is......Page 82
General Grounds for Anti-Individualism......Page 94
Anti-Individualism Regarding Perception......Page 103
The Shape of Perceptual Psychology......Page 108
Perceptual Psychology Presupposes Anti-Individualism......Page 119
Perceptual Capacities Shared Across Species......Page 122
Individual Representationalism and Perceptual Psychology......Page 124
Perception and Concepts......Page 125
Anti-Individualism and Individual Representationalism......Page 126
PART II......Page 130
4. Individual Representationalism in the Twentieth Century’s First Half......Page 132
Individual Representationalism in Psychology......Page 133
Individual Representationalism in Mainstream Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century......Page 136
Individual Representationalism in “Continental” Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century......Page 150
5. Individual Representationalism after Mid-Century: Preliminaries......Page 158
The Demise of Logical Positivism, Behaviorism, and Descriptivism......Page 161
Descriptivism and the Causal Picture of Reference......Page 164
Individual Representationalism and Anti-Individualism: Again......Page 170
Kant......Page 175
Strawson—Two Projects......Page 177
Strawson on Kant......Page 181
Strawson on Solipsism......Page 183
Strawson on Feature Placing......Page 184
Strawson on Particular-Identification in Thought......Page 192
Strawson on Criteria for Representation......Page 197
Postlude: Strawson on Criteria in Identificational Reference......Page 201
Evans on Strawson......Page 202
Evans on Constraints on Objective Reference in Perception......Page 205
Evans on Demonstrative, Perceptual Thought......Page 212
Evans on Conditions for Representing Kinds and Particular Objects......Page 215
Evans on Spatial Representation in Thought......Page 220
Neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism: Summary......Page 229
7. Language Interpretation and Individual Representationalism: Quine and Davidson......Page 232
Quine’s Starting Point: The Argument from Default Neutrality......Page 233
Interlude: Evans’s Critique of Quine on Referential Indeterminacy......Page 237
Communication and Evidence: Quine’s Notion of the Empirical......Page 244
Before Objective Reference: The Pre-Individuative Stage......Page 248
Truth Conditions and Structure......Page 251
The Pre-Individuative Stage: Proximal Stimulation and the Physical Environment......Page 253
Divided Reference: The Supplemental Linguistic Apparatus......Page 256
Quantification......Page 259
Further Elements in Quine’s Individuative Apparatus......Page 271
The Basic Assumption......Page 275
Identity and Resemblance......Page 281
Davidson on Conditions for Objective Empirical Representation......Page 285
Davidson’s Two Arguments......Page 288
Davidson on Belief......Page 297
Language-Centered Individual Representationalism: Summary......Page 302
A Retrospective on Individual Representationalism......Page 304
PART III......Page 310
8. Biological and Methodological Backgrounds......Page 312
Deflationary Conceptions of Representation; Biological Function and Representational Function......Page 313
Representational Function and Natural Norms......Page 329
The Lower Border of Perception: Sensory Information Registration and Perception......Page 336
Perception and the Environment: The ‘Disjunction Problem’......Page 340
Primitive Agency......Page 347
Perceptual Psychology and the Distinction between Sensory Information Registration and Perception......Page 363
9. Origins......Page 388
Perception as the Individual’s......Page 390
Perception as Sensory......Page 397
Perception as Representation......Page 400
Perception as Objectification......Page 417
Perception as Objectification as Opposed to Perception as Extraction of Form......Page 437
Phylogenetic Distribution of Perceptual Systems......Page 440
Examples of the Sensory-Registration/Perception Distinction......Page 442
Perception, Representation, Propositional Knowledge......Page 451
Perception and Body......Page 458
Perception and Origins of Mathematical Capacities......Page 492
Perception and Origins of Spatial Representation......Page 513
Perception and Origins of Temporal Representation......Page 539
Association, Computation, Representation......Page 550
The Epistemic Status of Constitutive Principles Governing Perception......Page 553
The Upper Border of the Perceptual: Perception and Propositional Attitudes......Page 558
Propositional Attitudes, Individual Representationalism, and Conceptualization of Perception......Page 565
Origins, Levels, and Types of Objectivity......Page 568
Bibliography......Page 573
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