Ontology and the ambitions of metaphysics

Content: Cover
 Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
 Copyright
 Dedication
 Contents
 Preface
 Acknowledgments
 How to Read This Book
 1: Ontology and Metaphysics
 1.1 Introduction
 1.2 Four Problems in Ontology
 1.2.1 Numbers
 1.2.2 Ordinary Objects
 1.2.3 Properties
 1.2.4 Propositions
 1.3 Two Kinds of Ontological Questions
 1.4 Three Puzzles About Ontology
 1.4.1 Is Philosophical Ontology an Incoherent Project?
 1.4.2 The First Puzzle: How Hard?
 1.4.3 The Second Puzzle: How Important?
 1.4.4 TheThird Puzzle: How Philosophical?
 1.5 Towards a Solution. 2: Innocent Statements and Their Metaphysically Loaded Counterparts
 2.1 The Trivial Arguments
 2.2 The Standard Solutions to the Metaphysical Puzzle
 2.3 Some Syntactic and Semantic Puzzles
 2.3.1 The Number of Moons of Jupiter
 2.3.2 Is Four
 2.3.3 Substitution Failure
 2.3.4 The Obviousness of the Equivalence
 2.3.5 The Puzzle of Extravagance
 2.4 Solving the Syntactic and Semantic Puzzles
 2.4.1 The Function of the Cleft Construction
 2.4.2 Focus and Communication
 2.4.3 Questions, Answers, and Focus
 2.4.4 Another Look at the Loaded Counterparts:The Numbers Case. 2.5 Explaining the Focus Effect
 2.5.1 The Argument Against the Standard Solutions
 2.5.2 The Explanation
 2.6 A Solution to the Syntactic and Semantic Puzzles
 2.6.1 Numbers
 2.6.2 Properties
 2.6.3 Propositions
 2.6.4 Content Carving Without Tears
 2.7 On to the Second Step
 2.8 Appendix: Focus and Identity Statements
 3: Quantification
 3.1 The Significance of Quantification
 3.2 The (Fairly) Uncontroversial FactsAbout Quantifiers
 3.2.1 The Structure of Quantified Noun Phrases
 3.2.2 "There Is" Is Not a Quantifier
 3.2.3 Singular and Plural Quantifiers
 3.2.4 The Domain Conditions Reading. 3.3 Semantic Underspecification
 3.4 Quantifiers as a Source of Underspecification
 3.4.1 How to Settle the Issue
 3.4.2 The Communicative Function of Quantifiers
 3.4.3 Inferential Role and Empty Terms
 3.4.4 Some Examples
 3.4.5 Inferential Role and Truth Conditions
 3.4.6 How the Readings Are Related, but Different
 3.5 Compare and Contrast
 3.5.1 Substitutional Quantification
 3.5.2 Meinong and Non-Existent Objects
 3.5.3 Carnap on Internal and External Questions
 3.5.4 Lightweight and Heavyweight Quantifiers
 3.6 The Solution to the First Puzzle
 3.7 Appendix: Generalized Quantifiers. 4: Internalism, Externalism, and the Ontological Question
 4.1 Internalism and Externalism
 4.2 Towards a Solution to the Second andThird Puzzles
 4.3 Internalism and the Answer to the Ontological Question
 4.4 How to Settle the Issue
 5: Talk About Natural Numbers
 5.1 Frege's Other Puzzle
 5.2 How the Puzzle Can't Be Solved
 5.3 Number Determiners
 5.3.1 Determiners and Quantifiers
 5.3.2 Bare Determiners
 5.3.3 Complex Determiners and Quantifiers
 5.3.4 Arithmetic-Like Bare Determiner Statements
 5.4 Numbers and Arithmetic
 5.4.1 Basic Arithmetical Statements
 5.4.2 Learning Basic Arithmetic.