On Believing and Being Convinced

Cover
Title page
Copyright page
On Believing and Being Convinced
	Contents
	1 Introduction
	2 Conviction and Its Doxastic Neighbourhood
		2.1 A Kantian Approach to the Doxastic Attitudes
		2.2 Natural Language on Thinking, Conviction, and Certainty
		2.3 The Failure of the Lockean Threshold View
	3 Degrees of Conviction and the Reduction of Outright States
		3.1 Degrees of Conviction
		3.2 The Kantian Threshold View
	4 The Metaphysics of Belief and Degrees of Conviction
		4.1 What Is Belief?
		4.2 From Belief’s Dispositions to Degrees of Conviction
	5 The Sui Generity of Degrees of Conviction
		5.1 Degrees of Conviction Are Not Degrees of Confidence
(Credences)
		5.2 Degrees of Conviction Are Not Degrees
of Phenomenal Conviction
		5.3 Degrees of Conviction Are Not Degrees of Revisability
		5.4 What Are Degrees of Belief?
	6 Belief-Suspension Compatibilism
		6.1 Incompatibilism and the Species of Suspension
		6.2 Masking a Belief’s Dispositions
		6.3 Belief-Suspension Compatibilism
		6.4 Consequences of Believing Suspension
	7 Was Kant a Kantian about Doxastic States? by Christopher Benzenberg
		7.1 Kant on Opinion, Conviction, and Certainty
		7.2 Belief in Kant
References
Acknowledgements