Objectivity and the rule of law

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Preface......Page 13
1.1 Brief Preliminary Remarks......Page 17
1.2 Types of Objectivity......Page 18
1.2.1 Objectivity qua Mind-Independence......Page 19
1.2.2 Objectivity qua Determinate Correctness......Page 30
1.2.2.1. Indeterminacy Overestimated......Page 31
1.2.2.1.1. Unwarranted Generalizations from Appellate Cases......Page 32
1.2.2.1.2. Indemonstrability versus Indeterminacy......Page 33
1.2.2.1.4. Indeterminacy versus Uncertainty......Page 35
1.2.2.1.5. Indeterminacy versus Ultimacy......Page 37
1.2.2.1.6. Executive Discretion......Page 41
1.2.2.2. Indeterminacy Underestimated......Page 49
1.2.3 Objectivity qua Uniform Applicability......Page 54
1.2.3.1. Uniformity versus Individualization......Page 57
1.2.3.2. Uniform Applicability versus Neutrality......Page 61
1.2.4 Objectivity qua Transindividual Discernibility......Page 62
1.2.5.1. Impartiality Distinguished from Neutrality......Page 69
1.2.5.2. Disinterestedness......Page 70
1.2.5.3. Open-Mindedness......Page 74
1.2.5.4. Open-Mindedness in a Juridical Setting......Page 76
1.2.5.5. Why Impartiality?......Page 80
1.2.6 Objectivity qua Truth-Aptitude......Page 84
1.2.6.1. Correspondence Theories of Truth Deflated......Page 89
1.2.6.2. Does Anyone Doubt the Semantic Objectivity of Legal Discourse?......Page 91
1.2.6.3. Two Caveats......Page 92
1.2.6.4. The Internal Standards Doctrine......Page 94
1.2.7.1. Objectivity qua Rational Requisiteness......Page 98
1.2.7.2. Objectivity qua Invariance......Page 102
1.2.7.3. Objectivity qua Corrigibility......Page 107
1.2.7.4. Objectivity qua Nonillusiveness......Page 108
1.2.7.5. Objectivity qua Susceptibility to Reasons......Page 112
1.3 A Pithy Conclusion......Page 116
CHAPTER 2 Elements of the Rule of Law......Page 117
2.1 Of the Essence of Law......Page 119
2.1.1 Governance by General Norms......Page 125
2.1.2 Public Ascertainability......Page 129
2.1.3 Prospectivity......Page 134
2.1.4 Perspicuity......Page 138
2.1.5 Against Conflicts and Contradictions......Page 141
2.1.6 Compliability......Page 146
2.1.7 Steadiness over Time......Page 148
2.1.8 Congruence between Formulation and Implementation......Page 150
2.2 The Rule of Law as a Moral Ideal......Page 158
2.2.1 Governance by General Norms......Page 160
2.2.2 Public Ascertainability......Page 166
2.2.3 Prospectivity......Page 170
2.2.4 Perspicuity......Page 172
2.2.5 Against Conflicts and Contradictions......Page 174
2.2.6 Compliability......Page 180
2.2.7 Steadiness over Time......Page 186
2.2.8 Congruence between Formulation and Implementation......Page 189
2.3 Conclusion......Page 199
CHAPTER 3 Objectivity and Law's Moral Authority......Page 203
3.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Matter of Observational Mind-Independence......Page 204
3.2 The Authoritativeness Doctrine......Page 205
3.3 Weak Observational Mind-Independence?......Page 210
3.4 Strong Observational Mind-Dependence and Indeterminacy......Page 217
3.5 Other Types of Indeterminacy......Page 222
3.6 Why Is Rampant Indeterminacy Destructive of Moral Authority?......Page 226
3.7.1 Coleman and Leiter on Indeterminacy......Page 232
3.7.2 Waldron on Disagreement and Determinacy......Page 240
3.8 Conclusion......Page 246
Bibliographic Notes......Page 249
References......Page 253
Index......Page 257