Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy

Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation......Page 4
Copyright Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 8
Foreword......Page 12
Preface......Page 14
Acknowledgments......Page 16
Contributors......Page 18
Objectives for This Book......Page 24
Nuclear Security in the Twenty-First Century......Page 26
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation......Page 29
Summary......Page 36
Part I: Technologies and Processes for the Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Material......Page 38
International Control or Secrecy and Denial: From 1945 to Atoms for Peace......Page 40
International Collaboration and Technology Sharing: Atoms for Peace to the Late 1960s......Page 42
Efforts to Stem Nuclear Proliferation: The 1970s Through the 1980s......Page 44
Cheaters, Rogue States, and Terrorists: The Early 1990s to 2006......Page 47
More Wake-Up Calls for Nuclear Security......Page 48
The Continuing Evolution of IAEA Safeguards......Page 50
Summary......Page 52
Further Readings......Page 53
Destructive Analysis......Page 54
Nondestructive Assay (NDA)......Page 56
Calorimetry......Page 75
Handheld Gamma-Ray Instruments......Page 80
Summary......Page 83
Introduction......Page 86
Nuclear Reactor Designs......Page 87
Radiological Characteristics......Page 89
Plutonium Production......Page 90
Spent Fuel Storage......Page 91
IAEA Safeguards......Page 92
Cerenkov Radiation......Page 93
Passive Gamma-Ray and Neutron Total Counting......Page 94
Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy......Page 95
High-Energy Gamma Tomography......Page 96
Active Neutron Coincidence Counting......Page 97
Summary......Page 98
Introduction......Page 100
Gamma-Ray Signatures and Equipment......Page 101
Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) Assay Method......Page 102
Performing the GGH Measurement and Assay......Page 103
Holdup Measurement System Examples......Page 104
Neutron Holdup Measurements......Page 106
Accuracy of Gamma-Ray and Neutron Holdup Measurements......Page 108
Introduction......Page 110
Process Overview......Page 111
Physical Protection System Design......Page 114
Physical Protection System Design and the Relationship to Risk......Page 117
Summary......Page 118
Further Readings......Page 119
Introduction......Page 120
The Concept of Significant Quantities of Nuclear Material and Timeliness of Detection......Page 121
Facilities in the IAEA Context......Page 122
Basic Goals of IAEA Safeguards at LWRs......Page 124
The MBA and KMP Safeguards Concepts Applied to LWRs......Page 125
Inspection Frequency at LWRs......Page 128
LWR PIV Inspection......Page 129
Summary......Page 135
Background......Page 136
What is an Unattended Monitoring System?......Page 137
Cost Advantages of UMS......Page 138
UMS Design Considerations......Page 139
Authentication......Page 141
Tamper-Indicating Features......Page 142
Security Solution: Virtual Private Network......Page 143
Wireless Solution......Page 144
System Components......Page 146
Surveillance Data Generator......Page 147
Radiation Data Generators......Page 148
Dedicated Simple Systems......Page 149
Advanced Thermohydraulic Power Monitor......Page 151
Dedicated Complex Systems......Page 153
Pre-Field Installation Testing......Page 155
Summary......Page 156
The Need for Evaluation......Page 158
Evolving Safeguards Objectives......Page 159
Performance Objectives: Verification, Deterrence, and Assurance......Page 160
Proliferation Pathways......Page 162
Defining a State-Level Safeguards Approach......Page 163
Proliferation Actions to Be Detected......Page 165
Estimating Detection Capability......Page 167
Producing Pathway-Level Results......Page 171
Evaluating State-Level Safeguards System Performance......Page 172
Introduction......Page 174
Background......Page 175
Review of Relevant Statistical Topics......Page 176
Measurement Error Models......Page 177
Sequential Testing......Page 179
Verifying Declarations......Page 181
Related Topics......Page 184
Summary......Page 187
Introduction......Page 188
International Safeguards......Page 190
Reprocessing and Safeguards......Page 192
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Safeguards Technologies......Page 197
Summary......Page 201
Introduction......Page 202
Overview of Safeguards History and Approach at the BN-350......Page 204
Summary......Page 216
Part II: Detecting Nuclear Proliferation and Verifying the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Programs......Page 218
Open-Source Analysis......Page 220
Search Strategies......Page 223
Sources for Data Collection......Page 228
Analyzing S&T Capabilities......Page 233
Assessing Military R&D Capabilities......Page 239
Additional Open-Source Analysis Software Tools......Page 240
Acknowledgments......Page 243
Introduction......Page 244
Commercial Satellite Imagery: A New Basis for Modern Geospatial Awareness and Global Transparency......Page 245
Imagery Analysis: The Process......Page 250
The Utility of Commercial Satellite Imagery for the Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Facilities......Page 254
Summary......Page 270
Epilogue......Page 271
History......Page 274
Verification......Page 276
Seismic Monitoring......Page 277
Hydroacoustic Monitoring......Page 279
Atmospheric Radionuclide Monitoring......Page 280
Communications......Page 281
Onsite Inspections......Page 282
Further Readings......Page 283
Introduction......Page 286
Peaceful Use vs. Peaceful Purpose......Page 287
Indicators of Peaceful Uses......Page 288
Fulfillment of NPT Article III (Safeguards) Obligations......Page 296
Coherence of a State’s Nuclear Energy Program......Page 298
Geopolitical Cooperation......Page 302
Analysis of Case Studies: Brazil and Iran......Page 303
Summary......Page 304
Introduction......Page 306
Why Did South Africa Pursue the Bomb?......Page 312
Nuclear Weapons......Page 315
Peaceful Nuclear Explosives......Page 316
Research, Development, and Weaponization......Page 317
How Did South Africa Eliminate Its Weapons Program?......Page 318
The IAEA Unravels the Scope of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program......Page 319
The IAEA Verifies South Africa’s Dismantlement......Page 320
Implementation of the Dismantlement Plans......Page 322
Security Concerns......Page 323
Domestic Politics......Page 324
International Politics and Economics......Page 325
Remaining Proliferation Concerns......Page 327
Can South Africa Serve as a Nuclear Rollback Model to North Korea and Iran?......Page 328
Summary......Page 329
Introduction......Page 330
Motivations for Acquiring the Capability to Build Nuclear Weapon......Page 331
Reservations and Constraints......Page 333
Pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons Option......Page 334
Domestic Determinants of the Rollback Decisions......Page 337
International Factors Influencing the Argentine and Brazilian Rollback Decisions......Page 344
Summary......Page 351
Nuclear Intentions, 1969–2003......Page 354
Nuclear Capability: 1970s and 1980s......Page 356
Nuclear Capability: The 1990s and Beyond......Page 360
Giving Up the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons......Page 366
Intelligence......Page 370
Dismantlement and Verification......Page 371
Summary......Page 374
Weapons-Usable Materials and Their Availability......Page 376
Efforts to Control and Eliminate Fissile Materials......Page 378
HEU Disposition Efforts......Page 379
Plutonium Disposition Efforts......Page 386
Implementation Challenges of the PMDA......Page 392
Summary......Page 398
Background......Page 400
Objectives of Dismantlement......Page 401
Scope and Limitations......Page 402
The 5 MWe Nuclear Reactor......Page 403
Radiochemical Laboratory......Page 405
Decommissioning Options......Page 407
Decommissioning of Key Elements......Page 408
Decommissioning the Radiochemical Laboratory......Page 412
Liquid HLW, Chemical Decladding Waste, and the Radiochemical Laboratory......Page 414
Facilities Required for Waste Management in the DPRK......Page 416
Summary......Page 421
Part III: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism and Illicit Nuclear Trade......Page 424
Introduction......Page 426
Improvised Nuclear Devices from Inadequately Secured Fissile Materials......Page 427
Five Characteristics of Fissile Materials......Page 430
Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System......Page 432
Other Vulnerabilities......Page 434
Today’s Greatest Threats......Page 435
Background: Post-9/11 Environment Highlights the Threat of Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Terrorism......Page 438
Materials: Today’s Concern Is Not Only for Direct Weapons Material But for Radioactive Sources as Well......Page 439
International Monitoring of Nuclear Trafficking......Page 441
Combating Nuclear Trafficking: Building an Integrated and International Response......Page 450
Summary......Page 453
Further Readings......Page 454
The Chain of Nuclear Terror......Page 456
Terrorist Groups with Motivation to Build and Use an IND......Page 457
Types and Availability of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material......Page 458
Acquisition of Fissile Material......Page 459
Manufacture of an Improvised Nuclear Device......Page 461
Nuclear Materials Security at the State Level......Page 465
Russian HEU and Plutonium......Page 466
Summary......Page 474
Introduction......Page 476
Overview of Nuclear and Radiological Materials......Page 477
Sources Used to Alter or Kill Living Cells......Page 478
Sources Used to Provide Power......Page 482
Sources Used for Imaging and Measuring......Page 483
Radiological Source Producers and Suppliers Worldwide......Page 484
Life Cycle of Radiological Sources......Page 485
Options for Reducing Radiological Source Concerns......Page 488
Prioritizing Alternate Technology Options......Page 493
Summary......Page 494
The Evolution of a Threat......Page 496
Evaluating the Threat......Page 498
Risk Assessment......Page 504
Reflection on the Radiological Threat......Page 505
Recovery and Removal......Page 506
Issues and Obstacles......Page 510
Summary......Page 511
Introduction......Page 512
Passive Gamma Detection......Page 513
Commonly Encountered Radioactive Materials......Page 516
Gamma Detection Fundamentals......Page 519
Passive Neutron Detection......Page 527
Neutron Detection Fundamentals......Page 529
Radiography......Page 533
Active Interrogation......Page 534
Introduction......Page 538
Forward and Inverse Models for Material Attribution......Page 539
Spent Fuel RDD Attribution......Page 540
HEU IND Attribution......Page 547
Triage and ReachBack......Page 552
Summary......Page 553
Introduction......Page 554
History of International Nuclear Export Controls......Page 555
Special Issues Associated with Technology Controls......Page 558
Reasons for Denial of a Nuclear Export......Page 560
Additional Factors to Be Considered in Reviewing an Export Application......Page 565
The U.S. System of Nuclear Export Controls......Page 566
Summary......Page 568
Introduction......Page 572
The Evolving Threat and the International Response......Page 573
Implementation of the Export Control Enforcement Mission......Page 574
Future Challenges and Opportunities......Page 580
Insight into the Khan Network......Page 584
The A.Q. Khan Network Exposed......Page 591
Khan’s Public Admission......Page 592
Challenges That Lie Ahead......Page 594
Summary......Page 596
A......Page 598
C......Page 599
D......Page 600
F......Page 601
H......Page 602
I......Page 603
L......Page 605
N......Page 606
P......Page 609
R......Page 610
S......Page 612
U......Page 613
W......Page 614
Z......Page 615