Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis

Cover......Page 1
Half-Title Page......Page 3
Title Page......Page 5
Copyright Page......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgments......Page 13
Preface......Page 15
 1.1. Introduction......Page 17
 1.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk......Page 20
  1.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards......Page 21
  1.2.2. Contamination of the environment, including the anthroposphere, by radionuclides......Page 23
  1.2.3. Exposure to radiation......Page 27
 1.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna)......Page 33
  1.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation......Page 34
  1.3.2. The dose–response relationship......Page 36
  1.3.3. Recommended threshold values......Page 38
  1.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects......Page 40
  1.4.2. Dose–response relationships for average doses: epidemiological studies......Page 41
  1.4.3. Responses to low doses......Page 42
 1.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation......Page 48
 1.6. Risk perception......Page 51
  1.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident......Page 52
  1.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy......Page 53
  1.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power......Page 54
  1.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk......Page 57
 1.7. Conclusion......Page 58
 2.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk......Page 61
  2.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990......Page 62
  2.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day......Page 63
  2.2.3. The example of France......Page 64
  2.2.4. Future change?......Page 66
  2.3.1. Introduction: what is REX?......Page 67
  2.3.2. The overall REX process......Page 68
  2.3.3. Causes of REX failure......Page 70
  2.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents......Page 71
  2.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents......Page 73
  2.4.3. Medical accidents......Page 88
  2.5.1. Transnational exercises......Page 93
  2.5.2. National exercises......Page 94
  2.6.1. A common severity scale......Page 96
  2.6.3. Reporting systems......Page 97
  2.6.4. Websites......Page 98
 2.7. Conclusion......Page 99
  3.1.1. Safety history......Page 101
  3.1.2. The main safety objectives......Page 102
  3.1.3. Defense in depth......Page 103
  3.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety......Page 104
  3.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations......Page 106
  3.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state......Page 108
  3.2.2. The IAEA......Page 110
  3.2.3. The NEA......Page 111
  3.2.4. The ICRP......Page 114
  3.2.5. UNSCEAR......Page 115
  3.2.7. The IRSN at international level......Page 116
  3.3.1. Euratom......Page 117
  3.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process......Page 118
 3.4. French actions......Page 119
 3.5. Advances in nuclear safety......Page 122
  3.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel......Page 123
  3.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions......Page 126
  3.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases......Page 127
  3.5.4. Consequences of a fire......Page 128
  3.5.5. Knowing more about corium......Page 129
  3.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems......Page 131
  3.5.8. Improving modeling......Page 132
  3.6.1. Determination of the source term......Page 134
  3.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment......Page 135
  3.6.3. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in aquatic environments......Page 136
 3.7. Advances in radiation protection......Page 137
  3.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system......Page 138
  3.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident......Page 141
  3.8.1. Cooling pools......Page 144
  3.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility......Page 145
 3.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences......Page 146
 3.10. Conclusion......Page 147
 4.1. Introduction......Page 149
 4.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods......Page 150
  4.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor......Page 151
  4.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident......Page 152
 4.3. Population management in the emergency phase......Page 154
  4.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population......Page 156
  4.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population......Page 157
  4.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets......Page 168
  4.4.1. Recommended values......Page 172
  4.4.2. Regulatory values......Page 174
  4.5.1. International recommendations......Page 176
  4.5.2. The texts of the various states......Page 179
 4.6. The organization of crisis management in France......Page 180
  4.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan......Page 181
  4.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management......Page 183
  4.6.4. The internal emergency plan......Page 184
  4.6.5. The plan particulier d’intervention (PPI, special intervention plans)......Page 186
  4.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI......Page 196
 4.7. Exiting the emergency phase......Page 198
 4.8. Conclusion......Page 199
 5.1. Introduction......Page 201
 5.2. The actions to be taken......Page 202
  5.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken......Page 203
  5.2.2. Actions during the transitional period......Page 204
  5.2.3. Long-term actions......Page 205
  5.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident......Page 206
  5.3.1. Management of aquatic environments......Page 207
  5.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments......Page 209
 5.4. Managing the anthroposphere......Page 211
  5.4.2. Nuclear waste management......Page 212
  5.4.3. Agricultural management......Page 213
  5.4.4. Managing the economy......Page 218
  5.4.5. Food supply management......Page 219
  5.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation......Page 220
  5.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations......Page 222
  5.5.4. Health monitoring of exposed populations......Page 224
  5.5.5. The return of evacuated populations......Page 225
  5.5.7. Human dignity......Page 227
  5.6.1. International and European recommendations......Page 228
  5.6.2. French doctrine......Page 231
 5.7. Conclusion......Page 237
 6.1. Introduction......Page 239
 6.2. Malicious acts......Page 240
  6.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko......Page 241
  6.2.3. Arafat’s death......Page 242
 6.3. Possible terrorist attacks......Page 244
  6.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb......Page 245
  6.3.4. The release of radioactive material......Page 247
  6.3.5. Cyber-attacks......Page 248
 6.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field......Page 249
  6.4.1. The health consequences......Page 250
  6.4.2. The psychological consequences......Page 252
  6.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks......Page 253
 6.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat......Page 256
  6.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation......Page 258
  6.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides......Page 261
  6.6.3. The actions to be taken......Page 263
  6.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials......Page 264
 6.7. Conclusion......Page 265
  7.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities......Page 269
  7.1.2. The causes of accidents......Page 270
 7.2. The environmental consequences of accidents......Page 271
 7.3. The health consequences of accidents......Page 272
 7.4. The economic consequences of accidents......Page 276
 7.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents......Page 278
 7.7. Perception of nuclear risk......Page 280
 7.8. Public information......Page 281
References......Page 285
Acronyms and Abbreviations......Page 355
Index......Page 371
Other titles from iSTE in Ecological Science......Page 373
EULA......Page 375