North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un (Lexington Studies on Korea's Place in International Relations)

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
	Overview
		Pyongyang’s Policy Changes
		Pyongyang’s Initial Framing
		Policy Question
	Definition of Risk
	Research Methodology
		Within-Case Method
		Case Study of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
		Causal Mechanism
		Three Leaders and Multiple Observations
	Outline of the Book
	Notes
Chapter 1: Realism and Liberalism on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
	Realist Approach
		Determined to Seek Nuclear Deterrence
		Pursuing Expansionist Ambitions
		Resolving Security Concerns
		Criticism
	Liberal Approaches
		Reciprocal Behavior
		Pyongyang’s Changed Nature
		Criticism
	Explanations by Domestic Determinants
		Domestic Political Structure
		History and Culture
		Criticism
	Explanation by Prospect Theory
	Summary
		Points of Agreement
		Points of Disagreement
		Where Does This Book Go from Here?
	Notes
Chapter 2: Theorizing the North Korean Nuclear Risk-Taking: Prospect Theory
	Prospect Theory and Decision-Making Under Risk
		Reference Dependence
		Risk-Taking Tendency: Risk-Aversion versus Risk-Acceptance
		Loss-Aversion
		Shifts of Reference
		Probability Weighting Function and the Certainty Effect
		Framing and Evaluation
	Prospect Theory, Weaker States, and Foreign Policy
	Framing
		Strategic Interaction
		Domestic–International Interactions
		Weaker States
		Dynamic Change in Framing
	Evaluation: Choosing a Foreign Policy Option
		Loss-Aversion and Status Quo Bias in the International Domain
		Catastrophic Outcome and Preference Reversal
		Domestic Loss-Aversion and International Risk-Taking
	Summary
	Notes
Chapter 3: Kim Il Sung: From Confrontation to Engagement
	Framing North Korea’s Post–Cold War Domain of Action
		Pyongyang’s Situation during the Cold War
		Pyongyang’s Perception during the Cold War
		Change of Situation and the Reference Point after the Cold War
			The Soviet Union
			China
			North Korea’s Economic Situation
			Pyongyang’s External Perception
	Evaluating North Korea’s Policy Options after the Cold War
		Relative Riskiness of Each Policy Option
			Confronting the United States with a Nuclear Program
			Engaging the United States
			Relative Riskiness of Two Policy Options
		Pyongyang’s Policy Decision
	Reframing North Korea’s Domain of Action: June 1994
		Change in Pyongyang’s International Situation
			UN Sanctions
			U.S. Military Strikes
		Change of Pyongyang’s Perception and Risk-Taking Attitude
	Pyongyang Changed Its Course of Action: June 1994
		From Confrontation to Engagement
	Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1989–1994
		Domestic Stability
		Leadership Succession
		Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
	Summary
	Notes
Chapter 4: Kim Jong Il: From Engagement to Confrontation
	The Agreed Framework, the Clinton Administration, and North Korea: Post-June 1994
		Pyongyang’s Improving International Situation
			The Agreed Framework
			Improving Relations between Pyongyang and Washington
		Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Engaging the United States
			Implementation of the Agreed Framework
			Missile Moratorium
			Reaching out to Washington
			Avoiding Losses and Seeking Gains
	The Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration, and North Korea: Pre-October 2002
		Pyongyang’s Changing Situation: Returning to Losses
			Pyongyang’s Increasing Threat Perception
			The Bush Administration’s Perception of North Korea
			September 11 and the “Axis of Evil”
		Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: From Engagement to Restraint
	The Collapse of the Agreed Framework: October 2002
		Reframing Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Losses
			The Kelly Visit and the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program
			Pyongyang’s Subsequent Perception of the United States
		Pyongyang Changes Its Course of Action: From Restraint to Confrontation
	The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Post-October 2002
		Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Growing Losses
			The Iraq War
			Six-Party Talks
			Deepening Crisis
		Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Deepening Nuclear Confrontation
	The Six-Party Talks Agreements and Nuclear Tests: 2005–2011
		Pyongyang’s Perception of Threat
			The Six-Party Talks Agreements and U.S. Policy toward North Korea
			The Obama Administration and Pyongyang’s Perception
		Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Conducting Two Nuclear Tests amid Six-Party Talks
	Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1995–2011
		Food Crisis and “Arduous March”: Seeking Help and Saving the Regime
		Regime Stability under Kim Jong Il
		Leadership Succession to Kim Jong Un
	Summary
	Notes
Chapter 5: Kim Jong Un: Between Confrontation and Engagement
	The “Byungjin” and Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: 2012–2017
		Pyongyang’s Perception: A New Leadership and the Need for Nuclear Deterrence
			China and Kim Jong Un Regime
			The Obama Administration and Kim Jong Un Regime
			Pyongyang’s Threat Perception
		Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Byungjin and Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability
			Byungjin and Nuclear Tests
			Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability
	Inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korean Summits: 2018–2019
		Pyongyang’s Perception: Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence
			Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence Capability
			The Trump Administration and “America First”
		Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Summits with South Korea and the United States
			The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula
			Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore
			Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018
	The Collapse of Summits and “Head-on Breakthrough”: After 2020
		Pyongyang’s Perception: Returning to the Past
			Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime
			Pyongyang’s Perception at Hanoi and After
		Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Returning to Confrontation
	Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy in the Kim Jong Un Era
		Regime Stability under Kim Jong Un
			COVID-19 and the Kim Jong Un Regime
	Summary
	Notes
Conclusion
	Competing Explanations
	Some Implications for Future Study
		The Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis
		Implications for Other Cases
		Theoretical Implications
	Note
Bibliography
Index
About the Author