Morality: From Error to Fiction

Cover
Morality: From Error to Fiction
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Part I: Morality in Error
	1: Mackie’s Arguments for Error Theory
		Introduction: Mackie’s Moral Error Theory
		Mackie’s Conceptual Premise
		The Argument from Moral Diversity
		The Argument from Strangeness
		The Argument from Objectification
		Summing up Mackie’s Arguments
	2: Argument by Elimination
		Introduction
		Against the Noncognitivists
		Against the Moral Non-objectivists
		Against the Non-naturalists
		Against the Moral Intuitionists
		Summary
	3: The Naturalist’s Case for Error Theory
		Introduction: Naturalizing Morality
		Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives
		Moral Imperatives Are Not Hypothetical Imperatives
		Are Moral Imperatives Institutional Categorical Imperatives?
		Speaking from within an Institution
		Moral Naturalism and the Holy Grail
		Summing up: A Dilemma for the Moral Naturalist
	4: The Argument from Moral Responsibility
		Introduction: The Argument from Moral Responsibility
		The Case against Moral Responsibility
		Morality without Moral Responsibility
		Apologies, Forgiveness, and Guilt
		Virtue and Vice without Moral Responsibility
	5: Defenses of Moral Error Theory
		Introduction
		Is Moral Error Theory Incoherent?
		Can Moral Error Theorists Really Love Anyone?
		Companions in Guilt Arguments
		Why Stop at Morality?
		The Challenge from Moorean Epistemology
		The Moral Indispensability Argument
		The Defense Rests
Part II: Morality as Fiction
	6: After Error Theory: The “What Next?” Question
		Introduction: What Is Fictionalism?
		Everyday Useful Falsehoods
		The “What Next?” Question Asked by an Individual
		The “What Next?” Question Asked by a Group
		The Normativity of the “What Next?” Question
		The Modality of the “What Next?” Question
		Recap
	7: A Theory of Moral Fictionalism
		Introduction: Preliminaries
		The Benefits of a Believed Morality
		Taking Stock
		The Suspension of Disbelief
		The Paradox of Happiness
		The Benefits of a Fictionalized Morality
		A Fictionalized Morality Is Better than a Believed Morality
		Taxonomic Loose Ends
	8: Defenses of Moral Fictionalism
		Introduction
		Metaphors in Defense of Fictionalism
		Fictionalism versus Abolitionism
		Fictionalism versus Conservationism
		The Defense Rests (Again)
	Epilogue: Meta-metaethics—Are there Many Right Ways?
		Introduction: Locke’s Pancakes
		The Canberra Plan
		Magicians and Witches
		The Dangers of Imperfect Deservers
		The Oddity of Ecumenical Belief
References
Index