Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy (International Studies in Entrepreneurship, 56)

Preface
Contents
About the Editors
Part I: Introductory Chapter
	Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy
		Introduction
		Questioning the Entrepreneurial State
			The Critique
			The Rationale Behind This Volume
		Historical and Conceptual Background to Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy
		How to Read this Volume
		Part II: Theoretical Perspectives
		Part III: Empirical Evidence
			Exaggerated Claims Regarding the Role of the State
			Three Case Studies of Failed MOIPs
			Laudatory Self-Evaluations by Government Agencies
			Main Takeaways from Parts II and III
		Part IV: Alternative Paths
		Conclusions and Future Research
		References
Part II: Theoretical Perspectives
	State and Markets: Not Whether But How
		Introduction
		The Case for a Strategic Supply Side Policy Framework
		Mission-Oriented Policies in History
		State and Markets
		References
	Engineering Is Not Entrepreneurship
		Introduction
		Entrepreneurial Government
		Engineering and Entrepreneurship
		Profits and Progress
		Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship
		Government Monopolies
		Government Decision-Makers
		What Goals Make Good Missions?
		Mission-Oriented Democracy
		Choosing Missions
		Conclusion
		References
	A Behavioral Economics Perspective on the Entrepreneurial State and Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy
		Introduction
		Behavioral Political Economy in Innovation Policy
			What Is Behavioral Political Economy?
			Behavioral Political Economy in Innovation Policy
		Is the Mission-Oriented Entrepreneurial State Susceptible to Behavioral Biases?
			Mission Orientation as a Political Commitment
			Loss Aversion
			Picking Missions
		The Cognitively Biased Argument for the Mission-Oriented Approach
		Conclusions
		References
	Innovationism and the New Public Intellectuals
		Introduction
		Public Intellectuals
		Innovationism
		The Role of the New Public Intellectuals
		The Vanity Trap and Tedious Academia
		The Old and the New Public Intellectuals
		References
Part III: Empirical Evidence
	Analyzing the Effectiveness of State-Guided Innovation
		Introduction
		The Debate
		Use Case Analysis
			Use Case #1: Touch Screen Technology
			Use Case #2: GPS
			Observations
		Public Sector Entrepreneurship
		Conclusion
		References
	A Case Study on DARPA: An Exemplar for Government Strategic Structuring to Foster Innovation?
		Introduction
		DARPA´s History and Construct
		Factor 1: Trust and Autonomy
		Factor 2: Small Size and Externalization of Research
		Factor 3: Limited Tenure and Urgency
		Empirical Analysis
		Conclusion
		References
	The State of the Entrepreneurial State: Empirical Evidence of Mission-Led Innovation Projects around the Globe
		Introduction
		Methods and Literature Overview of Missions
		Results
			Mission Types and Settings
			Types of Mission Deployment
			Mission Launch Date and Duration
			Governance and Actors Involved in Missions
			Leadership and Institutional Entrepreneurship in Missions
		Evaluating Missions
			Learning from a Selected Sample
			Mission Types, Risks of Failure, and Mission Capture
		Discussion
		Conclusions
		Appendix: Studies in the Literature Review
		References
	When ``What Works´´ Does Not Work: The United States´ Mission to End Homelessness
		Introduction
		A Very Brief History
			From the Linear Model to Housing First
		The Emergence of a Mission for Homelessness
			The Preconditions
			Opening Doors: The Federal Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness
		Results
			The Four Goals
		Federal Strategies Through the Period
			Federal Homelessness Funding
			Advancing Housing First
			Revisions to the Federal Mission
			A Brief Tide-Turning
			Lessons (Not) Learned
		Takeaways
			The Mirage of ``What Works´´
			Whither State Leadership?
		Conclusion
		References
	The Cost of Missions: Lessons from Brazilian Shipbuilding
		Introduction
		From Institutions to Missions
			Mission-Oriented Policies and Industrial Innovation
			Can MOPs Really Create Markets?
			Capability-Building Costs in Catching up and Innovation
		The ``New´´ Mission Case: Policy for Innovation in the Brazilian Shipbuilding and Offshore Industry
			Routes and Direction: Setting Policy to Create the Market
			From Market Creation to Building Production and Technological Capabilities
		The Cost of a Mission-Oriented Policy: From Market Creation to Market Failure
		Concluding Remarks
		References
	You Can´t Develop What You Don´t Know: The Realities and Limitations of Foreign Aid Missions
		Introduction
		Theory
			What Is a Mission Economy?
			The Knowledge Problem
			Political Economy Problems
		Foreign Aid: Mazzucato´s Principles in Action
			Collectively Creating Value
			Market Shaping
			Building Up Government Capabilities
			Budgeting Based on the Desired Outcomes
			Pre-Distributing Risks and Rewards
			Embracing Stakeholder Value
			Open Systems and Co-Designing the Future
		Conclusion
		References
	A Public Choice Perspective on Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies and the Behavior of Government Agencies
		Introduction
		Background: Innovation Policy and Missions
		Public Choice Theory and Mission-Oriented Policies
			Public Choice and the Incentives of Government Agencies
		Method
			Data Analysis
		Results
			Empirical Background
			Evaluations of Innovation Policies in Sweden
			Examples of Critical Policy Evaluations
			How Government Agencies Use Evaluations
		Discussion
			Evaluations Are Positive but Lack Evidence
			Dependent Evaluators Are More Positive in Their Evaluations
			Evaluations Are Referred to in a Positive Manner
			Critical Evaluations Receive Little Attention
			Government Agencies as Special Interests
		Conclusions, Implications, and Future Research
		References
	Learning from Overrated Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies: Seven Takeaways
		Introduction
		Learning from Historical Missions
			Nixon´s War on Cancer
			Boosting Homeownership in the United States
			The Swedish Million Program
		Learning from Mission Failure: Seven Takeaways
			1. Wicked Problems Cannot Be Solved Through Missions
			2. Politicians and Government Agencies Are Not Exempt from Self-Interest
			3. MOIPs Are Subject to Rent Seeking and Mission Capture
			4. MOIPs Distort Competition
			5. Policymakers Lack Information to Design MOIPs Efficiently
			6. Government Support Distorts Incentives and Creates Moral Hazard
			7. MOIPs Ignore Opportunity Costs
		Concluding Remarks
		References
Part IV: Alternative Paths
	The Entrepreneurial State Cannot Deliver Without an Entrepreneurial Society
		Prologue
		The Fallacy of Hindsight
		Mazzucato Meets Schumpeter
		No Entrepreneurial State Without an Entrepreneurial Society
		Epilogue
		References
	Overcoming the Siren Song of Central Planning
		Introduction
		The Siren Song of Control
		The Power of Evolution
			Guided Versus Girded Control and Evolution
			Utopianism
			Market Failure
		How Moral Beliefs Can Defeat the Siren Song of Control
		References
	R&D Tax Incentives as an Alternative to Targeted R&D Subsidies
		Introduction
		Public Support of Private R&D
			Targeted R&D Subsidies
			R&D Tax Incentives
			The Pros and Cons of the Policy Instruments
		Empirical Research on the Efficiency of the Instruments
			Targeted R&D Subsidies
			R&D Tax Incentives
			Targeted Subsidies vs. Tax Incentives
			Theories about the Skewed Distribution of Direct R&D Subsidies
		Conclusions and Implications for Mission-Oriented Policy
		References
	Bottom-Up Policies Trump Top-Down Missions
		Introduction
		Top-Down Missions
		The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem
		A Bottom-Up Approach
			Rule of Law and Property Rights
			Taxation
			Savings and Capital Formation
			Labor Market Regulations and Social Security
			Product Market Regulations
			Insolvency Law
			R&D and Knowledge Spillovers
			Incentives for Human Capital Investment
			In Sum
		Mazzucato on the Bottom-Up Approach
		Conclusion
		References