Mind Ascribed: An elaboration and defence of interpretivism

Mind Ascribed......Page 2
Editorial page......Page 3
Title page......Page 4
LCC data......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Table of contents......Page 8
Acknowledgements......Page 12
1.1 Mind and content: First steps......Page 14
1.2 Truth and meaning......Page 23
1.3 A road map......Page 26
Part I. Towards interpretivism......Page 30
2.1 A general metaphysical scheme: Pleonastic properties and the natural basis......Page 32
2.2 Mind-body relations......Page 45
2.3 Supervenience......Page 47
2.4 Reduction and identity......Page 56
2.5 Realisation and functionalism......Page 70
2.6 Ascription theory and explanatory relations......Page 83
3.1 Varieties of interpretivism......Page 88
3.2 Donald Davidson and radical interpretation......Page 98
3.3 Daniel Dennett and the intentional stance......Page 115
3.4.1 Rationality......Page 131
3.4.2 The sources of evidence for interpretation......Page 134
3.4.3 Explaining meaning......Page 137
Part II.  Elaborating and defending the ascription theory......Page 142
4.1 Common-sense functionalism and the meaning of mental terms......Page 144
4.2 Natural kinds and the reference of mental terms......Page 151
4.3 The role of folk psychology in the ascription theory......Page 158
5.1 Preliminaries......Page 164
5.2 The ascription sources......Page 172
5.3 Modelling the coherence......Page 178
5.4 The canonical ascription......Page 183
5.5 The indeterminacy and uncodifiability of the mental......Page 192
6.1.1 The circularity charge......Page 198
6.1.2 The regress objection......Page 200
6.1.3 Intrinsic intentionality......Page 202
6.1.4 Liberalism and chauvinism......Page 203
6.1.5 Observer-dependence......Page 209
6.2 Arguing for interpretivism......Page 210
6.2.1 The consideration from behavioural criteria......Page 211
6.2.2 The consideration from the publicity of meaning......Page 212
6.2.3 The consideration from folk psychology......Page 214
6.2.4 The consideration from stance-dependent patterns......Page 215
Part III. Extending the view......Page 218
7. Interpretivism and mental causation......Page 220
7.1 Davidson on mental causation......Page 221
7.2 Troubles with the causal role of the mental......Page 226
7.3 Causal explanation and causation......Page 232
7.4 Causal efficacy and causal relevance......Page 237
7.5 The relevance of mental causation......Page 241
8.1 The specificity of perception......Page 246
8.2 The factivity constraint......Page 248
8.3 The veridicality of perception......Page 250
8.4 The content of perceptual states......Page 253
8.5 Non-conceptual content in the ascription theory......Page 256
8.6 Phenomenology, non-conceptual content and protocontent......Page 260
9. Self-knowledge......Page 270
9.1 Approaches to self-knowledge......Page 271
9.2 Self-constitution......Page 273
9.3 First-person operationalism......Page 276
9.4 The idea of a mechanism......Page 280
9.5 The ascriptionist model of self-knowledge......Page 281
10. Conclusion......Page 288
References......Page 292
Index......Page 304
The series Advances in Consciousness Research......Page 307