Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy: 4th International Conference MARBLE 2023, London, United Kingdom (Lecture Notes in Operations Research)

Preface
Contents
Deep Reinforcement Learning-Based Rebalancing Policies for Profit Maximization of Relay Nodes in Payment Channel Networks
	1 Introduction
	2 Background
		2.1 Payment Channel Networks and the Need for Rebalancing
		2.2 The Submarine Swap Rebalancing Mechanism
	3 Problem Formulation
		3.1 System Evolution
		3.2 Writing the Problem as a Markov Decision Process
	4 Heuristic and Reinforcement Learning-Based Policies
		4.1 Heuristic Policies
		4.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm Design
	5 Evaluation
	6 Related Work
	7 Conclusion
	A Causes of Channel Depletion
	B The Submarine Swap Protocol
	C An Equivalent Objective
	D Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm Design Details
		D.1 Helping a Swap-In Succeed
		D.2 Design Choices
		D.3 Practical Applicability
	E Hyperparameters and Rewards
	F Additional Experimental Results
		F.1 The RebEL Policy Under Even Demand
		F.2 The Role of the Initial Conditions
	References
Game-Theoretic Randomness for Proof-of-Stake
	1 Introduction
	2 Preliminaries
		2.1 Games and Equilibria
		2.2 Publicly-Verifiable Secret Sharing
		2.3 Verifiable Delay Functions
	3 Random Integer Generation Game (RIG)
		3.1 Overview of RIG
		3.2 Analysis of Alliance-Resistant Nash Equilibria
		3.3 Dense RIG Bimatrix Game
	4 Designing a Random Beacon Based on RIG
		4.1 Commitment Scheme and VDF Approach
		4.2 PVSS Approach
		4.3 Further Details of the Approach
		4.4 Assumptions and Limits to Applicability
	5 RIG in Proof of Stake Protocols
		5.1 RIG in Ouroboros Praos
		5.2 RIG in Algorand
	6 Conclusion
	References
Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators
	1 Introduction
	2 Model
		2.1 Extension to n+1 Validators
		2.2 Silent Validators
	3 Protocol Level Incentives
	4 Conclusions and Future Work
	References
Characterizing Common Quarterly Behaviors in DeFi Lending Protocols
	1 Introduction
	2 Methods
		2.1 Data Sources
		2.2 Transaction-Level Data
		2.3 Address-Level Summaries
		2.4 Computation of Clusters
	3 Results
		3.1 Interpretations of Clusters
		3.2 Insights Derived From Clusters
	4 Related Work
	5 Discussion and Future Work
	References
Blockchain Transaction Censorship: (In)secure and (In)efficient?
	1 Introduction
	2 Background
		2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts
		2.2 Centralized Transaction Propagation Services
		2.3 ZKP Mixers
		2.4 Blockchain Regulation and Censorship
	3 System Model
		3.1 System Components
		3.2 Blockchain Censoring
		3.3 Threat Model
	4 Censorship During Transaction Validation
		4.1 Miners\' Censorship on Tainted Transactions
		4.2 DoS Censoring Miners Through Crafting Tainted Transactions
		4.3 Attack Cost
	5 Censorship During Transaction Propagation
		5.1 FaaS Workflow
		5.2 FaaS Censorship Mechanism
		5.3 DoS Censoring FaaS Searchers and Builders
	6 Censorship During Transaction Generation
		6.1 Non-transparent Frontend-Level Censorship
		6.2 Investigating DeFi Platforms\' Censorship
		6.3 Tainting Innocent Addresses
		6.4 Bypassing Frontend-Level Censorship
	7 Related Work
	8 Conclusion
	References
An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-Rebalancing
	1 Introduction
		1.1 Our Contribution
		1.2 Organization of the Paper
	2 Related Work
	3 Preliminaries
		3.1 Constant Function Market Makers
		3.2 Loss-Versus-Rebalancing
		3.3 Auctions
	4 Diamond
		4.1 Model Assumptions
		4.2 Core Protocol
		4.3 Per-block Conversion Versus Future Contracts
		4.4 Periodic Conversion Auction
	5 Diamond Properties
	6 Implementation
		6.1 Core Protocol
		6.2 Conversion Protocols
	7 Experimental Analysis
	8 Conclusion
	A Proofs
	References
Profit Lag and Alternate Network Mining
	1 Introduction
		1.1 Nakamoto Consensus
		1.2 Mining Process
		1.3 Selfish Mining
		1.4 Smart Mining
		1.5 Intermittent Selfish Mining
		1.6 Alternate Network Mining
		1.7 Organization of This Article
	2 Modelization
		2.1 Mining and Difficulty Adjustment Formula
		2.2 Notations
		2.3 Profitability of a Mining Strategy
		2.4 Attack Cycles
		2.5 Performant Strategy and Profit Lag
	3 Selfish Mining Revisited
		3.1 Previous State-Machine Approach Revisited
		3.2 Profit Lag
	4 Intermittent Selfish Mining Strategy
		4.1 Profit Lag
	5 Alternate Network Mining Strategy
		5.1 Profit Lag
	6 Conclusion
	References
Oracle Counterpoint: Relationships Between On-Chain and Off-Chain Market Data
	1 Introduction
	2 Methods
		2.1 Fundamental Economic Features from On-Chain Markets
		2.2 Data-Driven Feature Analysis
		2.3 Modeling Off-Chain Prices
	3 Results
		3.1 Feature Analysis
		3.2 Recovering Off-Chain Prices from On-Chain Data
		3.3 Performance of Price Recovery
	4 Discussion
	A  More Details on Dataset Features
		A.1.1  Economic Features
	B  Further Information on Ethereum Analysis
		B.1.1  Performance of Price Recovery
	C  Analysis of Celo PoS Data
	References
Exploring Decentralized Governance: A Framework Applied to Compound Finance
	1 Introduction
		1.1 Motivation
		1.2 Contribution Summary
	2 Compound
		2.1 Governance
	3 Relevant Work
		3.1 Literature Discussion
	4 Methodology and Data
		4.1 Data
		4.2 Methodology
		4.3 Top 100 Leaderboard
		4.4 Proposals
	5 Discussion
	6 Conclusions
	Appendix A  Proof for Gini and Nakamoto Coefficients When n = 2 and u1 = u2
	References
A Mathematical Approach on the Use of Integer Partitions for Smurfing in Cryptocurrencies
	1 Introduction
	2 Related Work
	3 Using Integer Partitions to Create Patterns for Smurfing
		3.1 Problem Formulation
		3.2 Possible Implications of the Conceptualization of Smurfing via Integer Partitions
		3.3 Examples for Integer Partitions and Smurfing
	4 Conclusion and Future Work
	References
Bigger Than We Thought: The Upbit Hack Gang
	1 Introduction
	2 Rough ML Network Construction
		2.1 Crawling Tool and Event
		2.2 Account and Transaction Data Crawling
		2.3 Network Construction
	3 ML Network Refinement
		3.1 Design an ML Suspiciousness Indicator
		3.2 Calculate ML Risks of Accounts
	4 Results and Analysis
	5 Conclusion
	References
Staking Pools on Blockchains