Limits of leviathan

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Foreword......Page 9
1 Introduction......Page 11
Methodology......Page 16
Formal and Informal Enforcement of International Law......Page 19
Contract Theory and International Law Enforcement......Page 26
The Structure of the Argument......Page 34
2 States, Firms, and the Enforcement of International Law......Page 39
Joint Production of Collective Welfare......Page 40
Enforcement Choices......Page 41
Enforcement versus Compliance......Page 49
States Are Different......Page 53
States Do Not Make International Law......Page 57
Incentives Do Not Matter......Page 62
Political Elites Are Not Faithful Agents......Page 66
3 Lessons from Contract Theory......Page 69
The Elements of Contract Theory......Page 70
Why Do Parties Contract?......Page 73
Protecting Relation-Specific Investments......Page 75
Problems of Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Verification......Page 80
Using Rules and Standards to Ameliorate the Verification Problem......Page 82
Simple Contracts and the Problems of Incomplete Contracting......Page 86
Can the Hold-Up and Moral Hazard Problems Be Solved?......Page 89
Conclusion......Page 92
The Limitations of Formal Enforcement......Page 94
Expanding Informal Self-Enforcement through Reciprocity......Page 98
Inequity Aversion in International Relations......Page 104
The Role of Formal Enforcement in a World of Informal Enforcement......Page 108
Rivalrous Enforcement Systems and the “Crowding Out” Phenomenon......Page 111
Explaining the Rivalry between Formal and Informal Enforcement......Page 116
Summary......Page 118
5 Patterns of International Law Enforcement......Page 120
Informal Enforcement......Page 121
Retaliation......Page 125
Reputation......Page 128
Rational Reciprocity......Page 132
Formal Enforcement......Page 137
European Court of Justice and Its Descendants......Page 138
European Court of Human Rights......Page 140
International Criminal Courts......Page 141
United States – Iran Claims Tribunal......Page 143
Investor Protection Arbitration......Page 144
Private International Commercial Arbitration......Page 149
Domestic Courts......Page 151
Summary......Page 156
6 The Choice between Formal and Informal Enforcement......Page 157
Example 1: Arms Control......Page 161
Example 2: Environmental Law......Page 163
Example 3:Trade......Page 164
Example 4: Vital State Interests......Page 169
Example 5: Human Rights......Page 172
Example 6:Property Rights......Page 176
Complex Interdependence......Page 177
Uncertainty about Enforcement Mechanisms......Page 179
Human Rights and Civil Rights in the United States......Page 180
Domestic Enforcement of International Trade Law......Page 182
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the International Criminal Court......Page 184
European Integration and the Constitutional Treaty......Page 187
Summary......Page 188
7 The Future of International Law and Its Enforcement......Page 190
Opening up New Areas of International Cooperation......Page 192
Reducing Enforcement Risk......Page 198
The International Criminal Court and International Criminal Law......Page 199
Privatizing the WTO DSB......Page 202
ICJ Decisions as Creating Private Rights......Page 206
International Humanitarian Law as Private Law......Page 211
The Domain of the Warsaw Convention......Page 213
Odious Debt and Sovereign Contracts......Page 216
Conclusion......Page 222
Glossary......Page 225
Table of Authorities......Page 235
Index......Page 257