Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons that Goodness Gives

0 Introduction
	0.1 The Rejection of Neutrality
	0.2 Why the Rejection of Neutrality is not Enough
	0.3 Basic Features and Definitions of Perfectionism
	0.4 Re-conceptualisation of the Differences between Neutralist and Perfectionist Liberals
	0.5 Summary of the Argument of the Book
1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions
	1.1 Defining Ethical Perfectionism, Prudential Perfectionism and Political Perfectionism
	1.2 Why Political Perfectionism Requires an Account of Ethical Perfectionism
	1.3 Prudential Perfectionism and Objective Goods
	1.4 Arguments for the Objective List Conception of Well-Being
	1.5 The Step from Prudential Perfectionism to Ethical Perfectionism
	1.6 The Step from Ethical Perfectionism to Political Perfectionism
	1.7 Conclusion
2 Perfectionist Goods
	2.1 Basic Terminology
	2.2 What Should we include in our List of Objective Goods?
		2.2.1 Too Sparse
		2.2.2 Refer to goods that are not fundamental
		2.2.3 Contain too many goods
		2.2.4 A Plausible List of Objective Goods
	2.3 Realizing Goods vs. Opportunities
	2.4 Agency and Good
	2.5 Bringing Back Perspective for a Perfectionist Renaissance
		2.5.1 There is Something about Perspective
		2.5.2 Endorsement Distinctions
		2.5.3 Well-being
	2.6 Does Perfectionism require a Unifying Account of the Good?
	2.7 Could Perfectionism be based on Cultural Norms or on an Overlapping Consensus?
	2.8 Is the Lack of Unifying Account Damaging for Political Perfectionism?
	2.9 Conclusion
3 Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and Objections
	3.1 Ethical Perfectionism as a Family of Theories
		3.1.1 Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive Perfectionism
		3.1.2 Pluralist vs. Monist Perfectionism
		3.1.3 Broad vs. Narrow Perfectionism
		3.1.4 Satisficing vs. Maximising Perfectionism
		3.1.5 Absolute vs. Relative Perfectionism
	3.2 Consequentialist, Virtue Ethics and Deontological Perfectionism
	3.3 Is Perfectionism too Self-indulgent?
	3.4 Praise and Blame
	3.5 Perfectionism and Positive Value
	3.6 Conclusion
4 The Reasons that Goodness Gives
	4.1 Prima Facie Arguments
	4.2 Well-Being and the Function of the State: The Crude Argument
	4.3 The Service and Well-Being Argument
	4.4 Is the Humanistic Principle necessary for the Service and Well-Being Argument?
	4.5 An Objection to the Social Forms Thesis
	4.6 The Service and Practical Reason Argument: The Explicit Version
	4.7 An Objection to the Service and Practical Reason Argument: Agentneutral vs Agent-relative Reasons
		4.7.1 The Objection
		4.7.2 Agent-relative Reasons in our Lives
	4.8 The Revised Service and Practical Reason Argument
	4.9 A Meta-ethical Objection
	4.10 An Objection to the Service Conception of Authority
	4.11 Conclusion
5 The Consistency Argument
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 Charles Taylor’s Argument
	5.3 Vinit Haksar’s Argument
	5.4 The Consistency Argument
	5.5 The Protection of Individual Rights and Interests
		5.5.1 In favour of the Interest Theory
		5.5.2 Is the Second Premise Really Necessary for the Consistency Argument?
	5.6 From Protection to Promotion
		5.6.1 The Consistency Argument
		5.6.2 Caveats
		5.6.3 Interpretation of Protection and Promotion
		5.6.4 The Normative Arbitrariness of the Distinction between Protection and Promotion of Interests
		5.6.5 In favour of the Consistency Argument
		5.6.6 Relation to Consequentialism
	5.7 Conclusion
6 The Location of Unfairness
	6.1 Introduction
		6.1.1 The Luck Egalitarian Location of Unfairness
		6.1.2 The Luck Egalitarian Aim
	6.2 Location of Unfairness
		6.2.1 A Dilemma for the Basic Luck Egalitarian Intuition
		6.2.2 How can the Fundamentalist Luck Egalitarian attempt to Justify her Position?
		6.2.3 How the Existing Literature accounts for the Two Forms of luck Egalitarianism
		6.2.4 Practical Implications
	6.3 Same Destination, Different Routes
		6.3.1 The Same Destination, Different Routes Argument
		6.3.2 Other Instrumental Benefits of Minimising Luck
		6.3.3 Is Redistribution instrumental to the Promotion of Responsibility?
	6.4 The Luck Egalitarian Response
		6.4.1 Attempting an Account of the BLEI
		6.4.2 The Impact on one’s Level of Advantages
		6.4.3 The Normative Distinction between Negative and Positive Value
	6.5 The Location of Unfairness
		6.5.1 Inconsistency
		6.5.2 What Justice Requires: Promoting the Conditions for Responsibility
		6.5.3 Justice Requires Structural Changes
		6.5.4 An Account of Responsibility
		6.5.5 The Practice of Responsibility Promotion
	6.6 The Luck Egalitarian Response
		6.6.1 The Good Luck Objection
		6.6.2 The Feasibility Objection
	6.7 Responsibility
		6.7.1 Two thought experiments
		6.7.2 ‘She did it her way’ or the Prudential Value of Responsibility
	6.8 Conclusion
7 Conclusion
	7.1 Three Distinctive Features
		7.1.1 Ethical Perfectionism
		7.1.2 Positive Arguments
		7.1.3 Luck Egalitarianism
	7.2 Objections
		7.2.1 Autonomy
		7.2.2 Moral Equality
		7.2.3 Pragmatic Objections
	7.3 Final Thoughts
Bibliography