Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective: Themes from Michael Devitt

Contents
Contributors
About the Editor
Chapter 1: Introduction – Michael Devitt at Eighty
Part I: Philosophy of Linguistics
	Chapter 2: Invariance as the Mark of the Psychological Reality of Language
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 The Very Idea of ‘Psychological Reality’
			2.2.1 Grammars and Psychologism
			2.2.2 Chomsky on Psychological Reality
			2.2.3 Minimal Realism
			2.2.4 General Remarks
		2.3 Devitt’s ‘Master Argument’
		2.4 Questioning Premise (2): Applying the Distinctions
			2.4.1 Chomsky and Devitt’s Three Distinctions
			2.4.2 Products Before Competence?
			2.4.3 Invariance
		2.5 Questioning Premise (4): Interpreting a Grammar
			2.5.1 The Intuitive Conception of Competence
			2.5.2 Chomsky’s Own Words
			2.5.3 Symbols
			2.5.4 Intuitions and Aboutness
			2.5.5 Non-intuitive Data
			2.5.6 Representation
		2.6 Concluding Remarks
		References
	Chapter 3: Priorities and Diversities in Language and Thought
		3.1 The Language of Thought and Diversities in Cognitive Format
		3.2 Language as Expressing Thought: Diversities in Linguistic Function
		3.3 Universal Grammar and the Psychology of Language Processing
			3.3.1 UG-Violating Strings
			3.3.2 UG-Conforming Complexities
		3.4 Priorities, Sufficiencies, and Speculations
		References
Part II: Theory of Reference
	Chapter 4: Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 A Brief Look at the Development of NTR
			4.2.1 Descriptivism and Its Critique
			4.2.2 The Historical Chain Picture
			4.2.3 The Varieties of Reference
			4.2.4 The Qua Problem
			4.2.5 Can Reference Never Change?
		4.3 What Was the Question?
			4.3.1 The “Main Problem” of the Theory of Reference
			4.3.2 The Millian View and Frege’s Puzzles
			4.3.3 Shared Meanings
			4.3.4 Meaning, Understanding, and Manifestability
		4.4 New Forms of Descriptivism
			4.4.1 Rigidified Descriptions
			4.4.2 Causal Descriptivism
			4.4.3 Nominal Descriptivism or Metalinguistic Descriptivism
			4.4.4 A Theory of Meaning?
			4.4.5 Substantial and Trivial Versions of Descriptivism
		4.5 Kind Terms
		4.6 Back to the Millian View?
		References
	Chapter 5: Multiple Grounding
		5.1 Devitt vs Kripke
		5.2 Reference Change
		5.3 Confusion
		5.4 Degrees of Designation
		5.5 Semantic Coordination
		5.6 Coreference De Jure
		5.7 Mental Files
		5.8 Coordination via Proper Names
		5.9 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 6: Reference and Causal Chains
		References
	Chapter 7: The Qua-Problem for Names (Dismissed)
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Brief Background: The Causal Theory of Reference
		7.3 Why Focus on Names?
		7.4 The Qua-Problem for Names
		7.5 In Defense of a “Dismissive” Response
		7.6 Devitt and Sterelny’s (Tentatively) Proposed Solution
		7.7 Failed Grounding?
		7.8 A Trio of Objections
			7.8.1 Missing the Point
			7.8.2 A Different Kind of Problem but a Problem Nonetheless
			7.8.3 Empty Names Left Unexplained
		7.9 Referring to felis catus
		7.10 The Curious Origins of an Apocryphal Problem
		References
	Chapter 8: Language from a Naturalistic Perspective
		8.1 What to Expect
		8.2 Proper Names
		8.3 Two-Dimensionalism
		8.4 A Second Application of Linguistic Modesty
		8.5 Twin Earth for Two-Dimensionalists
		8.6 The Internalism-Externalism Debate
		References
	Chapter 9: Michael Devitt, Cultural Evolution and the Division of Linguistic Labour
		9.1 The Division of Linguistic Labour
		9.2 Intuition and Evidence
		9.3 Two Conceptions of Cultural Evolution
		9.4 Is Vertical Transmission Different from Horizontal Transmission?
		References
Part III: Theory of Meaning
	Chapter 10: Still for Direct Reference
		10.1 Direct-Reference Theory
			10.1.1 Direct Reference, Semantic Content, Millianism, and Russellian Propositions
			10.1.2 Direct Reference, Attitude Ascriptions, and Shakespearean Attitude Ascriptions
			10.1.3 Direct Reference, Definite Descriptions, and Scope Ambiguity
		10.2 Devitt’s Methodology and Initial Theory of Meaning
			10.2.1 Devitt’s Methodology
			10.2.2 Devitt’s Initial Theory of Meaning
		10.3 Some Potential Hindrances to Dialogue Between Devitt and Direct-Reference Theorists
			10.3.1 Direct Reference and Devitt on Propositions
			10.3.2 Direct Reference and Devitt on Conventional Meaning
			10.3.3 Devitt’s Notions of Opacity and Transparency, and Being Shakespearean
		10.4 Devitt’s Revised Theory of Opaque Attitude Ascriptions
			10.4.1 Monolingual Non-English Speakers
			10.4.2 Bilingual Speakers and Devitt’s Revised View
		10.5 From Devitt’s Revised Theory to Shakespearean Attitude Ascriptions
			10.5.1 Devitt’s Revised Theory and Substitution of ‘Bernard’ for ‘Ortcutt’
			10.5.2 A Translation Relation that Hinges on Co-reference
			10.5.3 Well-Established, Frequently Used Translation
			10.5.4 Distinct-Language-Only Translation Relations
			10.5.5 How a Devittian Might Resist the Above Argument
			10.5.6 What the Above Argument Does, and Does Not, Show About Devitt’s Revised Theory
			10.5.7 Reflections on Direct-Reference Theory and the Preceding Argument that Devitt’s Revised Theory Implies Shakepearean Attitude Ascriptions
		10.6 Replies to Devitt’s Arguments Against Direct-Reference Theory
			10.6.1 The Identity Problem and the Opacity Problem for Direct Reference
			10.6.2 A Direct-Reference Reply to Devitt’s Identity and Opacity Problems
		10.7 More on Direct-Reference Theory and Explanation of Behavior
			10.7.1 Truth-Conditions for ‘Because’ Sentences
			10.7.2 ‘Because’ Sentences and Explanation
			10.7.3 Explanations and Identity
			10.7.4 Direct Reference and True ‘Because’ Sentences
			10.7.5 Direct Reference and Explanation
		10.8 Devitt’s Reply
		10.9 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 11: Naming and Non-necessity
		11.1  The Examples
		11.2  A Purported Proof
		11.3  Quasi-a-priority
		11.4 Kripke’s Revised Case
		References
	Chapter 12: Against Rigidity for General Terms
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Against Rigid Essentialism
		12.3 Against Rigid Expressionism
		12.4 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 13: Devitt and the Case for Narrow Meaning
		13.1 Narrow Content
		13.2 Syntactic Psychology
		13.3 Narrow Psychology
		13.4 Defending Narrow Psychology
		13.5 Objections to the 1989 Picture
		13.6 Abandoning Narrow Psychology
		13.7 Against the Functional-Role View of Narrow Meanings
		13.8 Explaining “Wide” Behavior
		13.9 The Problem of Psychosemantics
		13.10 Against Two Further Candidates for Narrow Meaning
		References
	Chapter 14: Languages and Idiolects
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 To Be Defended
		14.3 Objections and Replies
		References
Part IV: Methodology
	Chapter 15: Explanation First! The Priority of Scientific Over “Commonsense” Metaphysics
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 Scientific vs. Commonsense Realism
			15.2.1 Secondary Properties: Color
		15.3 Language
			15.3.1 Ontology
			15.3.2 Linguistic Explanation
		15.4 The A Priori
			15.4.1 A Working vs. an Explanatory Epistemology
			15.4.2 Is Quinean Holism a Good Abduction?
			15.4.3 Is a Naturalistic A Priori Obscure?
		15.5 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 16: Experimental Semantics, Descriptivism and Anti-descriptivism. Should We Endorse Referential Pluralism?
		16.1 Introduction
		16.2 Two Distinctions: Use vs. Reflections on Use, and Use vs. Interpretation. Testing Use
		16.3 On Referential Pluralism
		References
Part V: Metaphysics
	Chapter 17: Scientific Realism and Epistemic Optimism
		17.1 Introduction
		17.2 Devitt’s Formulations of Scientific Realism
		17.3 Metaphysical and Scientific Issues
		17.4 Confidence
		17.5 Scientific Realism
		References
	Chapter 18: Species Have Historical Not Intrinsic Essences
		18.1 Millian Kinds
		18.2 Essences
		18.3 Biological Taxa
		18.4 Devitt on (Partly) Historical Essences
		18.5 Historical over Intrinsic Essences
		18.6 Conclusion
		References
Part VI: Michael Devitt’s Responses
	Chapter 19: Stirring the Possum: Responses to the Bianchi Papers
		19.1 Philosophy of Linguistics
			19.1.1 The Linguistic Conception of Grammars (Collins, Rey)
				19.1.1.1 Introduction
				19.1.1.2 The “Master Argument”
				19.1.1.3 Linguistic Realism and Explanation
				19.1.1.4 The Paraphrase Response
				19.1.1.5 Criticism of the Paraphrase Response
			19.1.2 The Psychological Reality of Language (Camp)
		19.2 Theory of Reference
			19.2.1 Reference Borrowing (Raatikainen, Sterelny, Horwich, Recanati)
			19.2.2 Grounding (Raatikainen, Recanati)
			19.2.3 Kripkean or Donnellanian? (Bianchi)
			19.2.4 The Qua-Problem for Proper Names (Raatikainen, Reimer)
			19.2.5 Causal Descriptivism (Raatikainen, Jackson, Sterelny)
				19.2.5.1 Jackson
				19.2.5.2 Sterelny
		19.3 Theory of Meaning
			19.3.1 Direct Reference (Braun, Horwich)
			19.3.2 Descriptive Names and “the Contingent A Priori” (Salmon, Schwartz)
			19.3.3 Rigidity in General Terms (Schwartz)
			19.3.4 Narrow Meanings (Lycan, Horwich)
			19.3.5 The Use Theory (Horwich)
		19.4 Methodology
			19.4.1 Putting Metaphysics First (Rey)
			19.4.2 “Moorean Commonsense” (Rey)
			19.4.3 Intuitions (Martí, Sterelny, Jackson)
			19.4.4 Experimental Semantics (Martí, Sterelny)
		19.5 Metaphysics
			19.5.1 The Definition of “Scientific Realism” (Godfrey-Smith)
			19.5.2 Biological Essentialism (Godman and Papineau)
				19.5.2.1 Introduction
				19.5.2.2 Summary of Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism (IBE)
				19.5.2.3 G&P on Alice and Artifacts
				19.5.2.4 Implements
				19.5.2.5 Species
		References
Index