Knowledge

Cover
Half-title page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Why Only Agents Are Knowers
	I.1 Aims and Motivations
	I.2 Dexterity, Attention, and Integration
	I.3 A Brief Summary of Chapters
	I.4 A Tension in Virtue Epistemology
	I.5 Virtue Theoretic Epistemic Psychology
	I.6 The Attention-Assertion Model
	I.7 Methodology in Epistemology
1 Epistemic Virtue, Reliable Attention, and Cognitive Constitution
	1.1 The Argument from Attention
	1.2 Dispositions and Epistemic Abilities
	1.3 The Situationist Challenge
	1.4 Knowledge of Syntax
	1.5 Knowledge of Logic
	1.6 Arguments against Consequentialist Epistemic Norms
2 Meta-epistemology and Epistemic Agency
	2.1 On the Role of Motivational States
	2.2 The Direction of Attention: Self or World
	2.3 Cognitive Needs
	2.4 The Desire to Assert: The Content of Epistemic Motivation
	2.5 Epistemic Needs and the Grip of Epistemic Norms
	2.6 Frege on the Grip of Assertion
	2.7 The Frame Problem and Virtuous Insensitivity
	2.8 Some Concerns about Internal Normative Force
3 Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success
	3.1 The “Because of” Requirement for Knowledge
	3.2 Greco’s Contextualist Etiology
	3.3 Causality: Folksy, Metaphysical, and Psychologically Constrained
	3.4 Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success
	3.5 Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey: Reliability and Assertion
	3.6 The Norm of Assertion
	3.7 Assertion and Action
4 Epistemic Agency
	4.1 Tensions between Credit, Agency, and Automaticity
	4.2 Sosa’s Judgments and Functionings: Personal and Sub-personal Success
	4.3 Mental and Epistemic Action
	4.4 Resolving the Tension
	4.5 Language and Agency
5 Assertion as Epistemic Motivation
	5.1 Attention and Communication
	5.2 Dispositions to Assert and Successful Communication
	5.3 Forms of Assertoric Force and Forms of Epistemic Attention
	5.4 Factivity, Credit, and Social Environments
	5.5 Epistemically Virtuous Halting Thresholds and Assertable Contents: The Case of Epistemic Modals
	5.6 Retraction and Virtuous Sensitivity
	5.7 Conclusion
6 Curiosity and Epistemic Achievement
	6.1 Epistemically Virtuous Curiosity
	6.2 Basic Principles of Curiosity
	6.3 Curiosity and Halting Thresholds
	6.4 Curiosity and Virtuous Insensitivity
	6.5 Attention, Curiosity, and Creativity
7 Collective Agency, Assertion, and Information
	7.1 Collective Epistemic Agency and Cognitive Integration
	7.2 Collective Agency and Reliable Social Communication
	7.3 Social Epistemology and Collective Assertion
	7.4 Collective Attention and Collective Motivation
	7.5 Reflection, Explicit Judgment, and Reliability
	7.6 Complex Collective Agency
Bibliography
Index