James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy

Front Matter ....Pages i-xxi
 Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant?  (Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 1-9
Front Matter ....Pages 11-11
 What Should Economists Do Now?  (Robert Sugden)....Pages 13-37
 Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan  (Michael C. Munger)....Pages 39-64
 James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist  (Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino A. Candela)....Pages 65-83
 James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program  (Stefan Kolev)....Pages 85-108
 Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy  (Abigail N. Devereaux, Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 109-129
Front Matter ....Pages 131-131
 The Conflict Between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods  (Lawrence H. White)....Pages 133-146
 Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments  (Charles B. Blankart, David C. Ehmke)....Pages 147-167
 The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments  (David J. Hebert)....Pages 169-185
 Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a Mostly Private Good  (Mark Pauly)....Pages 187-203
 Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand  (Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones)....Pages 205-233
 The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons  (Christopher J. Coyne, Thomas K. Duncan)....Pages 235-261
 Contraception Without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraceptive Insurance Mandates  (Marta Podemska-Mikluch)....Pages 263-290
 Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity  (Meg Patrick Tuszynski, Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 291-311
Front Matter ....Pages 313-313
 Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality  (Dennis C. Mueller)....Pages 315-336
 Constitutional, Political and Behavioral Feasibility  (Alan Hamlin)....Pages 337-358
 Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution  (Shruti Rajagopalan)....Pages 359-381
 Blockchains as Constitutional Orders  (Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, Jason Potts)....Pages 383-397
 The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie  (J. R. Clark, Dwight R. Lee)....Pages 399-423
 Beneficent Bullshit  (Peter T. Leeson)....Pages 425-440
 Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy  (Jayme S. Lemke)....Pages 441-465
 Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the Work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom  (Roberta Q. Herzberg)....Pages 467-486
 On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion  (George Tridimas, Stanley L. Winer)....Pages 487-509
 Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire  (Adam G. Martin, James H. Ruhland)....Pages 511-536
Front Matter ....Pages 537-537
 James M. Buchanan: Political Economist, Consistent Individualist  (Viktor J. Vanberg)....Pages 539-576
 A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project  (Randall G. Holcombe)....Pages 577-602
 Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled  (Enrico Colombatto)....Pages 603-626
 Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice  (Georg Vanberg)....Pages 627-648
 Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar  (Glenn L. Furton, Alexander W. Salter)....Pages 649-670
 Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions  (Donald J. Boudreaux)....Pages 671-692
 James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals  (David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart)....Pages 693-712
 From Highway to Clubs: Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods  (Alain Marciano)....Pages 713-737
Front Matter ....Pages 739-739
 In Defense of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism  (Gerald Gaus)....Pages 741-767
 Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus  (Roger D. Congleton)....Pages 769-805
 The Constitution of Markets  (Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt)....Pages 807-838
 The Extent of the Market and Ethics  (Yong J. Yoon)....Pages 839-851
 When Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government  (Andrew T. Young)....Pages 853-881
 Rules Versus Discretion in Criminal Sentencing  (Daniel J. D’Amico)....Pages 883-902
 Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist  (Solomon M. Stein)....Pages 903-920
 From Models to Experiments; James Buchanan and Charles Plott  (Gil Hersch, Daniel Houser)....Pages 921-937
Front Matter ....Pages 939-939
 Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy  (Marianne Johnson)....Pages 941-963
 The Quest for Fiscal Rules  (Lars P. Feld)....Pages 965-990
 The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt  (Vito Tanzi)....Pages 991-1007
 Can There Be Such a Thing as Legitimate Public Debt in Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared  (Giuseppe Eusepi)....Pages 1009-1029
 Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements  (Leonidas Zelmanovitz)....Pages 1031-1049
Front Matter ....Pages 1051-1051
 Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program  (Alain Marciano, Manuela Mosca)....Pages 1053-1078
 Paretian Fiscal Sociology  (Michael McLure)....Pages 1079-1103
 Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and Beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice  (Paul Dragos Aligica)....Pages 1105-1129
 The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic  (Robert L. Bish)....Pages 1131-1154
 Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on His Wall Despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics  (Ross B. Emmett)....Pages 1155-1170
Back Matter ....Pages 1171-1182