Internet and Network Economics: 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010. Proceedings

Front Matter....Pages -
Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Centrality in Networks....Pages 1-13
On Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Design....Pages 14-25
The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces....Pages 26-37
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions....Pages 38-49
Sequential Item Pricing for Unlimited Supply....Pages 50-62
The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem....Pages 63-74
Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game....Pages 75-86
A Novel Approach to Propagating Distrust....Pages 87-105
Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear Programming....Pages 106-117
Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effects....Pages 118-132
Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn Games....Pages 133-144
Selective Call Out and Real Time Bidding....Pages 145-157
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions....Pages 158-169
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions....Pages 170-181
A Truthful Constant Approximation for Maximizing the Minimum Load on Related Machines....Pages 182-193
Braess’s Paradox in Large Sparse Graphs....Pages 194-208
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks....Pages 209-221
Stackelberg Strategies for Network Design Games....Pages 222-233
Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games....Pages 234-245
Constrained Non-monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms....Pages 246-257
Strategic Cooperation in Cost Sharing Games....Pages 258-269
Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies....Pages 270-281
An FPTAS for Bargaining Networks with Unequal Bargaining Powers....Pages 282-293
Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions....Pages 294-305
Exploiting Myopic Learning....Pages 306-318
The Limits of Smoothness: A Primal-Dual Framework for Price of Anarchy Bounds....Pages 319-326
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions....Pages 327-338
Near-Strong Equilibria in Network Creation Games....Pages 339-353
You Share, I Share: Network Effects and Economic Incentives in P2P File-Sharing Systems....Pages 354-365
The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games....Pages 366-377
Practical and Efficient Approximations of Nash Equilibria for Win-Lose Games Based on Graph Spectra....Pages 378-390
Market Communication in Production Economies....Pages 391-401
Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences....Pages 402-414
Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract)....Pages 415-423
Equilibrium Pricing with Positive Externalities (Extended Abstract)....Pages 424-431
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games....Pages 432-443
Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path Pricing....Pages 444-454
The Complexity of Determining the Uniqueness of Tarski’s Fixed Point under the Lexicographic Ordering....Pages 455-461
Approximation Algorithms for Non-single-minded Profit-Maximization Problems with Limited Supply....Pages 462-472
Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management....Pages 473-482
Envy-Free Pricing with General Supply Constraints....Pages 483-491
Impersonation Strategies in Auctions....Pages 492-495
Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs....Pages 496-504
An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers....Pages 505-514
Online Labor Markets....Pages 515-522
Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders....Pages 523-530
On (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location Games....Pages 531-538
Threshold Models for Competitive Influence in Social Networks....Pages 539-550
Course Allocation by Proxy Auction....Pages 551-558
False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line....Pages 559-562
Non-separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy – in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model (Extended Abstract)....Pages 563-570
Average-Case Analysis of Mechanism Design with Approximate Resource Allocation Algorithms....Pages 571-578
Back Matter....Pages -