Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism

Cover
Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Acknowledgments
Traditional Internalism: An Introduction
	1 The Aims of Traditional Internalism
		1.1 Evidentialism
		1.2 Conservatism
		1.3 Traditional internalism
	2 The Tenets of Traditional Internalism
		2.1 Non-inferentially justified belief
		2.2 Inferentially justified belief
		2.3 Skepticism
	3 The Problems for Traditional Internalism
		3.1 Non-inferentially justified belief
		3.2 Inferentially justified belief
		3.3 Skepticism
	4 Conclusion
	References
Chapter Abstracts
	Chapter 1: Confrontation Foundationalism, Peter Markie
	Chapter 2: Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification, Chris Tucker
	Chapter 3: Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance, Matthias Steup
	Chapter 4: Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem without Going Externalist, Berit Brogaard
	Chapter 5: Experience and Evidence Abridged, Susanna Schellenberg
	Chapter 6: Principles of Inferential Justification, Trent Dougherty
	Chapter 7: Inferential Appearances, Michael Huemer
	Chapter 8: The Costs of Demon-Proof Justification, Sanford C. Goldberg
	Chapter 9: Acquaintance and Skepticism about the Past, Ted Poston
	Chapter 10: On Metaepistemological Scepticism, Duncan Pritchard and Christopher Ranalli
	Chapter 11: How Our Knowledge Squares with Skeptical Intuitions Despite the Circle, Ernest Sosa
	Chapter 12: The Prospects for Traditional Internalism, Richard Fumerton
PART I: Traditional Internalism and Non-Inferentially Justified Belief
	Direct Acquaintance
		Chapter 1: Confrontation Foundationalism
			1 Confrontational Foundationalism: Classical and Neoclassical
			2 The Limits of Acquaintance
			3 Acquaintance and Identification Ability
			4 Alternatives
			5 Conclusion
			References
		Chapter 2: Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification
			1 Introduction
			2 Fumerton’s Account of Non-Inferential Justification
			3 A Fixable Problem
			4 Acquaintance with Contradicting Facts
			5 Fallible NIJ without Contradicting Facts?
			6 Hasan to the Rescue?
			7 Conclusion
			References
		Chapter 3: Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance
			1 Internalism vs. Externalism and the Expectation of Non-Accidentality
			2 BonJour’s Anti-Foundationalist Argument
			3 Two Foundationalist Responses to BonJour’s Argument
			4 Two Conceptions of Foundational Justification
			5 Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification
			6 Fumertonian Non-Inferential Justification
			7 Three Versions of Foundationalism
			8 Does Foundational Justification Require Acquaintance?
			References
	Perceptual Belief
		Chapter 4: Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem without Going Externalist
			1 The Threat of Skepticism
			2 Externalism
			3 Naive Realism and Disjunctivism
			4 Why Naive Realism Does Not Solve the Skeptical Problem
			5 Phenomenal Dogmatism
			6 Bootstrapping
			7 Conclusion
			References
		Chapter 5: Experience and Evidence Abridged
			Prologue to ‘Experience and Evidence Abridged’
			1 Perceptual Evidence and Introspective Evidence
			2 The Phenomenal Evidence Argument
				2.1 Premiss 2: sensory states and phenomenal evidence
				2.2 Premiss 2a: sensory states and perceptual capacities
				2.3 Premiss 2b: phenomenal evidence and systematic linkage
				2.4 Coda
			References
PART II: Traditional Internalism and Inferentially Justified Belief
	Chapter 6: Principles of Inferential Justification
		1 Fumerton’s PIJ
			1.1 Fumerton’s case for PIJ
			1.2 An alternative explanation
		2 Huemer’s PIJ*
			2.1 Huemer’s critique of Fumerton
			2.2 Huemer’s account of the Astrologer case
			2.3 Huemer’s own account flawed
		3 Chisholming Away
			3.1 A sketch of a theory of knowledge
				3.1.1 PERSPECTIVAL JUSTIFICATION
				3.1.2 A NOTE ON SEEMINGS AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS
				3.1.3 KNOWLEDGE
			3.2 On ‘inference’
			3.3 ‘Inferential’ justification in light of the above
		4 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 7: Inferential Appearances
		1 Justificatory Dependence
		2 Conditions for an Adequate Theory of Inferential Justification
		3 An Appearance-Based Theory of Inferential Justification
			3.1 Inferential appearances
			3.2 Conditions for explicit inferential justification
		4 The Inferential Appearance Theory Satisfies the Conditions for a Theory of Inferential Justification
		5 Revisiting Fumerton: Acquaintance vs. Appearance
		6 Inexplicit Justificatory Dependence
		7 Conclusion
		References
PART III: Traditional Internalism and Skepticism
	Responding to the Skeptic
		Chapter 8: The Costs of Demon-Proof Justification
			1
			2
			3
			4
			References
		Chapter 9: Acquaintance and Skepticism about the Past
			1 Skepticism about the Past
			2 Fumerton’s Acquaintance Theory and Skepticism about the Past
				2.1 Fumerton’s acquaintance theory
				2.2 Fumerton’s replies to skepticism about the past
					2.2.1 REPLY 1: SELF-REFUTATION
					2.2.2 REPLY 2: ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE RELATION OF MAKING-PROBABLE
				2.3 Difficulties with Fumerton’s response to memory skepticism
					2.3.1 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEM
					2.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF BACKGROUND EVIDENCE
					2.3.3 THE CONTENT PROBLEM
			3 Epistemic Conservatism and Skepticism about the Past
			4 Conclusion
			References
	Skepticism and Circularity
		Chapter 10: On Metaepistemological Scepticism
			1 Introduction
			2 Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Scepticism
			3 Stroud’s Metaepistemological Scepticism
			4 Fumerton and Stroud
			References
		Chapter 11: How Our Knowledge Squares with Skeptical Intuitions Despite the Circle
			1 Preliminaries on Skepticism in General
				1.1 Varieties of skepticism
				1.2 Skepticism, sensitivity, and safety
				1.3 Why the dream scenario is special
				1.4 Skepticism and circularity
			2 A More Specific Disagreement on Philosophical Skepticism
			3 Conclusion
			References
	Afterword
		Chapter 12: The Prospects for Traditional Internalism
			1 Introduction
			2 Noninferential Justification and Acquaintance
				2.1 Acquaintance and mental states
				2.2 Acquaintance and seemings
				2.3 Speckled hens and acquaintance
				2.4 Noninferential justification and assurance
			3 Inferential Justification
			4 Prospects for Traditional Internalism
				4.1 Traditional internalism and skepticism
				4.2 Will we find the future of traditional internalism by thinking about the past?
			References
Index