Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance: Comparative Views on the US and German Economies

BOOK COVER......Page 1
TITLE......Page 3
COPYRIGHT......Page 4
CONTENTS......Page 5
FIGURES......Page 7
TABLES......Page 8
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 11
INTRODUCTION......Page 13
TRENDS IN U.S. AND GERMAN LABOR MARKETS......Page 14
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: THE CHANGING VIEW ON INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS......Page 18
THE PLAN OF THE BOOK......Page 23
Work Organization......Page 24
Bargaining......Page 25
Employment Adjustments......Page 26
REFERENCES......Page 27
2 WORK ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING IN AMERICAN ENTERPRISES......Page 30
THE SURVEY......Page 31
FLEXIBLE WORK ORGANIZATION......Page 32
Markets and Strategy......Page 33
Firm Environment......Page 34
Estimation......Page 35
TRAINING......Page 36
Explaining the Variation in Firm Training Practices......Page 37
Results......Page 38
A BRIEF COMPARISON WITH GERMANY......Page 39
NOTES......Page 40
REFERENCES......Page 43
APPENDIX B......Page 45
WORKS COUNCILS: AMERICAN HOPES AND GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS......Page 51
CODETERMINATION AND AGGREGATE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE......Page 53
Employment Protection Legislation, Works Councils, and Personnel Turnover......Page 55
Dismissals......Page 56
Quits......Page 58
Costs of Quits and Dismissals......Page 59
Hirings......Page 60
Summary......Page 61
Works Councils and the Employment of Disabled Workers......Page 62
Interest Heterogeneity among Workers Representatives in the Case of Hirings and Dismissals......Page 65
Summary......Page 67
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS......Page 68
NOTES......Page 70
REFERENCES......Page 73
APPENDIX......Page 77
CONDITIONS FOR THE TRANSFERABILITY OF POLICY......Page 83
Two Examples Without Externalities......Page 84
An Example With an Externality......Page 86
Positive Implications......Page 87
HOURS LAWS: UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY......Page 88
WEEKLY AND DAILY HOURS IN THE FRG AND THE U.S.......Page 89
EMPLOYMENT-HOURS SUBSTITUTION AND THE EFFECT OF POLICY......Page 95
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 97
REFERENCES......Page 98
5 WHY DO AMERICANS AND GERMANS WORK DIFFERENT HOURS?......Page 100
HOURS WORKED IN THE U.S. AND GERMANY......Page 101
A Comparison with Hours Worked in the OECD......Page 103
Hours Worked in the ISSP......Page 106
PREFERENCES FOR HOURS WORKED......Page 107
Corroborating Evidence on Preferences......Page 110
Preferences over Time......Page 114
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF THE WORK HOURS GAP......Page 116
A Standard Supply Explanation......Page 117
Are Attitudes Toward Work Related to Incentives?......Page 120
Hours Differences and Earnings Inequality......Page 121
CONCLUSIONS......Page 124
NOTES......Page 125
REFERENCES......Page 126
INTRODUCTION......Page 128
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WAGE SETTING IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES......Page 129
Hypotheses Concerning Interindustrial Wage Differentials......Page 131
Previous Studies on Wage Differentials for Germany......Page 133
Plan of Our Study......Page 134
The Data......Page 135
Estimation Method......Page 136
Human Capital Effects on Earnings......Page 137
Interindustrial Wage Differentials......Page 139
Human Capital Variables Excluded......Page 143
Results for Industry Switchers......Page 144
Comparison of General Results......Page 145
Comparison of Interindustry Differentials......Page 147
CONCLUSIONS......Page 149
NOTES......Page 150
REFERENCES......Page 152
APPENDIX: CALCULATION OF NORMALIZED INDUSTRY EFFECTS......Page 154
INTRODUCTION......Page 162
Legal Basis in Germany......Page 163
PS schemes......Page 164
PS with a Silent Partnership......Page 167
Asset Participation on the Basis of Loans......Page 168
Schemes, Legal Issues, Growth, and Prevalence of PS in the United States......Page 169
PROFIT SHARING OF EMPLOYEES: HYPOTHESES......Page 171
PS Firms Versus Non-PS Firms and Comparison of PS Firms......Page 174
Simple Correlations of PS......Page 177
Nonpecuniary Participation in Different PS Schemes......Page 181
PS Participation Functions......Page 182
Effects of PS......Page 185
PS and Nonpecuniary Participation......Page 186
CONCLUSIONS......Page 190
REFERENCES......Page 191
APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES IN FIGURE AND TABLES......Page 193
INTRODUCTION......Page 197
INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS AND A QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW......Page 198
Large Companies: Specific Skills and the Apprenticeship Calculation......Page 206
Large Companies: Competing to get the Best School Leavers via Apprenticeships......Page 211
CONCLUSION......Page 216
NOTES......Page 217
REFERENCES......Page 218
PRELIMINARIES......Page 219
Wage Subsidy Programs......Page 221
Labor Market Information Programs......Page 222
Advance Notice of Plant Closing or Layoff......Page 223
Dismissal Policies......Page 224
HIRING BEHAVIOR WITH IMPERFECT SIGNALING......Page 225
Employer Screening......Page 226
CONCLUDING COMMENTS......Page 227
REFERENCES......Page 228
INTRODUCTION......Page 230
Employment Effects......Page 231
Legal Framework......Page 234
Public Employment Services......Page 236
Private Employment Services......Page 240
MONOPOLY OR COEXISTENCE: A RELEVANT QUESTION......Page 242
REFERENCES......Page 245
DYNAMICS OF EMPLOYMENT: JOB TURNOVER......Page 247
FIRM SIZE AND FIRM GROWTH......Page 251
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF NEWLY FOUNDED FIRMS......Page 253
FIRM PANELS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR DYNAMIC LABOR MARKET ANALYSES......Page 256
REFERENCES......Page 257
INTRODUCTION......Page 260
Germany......Page 261
The United States......Page 262
Employment and Hours Adjustment......Page 263
SHORT-TIME WORK IN GERMANY......Page 271
INVENTORY ADJUSTMENT......Page 274
CONCLUSION......Page 279
NOTES......Page 280
REFERENCES......Page 282
APPENDIX......Page 283
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW......Page 288
Social Security Insurance......Page 289
Unemployment Insurance......Page 290
Pension Insurance......Page 291
Codetermination......Page 292
Employment Protection......Page 293
EXPLAINING THE DECLINING MOBILITY IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET......Page 294
ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF LABOR MARKETS......Page 297
Beveridge Curve Analysis......Page 298
The Matching Function......Page 299
AN INSTITUTIONAL HYSTERESIS EXPLANATION FOR PERSISTENT GERMAN UNEMPLOYMENT......Page 304
NOTES......Page 307
REFERENCES......Page 309
INDEX......Page 311