Independent Energy Regulation in a Developing Economy: Stakeholder Perspectives and Legal Interpretations

Acknowledgements
Contents
About the Authors
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
	1.1 Part A
		1.1.1 Why Regulate?
		1.1.2 The Era of Neoliberalism
	1.2 Part B
		1.2.1 Electricity Regulation in India
		1.2.2 Contracting Power Purchase Through Competitive Bidding
		1.2.3 Role of India’s Electricity Regulators
	1.3 Chapter Scheme
	References
2 Theories of Regulation
	2.1 Public Interest Theory
		2.1.1 The Imperative of Universal Supply Argument
		2.1.2 The Political Imperative Argument
		2.1.3 The Natural Monopoly Argument
	2.2 Capture/Private Interest Theory of Regulation
		2.2.1 Stigler’s Interest Group Theory
		2.2.2 Posner’s Disguised Taxation Theory
		2.2.3 Bureaucratic Theory of Regulation
	2.3 Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost Theories
		2.3.1 Williamson’s Bounded Rationality Theory
	2.4 Part 3—Theories of Independent Regulation
		2.4.1 Credible Commitments, Expert Regulators, Rule-Based Regulation and Time-Consistent Contracts
	References
3 Sanctity of Contracts and the Hold-Up Problem
	3.1 CGPL
	3.2 Force Majeure
	3.3 Essar
	3.4 Analysis
	3.5 Chronology of Cases Relating to Sanctity of Contracts
		3.5.1 Adani Power Mundra Limited (APMuL)
		3.5.2 Coastal Gujarat Power Limited (CGPL)
		3.5.3 Essar
	References
4 Credible Commitments
	4.1 Hinduja National Power Corporation Limited
	4.2 Analysis
	4.3 Chronology in Hinduja National Power Corporation Limited
5 Interpreting/Implying Terms into Contracts
	5.1 Nabha Power Limited Versus Punjab State Power Corporation Limited
		5.1.1 Reddendo Singula Singulis
	5.2 Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (PSERC)
	5.3 APTEL
		5.3.1 Issue 1: Denial of Washing Related Costs
		5.3.2 Issue 2: Consideration of Incorrect GCV of Coal
		5.3.3 Issue 3: Denial of Road Transportation Cost
		5.3.4 Issue 4: Non-payment of Capacity Charges
		5.3.5 Issue 5: Non-payment of Third-Party Analysis Charges, Liaising Charges and Transit and Handling Losses
	5.4 Supreme Court
	5.5 Analysis
	5.6 Chronology—Nabha Power Limited
	5.7 Implying Terms into a Contract—APMuL Versus GUVNL
		5.7.1 GUVNL Versus APMuL
	5.8 Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC)
	5.9 APTEL
	5.10 Supreme Court
	5.11 The Sequel
	5.12 Analysis
	5.13 Chronology in GUVNL Versus APMuL
	5.14 Nabha Power Ltd Versus State of Punjab—Heat Rate Degradation
	5.15 Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (PSERC)
	5.16 APTEL
	5.17 Analysis
	5.18 Chronology in Nabha Power Limited Heat Rate Dispute
	References
6 Market-Making in Electric Supply
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 The Sisyphean Journey Towards Consumer Choice
	6.3 Regulatory Missteps
	6.4 APTEL’s Volte-Face
	6.5 The Supreme Court Opens up a Labyrinth
	6.6 The Sequel
		6.6.1 Prometheus Unbound
	6.7 Summary: Untangling Retail Competition
	6.8 Analysis
	6.9 Chronology of Cases Relating to Mumbai’s Retail Distribution
	References
7 Regulatory Legitimacy and Turf Wars
	7.1 Indraprastha Gas Versus Petroleum Regulator
	7.2 Section Analysis
	7.3 Chronology in PNGRB’s Turf Dispute
	7.4 ‘Rogue’ Regulators
	7.5 Section Analysis
		7.5.1 Expropriation by the Government
	7.6  Chapter Analysis
8 Summary, Findings, Conclusions and Policy Implications
	8.1 Sanctity of Contracts
	8.2 Implying Terms into a Contract
	8.3 Regulator as Market Maker
	8.4 Turf Wars
	8.5 ‘Rogue’ Regulator
	8.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
	8.7 India’s Regulatory Experience—Theory and Reality
	8.8 Public Interest Theory of Regulation
	8.9 Competition for the Market
		8.9.1 Competition in the Market
	References