High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy

Cover
High Wire
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Introduction
	I.1. The Dynamic Pyramid Model
		I.1.1. Hierarchy
		I.1.2. Volatility
		I.1.3. Fragility
	I.2. A Road Map
PART I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
	1. Hierarchy
		1.1. Top Leadership
		1.2. Regulators
		1.4. Platform Participants
		1.5. Summary
	2. Volatility
		2.1. Phase One: Lax Regulation
		2.2. Phase Two: Harsh Crackdown
			2.2.1. The Tipping Point
			2.2.2. Agency Overreach
		2.3. Phase Three: Regulatory Easing
		2.4. Summary
	3. Fragility
		3.1. China’s Covid Control
		3.2. The 2021 Energy Crisis
		3.3. The Property Crackdown
		3.4. The One-​Child Policy
		3.5. Reflections
		3.6. Decentralized Policy Experimentation
		3.7. Summary
PART II. PLATFORM REGULATION
	4. Antitrust Regulation
		4.1. Regulatory Challenges
			4.1.1. The Great Firewall
			4.1.2. Disorderly Expansion
			4.1.3. Unruly Competition
		4.2. Applying the Dynamic Pyramid Model
			4.2.1. Top Leadership
			4.2.2. Firms
			4.2.3. Platform Participants
			4.2.4. Regulators
		4.3. Future Trend
		4.4. Summary
	5. Data Regulation
		5.1. Regulatory Challenges
			5.1.1. Underground Industry
			5.1.2. The Government
			5.1.3. Tech Firms
		5.2. Applying the Dynamic Pyramid Model
			5.2.1. Top Leadership
			5.2.2. Firms
			5.2.3. Platform Participants
			5.2.4. Regulators
		5.3. Future Trend
		5.4. Summary
	6. Labor Regulation
		6.1. Regulatory Challenges
			6.1.1. Algorithmic Exploitation
			6.1.2. Lack of Social Protection
			6.1.3. Barriers to Collective Action
		6.2. Applying the Dynamic Pyramid Model
			6.2.1. Top Leadership
			6.2.2. Firms
			6.2.3. Platform Participants
			6.2.4. Regulators
		6.3. Future Trend
		6.4. Summary
PART III. PLATFORM SELF- REGULATION
	7. Platforms as Quasi-​Regulators
		7.1. Building (Faking) a Reputation Mechanism
		7.2. Credible Enforcement Mechanisms
			7.2.1. The Demand for Self-​Regulation
			7.2.2. The Law of Taobao
			7.2.3. Co-​Regulation with the State
		7.3. Summary
	8. Decentralizing Platform Governance
		8.1. Forms of Decentralization
			8.1.1. Weak Decentralization
			8.1.2. Semi-​Strong Decentralization
			8.1.3. Strong Decentralization
		8.2. Legitimacy Crises
			8.2.1. User Riot
			8.2.2. Corruption
			8.2.3. Case Ambiguity
		8.3. Decentralization to Enhance Legitimacy
			8.3.1. Procedural Justice
			8.3.2. Norm Searching
		8.4. Summary
PART IV. THE PATH FORWARD
	9. Is China Exceptional?
		9.1. Antitrust
			9.1.1. Western Trend
			9.1.2. Impact on China
		9.2. Data
			9.2.1. Western Trend
			9.2.2. Impact on China
		9.3. Labor
			9.3.1. Western Trend
			9.3.2. Impact on China
		9.4. Summary
	10. Assessing the Impact
		10.1. The Retreat of the Private Sector
			10.1.1. Exit and Restructuring
			10.1.2. The Unintended Consequences
		10.2. The Advancement of the Administrative State
			10.2.1. Golden Share and State Investment
			10.2.2. The Shift from Soft to Hard Tech
		10.3. Summary
	11. Regulating Generative AI
		11.1. Applying the Dynamic Pyramid Model
			11.1.1. Top Leaders
			11.1.2. Industry Stakeholders
			11.1.3. The Public
			11.1.4. Regulators
		11.2. Is China Exceptional?
		11.3. Future Trend
		11.4. Summary
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index