Handbooks in Economics

1.pdf......Page 1
2.pdf......Page 2
Allen Kneese......Page 6
4.pdf......Page 7
Acknowledgements......Page 11
Intertemporal Welfare Economics and the Environment......Page 13
Keywords......Page 14
Fundamental dilemmas of dynamic welfare economics......Page 15
Koopmans' axioms......Page 18
Utilitarianism - a summary......Page 22
Overtaking......Page 23
Chichilnisky's criterion......Page 25
Comparison with overtaking......Page 28
Discounting utility or consumption?......Page 29
Logarithmic discounting and the Weber-Fechner law......Page 32
Final comments on utilitarianism et al.......Page 34
Implications for the choice of growth paths......Page 35
Stationary solutions......Page 36
Dynamic behavior......Page 38
Renewable resources and the Green Golden Rule......Page 39
Chichilnisky's criterion......Page 40
Declining discount rates......Page 41
Examples......Page 43
Time consistency......Page 44
Conclusions on the choice of a discount rate......Page 46
References......Page 51
National Income and the Environment......Page 54
Abstract......Page 55
Keywords......Page 56
Introduction......Page 57
Outline......Page 59
Historical background......Page 60
The Keynesian imperative and Lindahl's alternative......Page 61
The accounts of the nation......Page 62
Lindahl's system......Page 64
Welfare interpretations of income and wealth......Page 65
Sustainable income: a graphical approach......Page 66
Sustainable income and the ideas of Fisher, Lindahl and Hicks......Page 67
Sustainable income and the Hamiltonian......Page 68
Income and welfare - the separating hyperplane approach......Page 69
Taking stock......Page 71
A general dynamic model......Page 72
Hicksian income and the Hamiltonian......Page 74
National wealth......Page 75
Hotelling......Page 78
Stock a source of utility......Page 79
Renewable resources......Page 80
Income, wealth and NNP......Page 81
 Applications and extensions......Page 82
Defensive expenditures......Page 83
Non-autonomous Hamiltonians......Page 84
Non-utilitarian optima......Page 85
Sustainable revenues and national income......Page 87
Theoretical issues - taking stock......Page 89
Valuation of ecological services......Page 90
Politically determined willingness to pay......Page 91
Defensive expenditures and similar approaches......Page 92
Valuation of stocks......Page 93
Economic depreciation......Page 94
Exhaustible resources.......Page 95
Transboundary pollution......Page 97
A small open economy......Page 98
Expanded social accounting matrices......Page 100
The Nordhaus-Tobin measure of economic welfare (MEW)......Page 101
Norwegian resource accounts......Page 102
Other developments......Page 103
Selected applications......Page 104
The SEEA......Page 105
Environmentally adjusted domestic product (EDP)......Page 107
The SEEA and forest accounting......Page 109
Applying the SEEA in Mexico......Page 110
Sweden......Page 111
Indonesia......Page 113
The Philippines......Page 115
Genuine savings......Page 116
Conclusions......Page 118
References......Page 119
Economic growth and the environment......Page 125
Keywords......Page 126
Introduction......Page 127
Modelling environmental pollution......Page 129
Environmental pollution in the Solow model......Page 132
Growth and pollution accumulation with emissions as an input......Page 135
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with environmental pollution......Page 139
Optimal growth with abatement......Page 144
Nonlinear pollution accumulation with optimal emission choice......Page 147
Discounting......Page 149
Growth and the environment when technical change is endogenous......Page 151
AK models and models with increasing returns......Page 152
Two-sector models......Page 155
Models with product variety......Page 156
Empirical evidence......Page 158
The environmental Kuznets curve......Page 159
Theoretical foundations......Page 160
Empirical results......Page 163
Growth accounting and the environment......Page 166
Summary and conclusions......Page 168
Acknowledgements......Page 171
References......Page 172
CGE Modeling of Environmental Policy and Resource Management......Page 178
Keywords......Page 179
Introduction......Page 180
Categories of CGE models......Page 181
CGE models and environmental policy analysis......Page 182
What are CGE models good for?......Page 183
Leif Johansen and the MSG model......Page 184
Herber Scarf and Scarf's algorithm......Page 185
Computers and software......Page 186
Environmental CGE modeling......Page 187
Some general issues in environmental CGE modeling......Page 188
Production sectors......Page 189
Production functions......Page 190
Emissions and abatement......Page 191
Technological change......Page 192
Environmental benefits......Page 193
International trade in CGE models......Page 194
The models......Page 196
The ``leakage'' issue......Page 198
Concluding remarks......Page 199
The models......Page 200
Specific features and problems......Page 201
Single-country ``externality'' CGE models......Page 202
The double dividend issue......Page 204
CGE models of resource depletion and management......Page 205
Concluding remarks......Page 206
References......Page 207
Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regulation......Page 212
Keywords......Page 213
Introduction......Page 214
Direct compliance costs......Page 216
Indirect costs and revealed cost measures......Page 219
Government expenditures on environmental protection......Page 221
Household regulation......Page 222
Discounting......Page 223
General equilibrium effects......Page 224
When partial equilibrium is right......Page 226
When partial equilibrium is wrong......Page 228
Approximating losses in other markets......Page 232
General equilibrium analysis......Page 234
Numerical analysis......Page 236
Environmental policy versus public good provision......Page 237
The double dividend......Page 238
Dynamic general equilibrium analysis......Page 239
Distribution of costs......Page 241
Impacts by household......Page 242
Households, general equilibrium, and social welfare......Page 243
Impacts by sector......Page 244
Impacts by region......Page 246
Conclusions......Page 247
References......Page 249
Environmental implications of non-environmental policies......Page 257
Abstract......Page 258
Keywords......Page 259
Background......Page 260
A simple model......Page 261
Policy failures......Page 264
Plan of the chapter......Page 265
Subsidies and related interventions outside the energy sector......Page 266
Agricultural subsidies......Page 267
Trade policies......Page 268
Privatization/deregulation......Page 271
Fossil fuel energy subsidies......Page 273
Partial-equilibrium studies......Page 274
General-equilibrium studies......Page 275
Environmental impacts of energy subsidies......Page 277
Environmental impacts of subsidies on global carbon levels......Page 278
Why do energy subsidies exist and what alternatives do we have?......Page 280
Simultaneous reductions in energy subsidies and other taxes......Page 281
Gross welfare double dividend vs. employment double dividend......Page 283
Weak vs. strong dividends......Page 284
Shifting the tax burden......Page 287
Improving the efficiency of the tax system......Page 289
The employment double dividend: the case without involuntary unemployment......Page 290
Conclusions from the theoretical double dividend literature......Page 292
Key aspects of the empirical models......Page 294
Analysis of the impacts of the 1992 EU energy tax proposal......Page 296
Sensitivity analysis......Page 298
Conclusions on the empirical evidence on the employment double dividend......Page 300
Conclusions......Page 301
Acknowledgements......Page 302
References......Page 303
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND THE ENVIRONMENT......Page 306
Abstract......Page 307
Keywords......Page 308
Introduction......Page 309
The endowment of a country with environmental resources......Page 311
Trade liberalisation and the gains from trade......Page 313
Changes in environmental policy after trade liberalisation......Page 315
Environmental policies in open economies......Page 316
Trade interventions as instruments of environmental policy......Page 319
International oligopoly and strategic environmental policy: the Nash-Cournot model......Page 321
Strategic environmental policy: variations and extensions......Page 323
Monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade......Page 325
Political economy and environmental policy in open economies......Page 327
International factor movements and the environment......Page 328
The gains from factor mobility......Page 329
Environmental policy in open economies and interjurisdictional competition......Page 330
The small open economy with factor market distortions......Page 331
The large-country case......Page 332
Noncompetitive models of foreign direct investment......Page 333
Stock pollutants and international trade......Page 335
Intertemporal trade, foreign debt, and the environment......Page 337
Environmental regulation and competitiveness......Page 338
The impact of environmental regulation on the international division of labour......Page 339
The impact of trade on the environment......Page 342
International factor movements......Page 344
Foreign debt and the environment......Page 345
Environmental agreements and trade agreements......Page 346
Summary and conclusions......Page 348
References......Page 350
The theory of international environmental agreements......Page 360
Keywords......Page 361
Introduction......Page 362
Relationship to other cooperation problems......Page 365
The problems IEAs are meant to address......Page 367
Overview of the chapter......Page 369
The non-cooperative and full cooperative outcomes......Page 373
Choices and payoffs......Page 374
The equilibrium in unilateral policies......Page 375
Constrained optima......Page 376
Example......Page 377
Non-signatory behavior......Page 378
Signatory behavior......Page 379
Example......Page 381
Do IEAs help much?......Page 383
Beliefs, credibility, and norm-breaking......Page 385
Minimum participation......Page 387
Strategic complements and coordination......Page 389
Compliance versus participation......Page 391
Environmental protection as a repeated game......Page 392
An infinitely repeated IEA game......Page 394
Is compliance a problem?......Page 396
Weakly collectively rational treaties......Page 397
The distributive role of side payments......Page 398
The strategic role of side payments......Page 402
Empirical application to acid rain......Page 403
Linkage......Page 405
Trade leakage......Page 407
The strategy of trade restrictions......Page 408
Application to ozone layer depletion and global climate change......Page 409
A research agenda......Page 412
References......Page 415
The Economics of Biodiversity......Page 420
Keywords......Page 421
Introduction......Page 422
Measures based on relative abundance......Page 423
Measures based on joint dissimilarity......Page 425
Use value and existence values of individual species......Page 428
Biological prospecting......Page 429
Biodiversity and ecosystem services......Page 431
Terrestrial habitat protection......Page 435
Marine biodiversity and reserves......Page 441
Introduced species......Page 443
Incentives to conserve and conservation policy......Page 447
Conclusions......Page 454
References......Page 455
The Economics of Climate Policy......Page 464
Keywords......Page 465
Nature of the challenge......Page 466
The potential physical and socioeconomic consequences of climate change......Page 468
Emissions control......Page 470
Sequestration......Page 471
Adaptation......Page 472
International policy toward climate change......Page 474
Benefits and costs of greenhouse gas control......Page 476
A cost taxonomy......Page 477
Bottom-up vs. top-down......Page 479
Costs are relative......Page 480
Estimates of control costs......Page 481
Scope of benefits......Page 482
Quantitative estimates of benefits......Page 484
Fundamental economics of the climate issue......Page 485
Simple models of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change......Page 486
Uncertainty, irreversibility, learning, and insurance......Page 490
What integrated assessment models say......Page 491
The optimal timing of emissions control......Page 494
Philosophical justifications for climate policy......Page 496
Designing climate policy instruments......Page 498
Designing incentive-based GHG abatement policy: fundamentals......Page 499
Price versus quantity policies: ``hybrids''......Page 501
Intertemporal flexibility and GHG policy design......Page 502
International GHG policy design......Page 503
Emission trading in the Kyoto Protocol......Page 505
Nonincentive-based policies......Page 506
Economics and international climate agreements......Page 507
The paradox of international agreements......Page 508
Designing climate agreements to draw in developing nations......Page 510
What have we learned?......Page 512
Research implications......Page 513
References......Page 514
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16.pdf......Page 541