Governing the World Trade Organization: Past, Present and Beyond Doha

Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
List of Figures......Page 9
List of Tables......Page 10
Notes on contributors......Page 11
Preface......Page 17
Abbreviations......Page 19
1 Introduction......Page 21
References......Page 29
Part I: Setting the stage......Page 31
2 The origins and back to the future: a conversation with Ambassador Julio Lacarte Muró......Page 33
Introduction......Page 40
The Crisis of Multilateralism and the ‘Demise’ of the WTO......Page 42
The ‘New Circumstances’ of WTO Reform......Page 50
From Existential Crisis to Institutional Transformation:What Future for the WTO?......Page 57
References......Page 62
Part II: Boundaries......Page 67
Introduction......Page 69
Reasons for Linking Internal Measures and Policies to Trade Negotiations......Page 71
When internal measures affect relative prices......Page 72
Internal measures can affect trade related fixed costs......Page 74
When internal measures shape the functioning of national markets......Page 75
Taking advantage of cross-linkages among issues in negotiations......Page 76
Guaranteeing the effectiveness of domestic policies......Page 77
GATT and GATS......Page 78
Subsidy agreement......Page 80
SPS and TBT Agreement......Page 82
TRIPS, TRIMs and government procurement......Page 83
Labour, environment and competition: the themes that didn’t make it......Page 86
Global Institutional Design: Defining the Roles of Different Multilateral Platforms......Page 87
Factors that have Affected Agenda-Setting in the Past......Page 91
An ambiguous attitude towards harmonisation......Page 94
Export interests and the anti-circumvention argument appear to have influenced the shape of WTO agenda......Page 95
Enforcement considerations play a role......Page 96
Conclusions......Page 97
References......Page 98
Introduction......Page 102
Legitimacy......Page 103
Democracy......Page 105
The democratic deficit of the WTO......Page 106
Legitimisation Through Parliamentarisation......Page 108
Historical development and legal basis......Page 110
Objectives and functions......Page 111
Structure and decision-making......Page 112
Content of meetings and outcome......Page 114
The PCWTO’s contribution to democratic legitimacy of the WTO......Page 116
The Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB)......Page 118
Historical development and legal basis......Page 119
Structure and institutional setting......Page 120
Contribution of the PNoWB to transnational democratic legitimacy......Page 122
Whither Now? Elements to Improve and Increase the Parliamentarisation of Global Economic Governance......Page 123
References......Page 125
Part III: Emerging and established powers......Page 129
Introduction......Page 131
Institutional Adaptation and Reform: The Responsiveness of the WTO to Changing Balances of Power......Page 132
Explaining Disengagement Amidst Reform......Page 134
Proposals for Reform......Page 138
Solution 2: ‘Club-of-Clubs’/critical mass approaches......Page 140
Solution 3: a new voting system......Page 143
Conclusion......Page 146
References......Page 147
Introduction......Page 149
The DDA: A Never-Ending Process with an Open Compromise Triangle......Page 150
Principal–agent theory......Page 153
Chains of delegation......Page 154
Dynamic agenda setting, contingent mobilisation, and preference making......Page 156
Agenda setting, ultimate agent preferences, and rippling along the delegation chain......Page 158
Two Pieces of Evidence......Page 160
The Commission’s objectives and frustrations with agenda expansion in the WTO......Page 161
Mobilised interests in the EU Member States: a clue from parliamentary debates......Page 165
Conclusion......Page 169
References......Page 171
Part IV: Weaker actors......Page 175
Introduction......Page 177
The theory behind public sector monitoring of WTO commitments......Page 181
A brief history of monitoring before and during the global economic crisis......Page 185
The four questions that information generated from these new initiatives could help to answer......Page 190
Monitoring Needs Due to Potential Crisis-Induced Abuses of WTO Commitments......Page 191
Crisis-induced abuses of trade remedies?......Page 193
Other tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed at the border?......Page 197
Crisis-induced abuses of subsidies and other behind-the-border measures?......Page 203
Conclusions and a Reminder not to Forget Permanent and Future Monitoring Needs......Page 204
References......Page 205
Introduction......Page 208
Institutional Coherence: the Conceptual Framework......Page 209
Criteria for Institutional Efficiency and Coherence......Page 213
Institutional Comparative Advantage......Page 214
Systemic and Coordination Issues......Page 218
The Changing Nature of Trade Agreements......Page 225
Summary and Conclusion......Page 230
References......Page 231
Part V: The consensus principle......Page 235
Introduction......Page 237
The WTO Agreement and Annexes as a ‘Living Instrument’......Page 238
Decision-making in the GATT: shades of informality......Page 240
Formalisation of informal consensus decision-making......Page 242
An unravelling of the major interests’ rule through informality......Page 247
The Continuing Importance of Consensus Decision-Making and Informality in keeping the WTO ‘Alive’......Page 248
Informal consultations......Page 249
Small group and ‘Green Room’ meetings......Page 250
Coalitions and alliances......Page 252
Chairpersons, facilitators and ‘friends’......Page 254
Conclusions......Page 256
References......Page 257
Introduction......Page 261
Crisis......Page 262
Consensus......Page 264
Active and passive consensus......Page 267
Crisis in the FAO......Page 269
Third-party agenda setting par excellence: the independent external evaluation......Page 271
Reform as a response to institutional crisis......Page 274
Promoting Active Consensus in the WTO: Crisis-Lite......Page 275
Four crisis scenarios for the WTO......Page 276
Crisis-lite......Page 278
Conclusion......Page 280
References......Page 281
Part VI: Quo vadis?......Page 283
Introduction......Page 285
Montesquieu and the Post-Montesquieu Frame......Page 286
Defining post-Montesquieu political thought......Page 288
The legislative power in the WTO......Page 290
The judicial power in the WTO......Page 293
The executive power in the WTO......Page 295
The WTO and its constituents......Page 300
Conclusion......Page 303
References......Page 304
Introduction......Page 309
Member-driven......Page 311
Consensus principle......Page 316
Single undertaking......Page 319
Why it doesn’t work......Page 320
Incremental change?......Page 321
The reshaping of decision-making: looking beyond Doha......Page 323
Conclusion......Page 329
References......Page 330
Introduction......Page 333
The Institution of Multilateral Trade Liberalisation......Page 336
The Narration of Multilateral Trade Liberalisation......Page 344
Conclusion......Page 352
References......Page 353
Index......Page 357