Godel, Putnam, and Functionalism: A New Reading of Representation and Reality (Bradford Books)

Preface......Page 8
Introduction......Page 14
1  Putnam’s Use of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems to Refute Computational Functionalism......Page 42
2  Putnam’s Bombshell: The Gödelian Argument in ‘‘Reflexive Reflections’’......Page 72
3  Universal Realization of Computation: Putnam’s Triviality Argument......Page 108
4  Putnam’s Triviality Theorem and Universal Physical Computation......Page 142
5  Searle on Triviality and the Subjective Nature of Computation......Page 170
6  There Are Infinitely Many Computational Realizations of an Arbitrary Intentional State......Page 190
7  Against Local Computational Reduction: The EQUIVALENCE Argument......Page 230
8  Rational Interpretation, Synonymy Determination, and EQUIVALENCE......Page 254
9  The Question of the Nonformalizability of SD, Coreferentiality Decisions, and the Family of Notions: Rational Interpretation1, General Intelligence, and Reasonable Reasoning......Page 290
Notes......Page 318
Index......Page 350