دسترسی نامحدود
برای کاربرانی که ثبت نام کرده اند
برای ارتباط با ما می توانید از طریق شماره موبایل زیر از طریق تماس و پیامک با ما در ارتباط باشید
در صورت عدم پاسخ گویی از طریق پیامک با پشتیبان در ارتباط باشید
برای کاربرانی که ثبت نام کرده اند
درصورت عدم همخوانی توضیحات با کتاب
از ساعت 7 صبح تا 10 شب
ویرایش: 4 نویسندگان: Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath, David H. Reiley Jr. سری: ISBN (شابک) : 0393124444, 9780393124446 ناشر: W. W. Norton & Co. سال نشر: 2014 تعداد صفحات: 755 زبان: English فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود) حجم فایل: 7 مگابایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Games of Strategy به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب بازی های استراتژیک نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
Cover (Games of Strategy) Front Matter Title page Copyright Contents Preface Part One - Introduction and General Principles 1 - Basic Ideas and Examples 1 What is a Game of Strategy? 2 Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games 3 Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy 2 - How to Think about Strategic Games 1 Decisions Versus Games 2 Classifying Games 3 Some Terminology and Background Assumptions 4 The Uses of Game Theory 5 The Structure of the Chapters to Follow Part Two - Concepts and Techniques 3 - Games with Sequential Moves 1 Game Trees 2 Solving Games by Using Trees 3 Adding More Players 4 Order Advantages 5 Adding More Moves 6 Evidence Concerning Rollback 7 Strategies in Survivor 4 - Simultaneous-Move Games: Discrete Strategies 1 Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games with Discrete Strategies 2 Nash Equilibrium 3 Dominance 4 Best-Response Analysis 5 Three Players 6 Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies 7 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies 5 - Simultaneous- Move Games: Continuous Strategies, Discussion, and Evidence 1 Pure Strategies that are Continuous Variables 2 Critical Discussion of the Nash Equilibrium Concept 3 Rationalizability 4 Empirical Evidence Concerning Nash Equilibrium 6 - Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves 1 Games with both Simultaneous and Sequential Moves 2 Changing the Order of Moves in a Game 3 Change in the Method of Analysis 4 Three-Player Games 7 - Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies 1 What is a Mixed Strategy? 2 Mixing Moves 3 Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Responses 4 Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games 5 General Discussion of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria 6 Mixing When One Player has Threeor More Pure Strategies 7 Mixing When Both Players have Three Strategies 8 How to Use Mixed Strategies in Practice 9 Evidence on Mixing Part Three - Some Broad Classes of Games and Strategies 8 - Uncertainty and Information 1 Imperfect Information: Dealing with Risk 2 Asymmetric Information: Basic Ideas 3 Direct Communication, or “Cheap Talk” 4 Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening 5 Signaling in the Labor Market 6 Equilibria in Two -Player Signaling Games Appendix: Risk Attitudes and Bayes’ Theorem 1 Attitudes Toward Risk And Expected Utility 2 Infering Probabilities from observing consequences 9 - Strategic Moves 1 A Classification of Strategic Moves 2 Credibility of Strategic Moves 3 Commitments 4 Threats and Promises 5 Some Additional Topics 6 Acquiring Credibility 7 Countering Your Opponent’s Strategic Moves 10 - The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games 1 The Basic Game (Review) 2 Solutions I: Repetition 3 Solutions II: Penalties and Rewards 4 Solutions III: Leadership 5 Experimental Evidence 6 Real-World Dilemmas Appendix: Infinite Sums 11 - Collective-Action Games 1 Collective-Action Games with Two Players 2 Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups 3 Spillovers, or Externalities 4 A Brief History of Ideas 5 “Help!”: A Game of Chicken with Mixed Strategies 12 - Evolutionary Games 1 The Framework 2 Prisoners’ Dilemma 3 Chicken 4 The Assurance Game 5 Three Phenotypes in the Population 6 The Hawk–Dove Game 7 Interactions by Population and Across Species 8 Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism 13 - Mechanism Design 1 Price Discrimination 3 Cost-Plus and Fixed-Price Contracts 4 Evidence Concerning Information Revelation Mechanisms 5 Incentives for Effort: The Simplest Case 6 Incentives for Effort: Evidence and Extensions Part Four - Applications to Specific Strategic Situations 14 - Brinkmanship the Cuban Missile Crisis 1 A Brief Narrative of Events 2 A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation 3 Accounting for additional complexities 4 A Probabilistic Threat 5 Practicing Brinkmanship 15 - Strategy and Voting 1 Voting Rules and Procedures 2 Voting Paradoxes 3 Evaluating voting systems 4 Strategic Manipulation of Votes 5 The Median Voter Theorem 16 - Bidding Strategy and Auction Design 1 Types of Auctions 2 The Winner’s Curse 3 Bidding Strategies 4 All-Pay Auctions 5 How to Sell at Auction 6 Some Added Twists to Consider 7 aditional reading 17 - Bargaining 1 Nash’s Cooperative Solution 2 Variable-Threat Bar 3 Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays 4 Experimental Evidence 5 Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience 6 Manipulating Information in Bargaining 7 Bargaining with Many Parties and Issues Glossary Index