From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 9
Preface to the reissue......Page 15
Acknowledgements......Page 17
Abbreviations......Page 19
I......Page 23
II......Page 26
III......Page 28
IV......Page 36
V......Page 37
1 Objectivity in international law: conventional dilemmas......Page 38
1.1 The identity of international law: the requirements of normativity and concreteness......Page 39
1.2 Proving the objectivity of international law......Page 45
1.2.1 A preliminary point: international law as problem-solution......Page 46
1.2.2.1 The basic position: objectivity and the judicial function......Page 50
1.2.2.2 The revised position: the doctrine of “relative indeterminacy”......Page 58
1.2.3 Objectivity in hard cases: the forms of modern doctrine......Page 63
1.3 The structure of international legal argument: the dynamics of contradiction......Page 80
1.3.1 The descending and ascending patterns of justification......Page 81
1.3.2 Indeterminacy as contradiction......Page 82
1.3.3 The structure of international legal argument......Page 89
1.4 Outline of the book......Page 91
2 Doctrinal history: the liberal doctrine of politics and its effect on international law......Page 93
2.1 The emergence and structure of the liberal doctrine of politics......Page 96
2.1.1 The structure of liberalism......Page 98
2.1.2 Liberalism and international law......Page 111
2.2 Early scholarship......Page 117
2.3 Classical scholarship......Page 128
2.3.1 Early classicists: Vattel......Page 130
2.3.2 The professionals......Page 144
2.3.2.1 Two deviationists: Austin and Jellinek......Page 147
2.3.2.2  Professional mainstream......Page 152
2.3.2.3  The coherence of professional writing: historicism and proceduralization......Page 165
2.4 Conclusion......Page 176
3 The structure of modern doctrines......Page 180
3.1 Modern interpretations of doctrine: descending and ascending arguments confirmed......Page 181
3.2 Modern interpretations of practice......Page 193
3.3 The relations of doctrine and practice reconsidered: four versions of modern doctrine......Page 204
3.3.1 Rule-approach: Schwarzenberger......Page 211
3.3.2 Scepticism: Morgenthau......Page 219
3.3.3 Policy-approach: McDougal......Page 223
3.3.4 Idealism: Alvarez......Page 231
3.4 Conclusions: descriptivism......Page 240
4 Sovereignty......Page 246
4.1 The structure of the problem: Schmitt v. Kelsen......Page 248
4.1.1 The “legal” and the “pure fact” approaches......Page 250
4.1.2 The continuing dispute about the extent and relevance of sovereignty......Page 255
4.2 The meaning of sovereignty......Page 262
4.3 The rise and fall of the legal approach: the temptation of analysis, domestic jurisdiction and the dilemma of interpretation......Page 268
4.4 The rise and fall of the pure fact approach: Lotus principle......Page 277
4.5 Constructivism: recourse to equity......Page 280
4.6 Example: statehood and recognition......Page 294
4.7 Example: territorial disputes......Page 304
4.8 Conclusion on sovereignty......Page 322
5 Sources......Page 325
5.1 Sources theory......Page 329
5.1.1 Consent v. justice......Page 331
5.1.2 Tacit consent: a reconciliation?......Page 347
5.2 Treaty interpretation......Page 355
5.3 Unilateral declarations......Page 367
5.4 Acquiescence and estoppel......Page 377
5.5 The structure of sources doctrine: examples......Page 386
5.5.1 Example 1: the Status of South West Africa opinion......Page 387
5.5.2 Example 2: the Reservations opinion......Page 390
5.5.3 Example 3: the Admission opinion......Page 393
5.5.4 Example 4: the Arbitral Award Case......Page 401
5.5.5 Example 5: the Temple Case......Page 404
5.6 Conclusion on sources......Page 407
6 Custom......Page 410
6.1 Custom as general law: two perspectives......Page 411
6.2 The identity of custom: the ascending and descending approaches......Page 419
6.3 Conventional theory: the psychological and the material element and the circularity of the argument about custom......Page 432
6.3.1 The rejection of pure materialism......Page 433
6.3.2 The rejection of pure psychologism......Page 436
6.3.2.1 The psychological element as the material one: collective unconscious......Page 437
6.3.2.2 Tacit agreement......Page 438
6.3.2.3 The psychological element as will and belief......Page 439
6.3.2.4 The phenomenological claim and the consequences of psychologism......Page 446
6.3.3 The re-emergence of materialism......Page 449
6.3.4 The re-emergence of psychologism: the circle closes......Page 453
6.4.1 General v. particular......Page 460
6.4.2 Time and customary law: the antinomy of stability and change......Page 472
6.5 Strategy of closure: custom as bilateral equity......Page 483
6.5.1 Bilateralization......Page 484
6.5.2 Recourse to equity......Page 489
7 Variations of world order: the structure of international legal argument......Page 496
7.1 The sense of the legal project: towards community or independence?......Page 497
7.2 The failure of legal formality: examples......Page 506
7.3 Reversibility and the structure of international legal argument......Page 525
8.1.1 The structure of legal argument revisited......Page 535
8.1.2 A fundamental dilemma: ideas/facts......Page 538
8.1.3 Ideas and facts in international law: the problem of method......Page 541
8.1.3.1 The interpretation of facts: the relations of law and society reconsidered......Page 544
8.1.3.2 The interpretation of ideas: the problem of language......Page 549
8.2 Nihilism, critical theory and international law......Page 555
8.3 Routines and contexts: a tentative reconstruction......Page 570
8.3.1 Routines: from legal technique to normative practice......Page 571
8.3.2 Contexts: from interpretation to imagination......Page 579
1 A retrospective......Page 584
2 The descriptive project: towards a grammar of international law......Page 585
2.1 What a grammar is......Page 588
2.2 The grammar articulated: sovereignty and sources......Page 595
2.2.1 Sovereignty......Page 598
2.2.2 Sources......Page 605
2.2.3 Conclusions on grammar: from rules and processes to decisions......Page 610
3 The normative project: from grammar to critique......Page 611
3.1 The nature of indeterminacy......Page 612
3.2 Grammar and the social world: the role of antagonism......Page 618
3.3 Structural bias......Page 622
4 Conclusion......Page 637
A.1 Philosophy, social and legal theory and method......Page 640
A.2 International law and international relations: general works......Page 650
A.3 International law: particular subjects......Page 658
B Articles......Page 663
C.1 Permanent Court of International Justice (Series A & B)......Page 692
C.2 International Court of Justice......Page 693
C.3 Other cases (in alphabetical order)......Page 695
Index......Page 698