For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Cover......Page 1
Frontmatter......Page 2
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
For the Sake of the Argument......Page 18
1.1. Supposing and Believing......Page 20
1.2. Supposition and Conditionals......Page 27
1.3. Belief-Contravening and Inductive Nonmonotonicity......Page 34
2.1. Contractions......Page 37
2.2. Revisions for Ramsey Tests......Page 46
2.3. Informational-Value-Based Ramsey Tests......Page 53
2.4. Consistent Expandability and Preservation......Page 59
2.5. Consensus-Based Ramsey Tests......Page 61
2.6. Attitudes, Their Representations, and Manifestations......Page 62
2.7. Conditionals and Hypothetical......Page 65
3.1. Truth, Information, and Full Belief......Page 70
3.2. Are Judgments of Serious Possibility Truth Valued?......Page 72
3.3. Truth and Probability......Page 74
3.4. Conditional Judgments of Possibility......Page 76
3.5. Reduction of Acceptance of Conditionals to Full Belief......Page 77
3.6. Trivializing the Ramsey Test......Page 79
3.7. Iteration......Page 88
3.8. Imaging......Page 93
3.9. Conclusion......Page 101
4.1. Logical Principles......Page 103
4.2. Validity in the Logic of Conditionals......Page 107
4.3. Logic of Noniterated Ramsey Test Conditionals......Page 120
4.4. The Demise of Modus Ponens......Page 124
4.5. Undermining and Undercutting......Page 131
4.6. Reasoning from Suppositions......Page 132
5.1. Inference and Transformation of Belief States......Page 139
5.2. Expansive Transformations......Page 146
5.3. Monotonic and Nonmonotonic Expansive Transformations......Page 151
5.4. Nonmonotonic Inferences......Page 155
5.5. Inductively Extended Ramsey Tests......Page 160
5.6. Ampliativity......Page 161
5.7. Ampliativity and Inclusion......Page 165
5.8. Nonmonotonicity and Restricted Weakening......Page 170
5.9. Monotonicity, Undermining, and Undercutting......Page 173
5.10. Ampliativity and Nonmonotonicity......Page 177
6.1. Expansion and Context......Page 179
6.2. Potential Answers......Page 180
6.3. New Error-Free Information......Page 184
6.4. Freedom from Error......Page 185
6.5. Informational Value......Page 186
6.6. Boldness and Inductive Expansion......Page 190
6.7. Inductively Extended Belief Revision Systems......Page 192
6.8. High Probability, Partition Sensitivity, Deductive Closure......Page 195
6.9. Belief and Disbelief......Page 199
6.10. Bookkeeping......Page 207
6.11. What Is Left of Conditional Logic?......Page 210
6.12. Induction as a Generalization of Deduction......Page 212
Appendix......Page 214
7.1. Defaults and Nonmonotonic Implication......Page 219
7.2. What Is a Default?......Page 226
7.3. Simple Normal Defaults and Nonmonotonicity......Page 233
7.4. The Default Assumption......Page 235
7.5. Foundationalism......Page 242
7.6. Foundationalism and Defaults......Page 246
7.7. Defaults and Bookkeeping......Page 248
7.8. Defaults and Partition Sensitivity......Page 249
8.1. Default Conclusions as Degrees of Belief......Page 253
8.2. Probability as Maximizing Support......Page 258
8.3. Probability as Satisficing Support......Page 262
8.4. Satisficing Support as a Shackle Measure......Page 275
8.5. Degrees of Incorrigibility......Page 280
9.1. Defaults and Normal Worlds......Page 288
9.2. Expectations and Inductive Expansion......Page 297
9.3. Probability-Based Induction......Page 304
10 - Agents and Automata......Page 308
Notes......Page 311
Bibliography......Page 345
Name Index......Page 352
Subject Index......Page 354